THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 


UNDEECUEEENTS  IN  AMEEICAN 
POLITICS 


UNDERCURRENTS 

IN 

AMERICAN  POLITICS 


COMPRISING  THE  FORD  LECTURES,  DELIVERED  AT 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY 

AND  THE  BARBOUR-PAGE  LECTURES,  DELIVERED  AT 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  VIRGINIA 

IN  THE  SPRING  OF  1914 


BY 

ARTHUR  TWINING   HADLEY 

PRESIDENT  OF  YALE  UNIVERSITY 


NEW  HAVEN:    YALE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

LONDON:    HUMPHREY  MILPORD 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

MDCCCCXV 


hi 


COPYRIGHT,  1915 

BY 
YAXE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 


First  printed  May,  1915,  1000  copies 
Reprinted  November,  1915, 1000  copies 


PREFACE 

In  the  spring  of  1914  it  was  my  privilege  to 
deliver  the  Barbour-Page  Lectures  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Virginia  and  the  Ford  Lectures  at  Oxford 
University.  As  the  two  courses  dealt  with  kindred 
subjects,  I  am  publishing  them  in  a  single  volume. 

The  whole  might  well  have  been  entitled  ' '  Extra- 
Constitutional  Government  in  the  United  States." 
The  Oxford  Lectures,  on  Property  and  Democracy, 
show  how  a  great  many  organized  activities  of  the 
community  have  been  kept  out  of  government  con- 
trol altogether.  The  Virginia  Lectures,  on  Politi- 
cal Methods,  show  how  those  matters  which  were 
left  in  government  hands  have  often  been  managed 
by  very  different  agencies  from  those  which  the 
framers  of  our  Constitution  intended. 

As  the  first  three  lectures  were  delivered  to  an 
English  audience,  they  contain  some  explanations 
which  are  unnecessary  for  American  readers;  but 
it  seemed  on  the  whole  better  to  print  them  in  their 
original  form. 

110463 


vi  PREFACE 

When  so  wide  a  range  of  topics  is  treated  in  so 
small  a  book,  it  is  impossible  to  give  any  adequate 
set  of  references  to  authorities.  I  have  tried  in  the 
several  lectures  to  make  due  acknowledgment  to 
the  men  who  have  most  nearly  anticipated  my  lines 
of  thought  or  have  furnished  me  with  the  largest 
budgets  of  illustrative  facts ;  but  I  have  only  been 
able  to  name  a  few  among  the  many  to  whom  I  am 
thus  indebted. 

Yale  University,  New  Haven 
April  1915 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
PROPERTY  AND  DEMOCRACY 

LECTURE  I 

THE    GRADUAL    DEVELOPMENT    OP    AMERICAN 

DEMOCRACY  .....         3 

Colonial  organization  was  essentially  aris- 
tocratic       ......         3 

Religious  exclusiveness  in  New  England,  4. 
Large  land  grants  in  middle  colonies,  6.  Effect 
of  slavery  in  south,  8. 

Independence  made  no  immediate  change 
in  this  respect     .....       10 
Universal  suffrage  not  adopted,  11.     High  prop- 
erty qualifications,  11.     Leaders  of  both  parties 
aristocratic,  13. 

The  turning  point  came  in  1820  with  the 
advent  of  a  new  generation  ...       14 
Effect   of   political   watchwords,   15.      Effect   of 
Hamilton's   land   policy,    16.      Western    type   of 
man  and  commonwealth,  20.   Andrew  Jackson,  20. 
Political  democracy  established  before  1840,  22. 

The  political  change  was  attended  with  a 
social  change,  but  not  with  an  industrial 
one  .......  25 

Contrast  between  Europe  and  America,  27. 
Absence  of  labor  legislation,  27.  Socialistic  agi- 
tation not  effective,  30. 


viii  CONTENTS 

LECTURE  II 

THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  POSITION  OF  THE  PROP- 
ERTY OWNER        .....       32 

The  American  political  and  social  system  is 
based  on  industrial  property  rights        .       33 

Traditional  opposition  between  military  and  in- 
dustrial classes  in  Europe,  33.  No  such  tradition 
in  America,  35.  Working  and  fighting  power  in 
same  hands,  36. 

These  rights  have  been  protected  by  a  con- 
stitutional compact       ....       37 

Character  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  of 
1787,  38.  Balance  between  home  rule  party  and 
federal  party,  39.  Immunities  given  to  the 
property  owner,  40.  The  American  doctrine  of 
sovereignty,  42. 

No  serious  attempt  has  been  made  to  amend 
the  Constitutional  provisions  protecting 
property      ......       47 

A  democracy  of  small  landowners,  48.  Need 
of  attracting  capital,  49.  Freedom  of  incorpora- 
tion, 51.  Constitutional  guarantees  of  corporate 
independence,  53.  The  Dartmouth  College  case, 
54.  The  Fourteenth  Amendment  and  the  San 
Mateo  case,  55. 

The  Civil  War  produced  industrial  unrest, 
but  not  industrial  reform  ...  56 
Emancipation  of  slaves,  56.  Currency  agitation, 
57.  High  protective  tariff,  58.  The  competitive 
system  in  America,  59.  Its  effect  on  industrial 
efficiency,  62. 


CONTENTS  ix 

LECTURE  III 

RECENT  TENDENCIES  IN  ECONOMICS  AND  IN 

LEGISLATION          .....       64 

Competition     did     not     protect     shippers 
against  abuse  of  railway  power      .         .       65 
Sudden  discovery  of  this  fact  after  the  civil  war, 
66.     The  Granger  movement,  67.     Kailway  com- 
missions  and   the   Interstate   Commerce   Act   of 
1887,  71. 

Failure  of  competition  was  not  confined  to 
railways       ......       72 

Other  public  utilities  put  under  control  of  com- 
missions, 73.  Attempt  to  enforce  competition  in 
productive  industry,  74.  The  Sherman  Anti- 
Trust  Act  of  1890  not  enforced  for  several  years 
after  its  passage,  75. 

The  present  century  has  witnessed  the  first 
serious  movement  toward  state  socialism 
in  America  .....  76 

Humanitarian  development  in  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury, 76.  Labor  agitation  ineffective  when  it 
antagonized  small  landowners,  78.  Change  in 
Twentieth  Century,  80.  Small  property  owners 
now  ranged  against  the  money  power,  81.  Char- 
acter of  new  laws  passed  since  1903,  86.  In- 
creased activity  in  enforcing  old  laws,  86.  Symp- 
toms of  a  reaction,  88.  Practical  limits  to  state 
control  in  America  today,  90. 


CONTENTS 


POLITICAL  METHODS   OLD  AND  NEW 

LECTURE  IV 
THE  GROWTH  OF  PARTY  MACHINERY     .         .       97 

The  perversion  of  party  government  .  97 
Two  distinct  senses  of  the  word  party,  99. 
Either  a  means  of  organizing  public  opinion  in- 
telligently, or  an  agency  for  controlling  the 
offices  of  the  country  as  a  source  of  power  and 
livelihood,  99.  Second  meaning  tends  to  sup- 
plant the  first,  101. 

Constitution   makes   no   provision   against 
this  danger  .          .          .         .         .102 

Prescribed  mode  of  election  and  duties  of  public 
officers,  105.  Did  not  prescribe  mode  of  nomi- 
nation or  character  of  pledges  that  might  be 
exacted  of  the  candidate,  105. 

Actual  agencies  of  nomination  .          .          .     108 
Caucus  established  1796,  108.     Overthrown  1824, 

109.  Substitution  of  the  convention  system,  110. 
Made  power  less  responsible  instead  of  more  so, 

110.  Martin  Van  Buren,  111. 

Rewards  of  irresponsible  activity      .         .     113 
Municipal  and  state  offices,   114.     Jackson  and 
the  Federal  civil  service,  116.     Franchises,  local 
and  national,  118.     The  tariff  and  the  currency 
as  party  issues,  120. 


CONTENTS  xi 

LECTURE  V 
THE  REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE  CONTROL    .     122 

Ineffective  remedies         ....     123 
Turning  one  party  out  brings  the  machinery  of 
another  party  into  office,   123.     Predatory  pov- 
erty as  dangerous  a  thing  as  predatory  wealth, 
125. 

Partially  effective  remedies  .  .  .  127 
Separation  of  local  from  national  issues,  128. 
Brought  to  public  notice  by  New  York  election  of 
1871,  129.  Local  politics  made  increasingly  inde- 
pendent of  national  party  affiliations,  131.  Elec- 
tion of  United  States  senators  by  the  people, 
132.  Civil  service  reform,  134.  What  it  has 
accomplished  and  what  it  fails  to  accomplish, 
136. 

Present  experiments  and  tendencies  .          .     137 

Distrust  of  the  legislature,  137.  Direct  legis- 
lation through  state  constitutions,  143.  The 
referendum  and  initiative,  145.  The  direct  pri- 
mary, 146.  The  recall,  147. 

LECTURE  VI 
THE  SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  ....     149 

Unorganized  political  opinion  ineffective  .     149 

New  system  transfers  political  chicane  from 
party  organization  to  groups  of  individuals,  151. 
Creation  of  public  sentiment  by  newspapers,  152. 


adi  CONTENTS 

Growth  of  the  independent  press      .         .     153 

The  slavery  agitation,  154.  The  campaign 
against  Tweed  in  New  York,  155.  Pulitzer's 
theory  of  journalism,  158.  Lessened  power  of 
party  leaders,  159.  Government  by  popular 
opinion,  159. 

Unforeseen  consequences  of  the  change      .     162 

The  appeal  to  emotion,  163.  The  appeal  to  im- 
patience, 167.  Theory  of  popular  omniscience, 
170.  Undervaluation  of  the  expert,  172.  True 
function  of  voters  in  a  democracy,  174. 

INDEX        ......  181 


PEOPEETY  AND  DEMOCEACY 


THE  GRADUAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
AMERICAN  DEMOCRACY 

At  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  federal  con- 
stitution in  1788  neither  the  United  States  as  a 
whole,  nor  any  of  the  several  commonwealths  of 
which  it  was  composed,  was  a  democracy  in  the 
modern  sense  of  the  word. 

Ever  since  their  original  settlement  the  political 
and  social  system  of  the  English  colonies  in 
North  America  had  been  essentially  aristocratic. 
Nowhere  among  them  do  we  find  universal  suffrage. 
The  right  to  vote  was  always  confined  to  taxpayers, 
and  almost  always  to  freeholders.  In  one  colony 
the  minimum  freehold  qualification  for  the  suffrage 
was  a  thousand  acres.  Nor  were  the  voters  as  a 
body  generally  allowed  the  privilege  of  choosing 
the  chief  magistrates.  The  higher  administrative 
officers  were  either  appointed  by  the  crown  or 
elected  by  councils  composed  of  a  few  of  the  richest 
and  most  influential  citizens.  The  man  of  small 
means  and  unconsidered  ancestry  had  very  little 
direct  participation  in  the  affairs  of  state. 


4          UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

Of  course  the  conditions  varied  in  different  parts 
of  the  country.  The  nearest  approach  to  democracy 
was  found  northeast  of  the  Hudson  river,  in  the 
colonies  of  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Rhode 
Island  and  Connecticut.  The  settlers  in  this  dis- 
trict were  for  the  most  part  Puritans.  The  region 
was  so  inhospitable  that  it  did  not  attract  men  of 
wealth.  In  three  of  the  four  colonies  a  religious 
rather  than  d  commercial  motive  had  been  domi- 
nant in  the  foundation.  There  was  no  opportunity 
for  the  growth  of  a  leisure  class,  nor  would  public 
sentiment  have  approved  of  it  if  there  had  been. 
But  though  the  New  England  freeholders  were 
poor,  they  were  exclusive.  Though  they  tilled  their 
own  lands,  it  did  not  prevent  them  from  being 
politically  arrogant,  any  more  than  the  same  cause 
had  prevented  a  Cincinnatus  or  a  Fabius  from 
being  politically  arrogant  in  the  early  days  of  the 
Roman  republic.  The  freeman  of  a  Massachusetts 
commonwealth  looked  upon  new  settlers  who 
aspired  to  become  freemen  with  much  the  same 
suspicious  eye  with  which  the  Roman  patrician 
regarded  his  plebeian  neighbors. 

These  suspicions  were  most  strongly  manifested 
when  the  new  settlers  held  a  different  creed  from 
the  older  ones.  The  original  emigrants  to  Massa- 
chusetts were  Congregationalists.  They  looked 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY        5 

upon  members  of  any  other  sect  as  men  of  doubtful 
character,  not  to  be  trusted  with  the  administration 
of  a  growing  commonwealth.  "Woe  to  the  Episco- 
palian who  held  that  his  Lares  and  Penates  were 
as  good  politically  as  those  of  his  Congregational 
brother!  During  the  earlier  years  of  the  history 
of  Massachusetts  the  charter  required  that  the 
freemen  should  be  godly ;  and  the  Puritan  founders 
of  the  colony  doubted  very  gravely  whether  the 
Thirty-nine  Articles  were  a  sufficiently  acceptable 
road  to  godliness  to  make  it  wise  to  trust  the 
Episcopalian  with  the  franchise.  Even  when  the 
franchise  itself  had  been  more  liberally  bestowed 
and  political  power  had  thus  become  diffused 
through  the  whole  body  of  freeholders,  the  spirit 
of  social  exclusiveness  remained  almost  unchanged. 
For  a  great  deal  of  the  work  of  New  England 
society  centered  around  the  church  rather  than  the 
state;  and  the  church  was  controlled  by  the 
descendants  of  the  original  settlers.* 

*  The  parallel  between  the  aristocracy  of  New  England 
and  the  aristocracy  of  the  early  Roman  republic  has  much 
interest  and  significance. 

In  either  case  the  aristocrats  were  at  once  farmers  and 
fighters,  tilling  the  soil  and  resisting  the  enemy  by  turns. 
In  either  case  there  was  a  body  of  outside  or  plebeian 
neighbors,  some  of  whom  were  just  as  wealthy  as  any  of 
the  patrician  aristocrats,  who  were  for  a  time  excluded 


6          UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

What  was  conspicuously  true  of  Massachusetts 
was  true  to  a  somewhat  less  degree  in  the  other 
New  England  colonies.  They  were  societies  of  poor 
but  proud  aristocrats.  Connecticut  was  in  some 
respects  the  most  independent  and  democratic  of 
all  the  New  England  commonwealths.  Yet  even  in 
Connecticut  class  distinctions  were  so  strong  that 
down  to  the  very  eve  of  the  Revolution  the  names 
of  the  students  in  the  catalogue  of  Yale  College 
were  arranged,  not  in  alphabetical  rank,  but  in  the 
order  of  the  respectability  of  their  parentage. 

In  the  group  of  colonies  immediately  southwest 

from  the  offices  and  privileges  of  the  state.  The  barrier 
which  separated  the  different  classes  from  one  another, 
whether  in  Eome  or  in  Massachusetts,  was  not  primarily 
a  political  but  a  religious  one.  The  plebeian  had  not  the 
same  gods  as  the  patrician.  The  Episcopalian  had  not  the 
same  gods  as  the  Congregationalist.  Long  after  the  plebeian 
had  obtained  equal  rights  to  military  offices  like  the  consul- 
ship or  the  dictatorship,  he  was  excluded  from  semi-religious 
positions  like  that  of  the  praetor.  The  same  thing  holds 
good  in  Massachusetts.  Both  in  Home  and  in  New  England 
the  ruling  class,  when  compelled  to  grant  political  equality, 
tried  to  keep  a  modicum  of  their  old  power  by  reserving  a 
good  deal  of  public  authority  to  the  representatives  of  the 
church  of  the  founders.  This  authority  the  outsider  could 
not  claim  to  share  merely  because  he  shared  the  franchise 
or  the  right  of  holding  military  command,  unless  he  had 
gone  through  the  process  which  the  Massachusetts  Christian 
described  in  terms  borrowed  from  the  phraseology  of  pagan 
Eome — the  process  of  " sanctification  and  adoption." 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY        7 

of  the  Hudson  river  the  social  system  was  of  a 
different  kind.  There  was  much  less  religious 
exclusiveness,  there  was  much  more  commercial 
inequality.  Neither  the  Dutch  in  New  York,  the 
Quakers  in  Pennsylvania,  nor  the  Catholics  who 
followed  Lord  Baltimore  to  Maryland,  showed  the 
same  degree  of  bigotry  and  intolerance  that  ani- 
mated the  settlers  of  New  England.  These  colonies 
were  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  trading  ventures, 
in  which  the  heads  of  the  enterprise  reserved  for 
themselves  the  dominant  influence  in  the  direction 
and  control  of  affairs.  Instead  of  a  religious 
aristocracy  of  small  farmers,  we  therefore  find  a 
commercial  aristocracy  of  traders  and  planters. 
The  agricultural  land  of  New  York  was  largely 
held  by  a  few  patroons  or  semi-feudal  overlords; 
a  system  originally  established  by  the  Dutch  but 
not  essentially  altered  or  disturbed  when  the 
colony  passed  under  British  sovereignty.  The 
charters  of  the  other  colonies  in  this  region — New 
Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware  and  Maryland — 
either  explicitly  provided  for  a  similar  form  of 
organization  or  tacitly  encouraged  it.  In  all  these 
colonies,  therefore,  the  influence  of  a  comparatively 
small  number  of  wealthy  citizens  was  dominant. 

This  dominance  of  wealth  was  even  more  marked 
south  of  the  Potomac,  in  the  colonies  or  plantations 


8          UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

of  Virginia,  the  Carolinas,  and  Georgia.  The 
agricultural  conditions  of  this  region  made  a 
system,  of  large  holdings  or  plantations  profitable 
both  to  the  colonists  themselves  and  to  the  fiscal 
agents  of  the  mother  country.  Inequalities  of 
wealth  which  in  the  middle  colonies  were  an 
accident  became  in  the  southern  colonies  an  indus- 
trial advantage  if  not  an  economic  necessity. 
Moreover  the  southern  plantations  were  particu- 
larly suitable  to  the  employment  of  slave  labor — 
first  that  of  convicts  or  redemptioners,  and  after- 
ward of  negroes  imported  for  the  purpose.  As  is 
generally  the  case  where  slavery  prevails,  the  body 
of  freemen  gradually  divided  itself  into  two 
classes:  those  who  were  rich  enough  to  own  slaves 
and  those  who  were  not.  The  former  class,  as  is 
usual  in  such  communities,  succeeded  in  engrossing 
the  political  authority;  partly  by  law,  partly  by 
political  maneuvering,  and  partly  by  the  force  of 
social  usage. 

According  to  a  report  of  the  Surveyor  General 
of  the  Colonial  Customs  at  the  beginning  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  quoted  by  Hildreth,*  there  were 

*  The  account  of  colonial  conditions  given  by  Hildreth  is 
in  many  respects  better  than  that  which  we  have  received 
from  later  historians.  Hildreth 's  merits  have  been  some- 
what underrated,  owing  to  his  intense  partisanship  in  deal- 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY        9 

in  Virginia  on  each  of  the  four  great  rivers  men 
in  number  from  ten  to  thirty,  who  by  trade  and 
industry  had  "gotten  very  competent  estates." 
These  gentlemen  took  care  to  supply  the  poorer 
sort  with  goods  and  necessaries,  and  were  sure  to 
keep  them  always  in  their  debt  and  consequently 
dependent  on  them.  Out  of  this  number  were 
chosen  the  council,  assembly,  justices,  and  other 
officers  of  government.  The  justices,  besides  their 
judicial  functions,  managed  the  business  and 
finances  of  their  respective  counties.  Parish  affairs 
were  in  the  hands  of  self-perpetuating  vestries, 
which  kept  even  the  ministers  in  check  by  avoiding 
induction  and  hiring  them  only  from  year  to  year. 
The  twelve  counselors  possessed  extensive  author- 
ity; their  assent  was  necessary  to  all  the  governor's 
official  acts;  they  constituted  one  branch  of  the 

ing  with  American  political  history  at  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  and  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century;  but 
his  treatment  of  early  colonial  affairs  is  comparatively 
unaffected  by  this  partisanship,  and  shows  the  good  effect 
of  contact,  personal  and  social,  with  colonial  traditions. 
The  men  with  whom  Hildreth  had  talked  in  his  boyhood 
came  of  these  colonial  families  whose  methods  and  doings 
he  described.  They  had  retained  to  a  surprisingly  large 
extent  the  prejudices  and  feelings  of  their  grandfathers. 
In  spite  of  his  late  date  Hildreth  thus  speaks  in  the 
character  of  an  eyewitness.  There  is,  I  believe,  no  other 
American  historian  of  whom  this  fact  is  true  in  approxi- 
mately equal  extent. 


10        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

Assembly;  they  exercised  the  principal  judicial 
authority  as  judges  of  the  General  Court;  they 
were  at  the  head  of  the  militia  as  lieutenants  of 
the  counties;  they  acted  as  collectors  of  the  export 
duty  on  tobacco  and  the  other  provincial  imposts, 
and  generally  also  of  the  Parliamentary  duties, 
while  they  farmed  the  king's  quit-rents  at  a  very 
favorable  bargain.  A  majority  of  these  counselors, 
united  together  by  a  sort  of  family  compact, 
aspired  to  engross  the  entire  management  of  the 
province. 

All  this  is  doubtless  somewhat  overstated.  Con- 
ditions were  probably  not  as  bad  as  this  in  1705, 
when  the  report  was  written;  they  certainly  were 
not  as  bad  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution.  But  we 
are  quite  safe  in  saying  that  Thomas  Jefferson's 
doctrines  of  political  equality  were  not  drawn  from 
an  observation  of  the  practices  that  prevailed  in 
his  immediate  neighborhood. 

The  Revolution  of  1776  severed  the  relation  of 
the  colonies  to  the  mother  country  but  did  not 
greatly  alter  the  constitutions  under  which  they 
were  organized.  These  constitutions  continued  to 
follow  the  lines  set  down  in  the  colonial  charters  in 
all  respects  except  those  which  concerned  the  Eng- 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   11 

lish  overlord.  Before  the  Revolution  most  of  the 
colonies  had  been  compelled  to  accept  the  governors 
appointed  by  the  crown;  after  the  Revolution  the 
leading  citizens  elected  their  own  governors  and 
fixed  the  bounds  of  their  authority;  but  with 
that  exception  the  machinery  was  arranged  and 
conducted  in  pretty  much  the  same  manner  as 
before.  No  immediate  attempt  was  made  to  extend 
the  right  of  suffrage  or  to  increase  the  proportion 
of  elective  offices.  The  property  qualifications 
demanded  of  officeholders  remained  very  high. 
In  South  Carolina,  to  quote  an  extreme  instance, 
no  man  could  serve  as  governor  unless  he  owned 
property  to  the  value  of  ten  thousand  pounds; 
which  even  in  the  depreciated  currency  was  an 
enormous  sum  for  that  time.  The  social  order  was 
essentially  an  aristocratic  one — not  quite  so  much 
so  as  it  was  in  England  at  that  time,  but  very  much 
more  so  than  it  is  in  England  today.  While  the 
right  to  stand  for  office  was  not  denied  to  qualified 
voters  of  proper  age  and  substance,  the  actual 
holding  of  office  was  chiefly  enjoyed  by  such  persons 
as  happened  to  belong  to  families  of  standing  and 
consideration. 

Nor  did  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution 
involve  any  necessary  or  immediate  change  in  these 
particulars.  This  constitution  indeed  provided 


12        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

that  each  of  the  several  federated  states  should 
have  a  republican  form  of  government.  But  to 
the  makers  of  the  Federal  Constitution  the  word 
"republican"  did  not  mean  democratic.  The 
members  of  the  convention  that  drafted  it  were 
representatives  of  the  conservative  class  in  the 
community.  Their  "republic"  was  the  equivalent 
of  Aristotle's  "politeia, "  or  self-governing  com- 
monwealth. Most  of  them  would  have  been  horror- 
stricken  at  the  idea  of  universal  suffrage.  There 
was  indeed  in  all  the  states  a  strong  minority  of 
real  democrats,  many  of  whom  opposed  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution.  But  the  necessity  of 
having  an  efficient  central  government  was  so 
obvious  that  the  views  of  the  conservative  party 
prevailed  decisively;  and  the  outspoken  champions 
of  democracy  were  forced  to  acquiesce,  as  best  they 
might,  in  the  adoption  of  a  polity  which  some  of 
them  regarded  as  a  betrayal  of  the  cause  of  popular 
liberty. 

The  conservatives  or  Federalists  remained  in 
control  for  twelve  years  after  they  had  secured 
the  passage  of  the  Constitution.  Then  it  was  the 
turn  of  the  Democrats,  who  came  into  power  with 
the  election  of  Thomas  Jefferson  in  1800.  It  is, 
however,  significant  of  the  state  of  popular  feeling 
at  the  time  that  the  advent  of  the  popular  party 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   13 

to  office  was  signalized  by  no  important  political 
or  social  changes.*  Jefferson's  administration 
illustrated  the  old  adage,  "A  radical  plus  power 
equals  a  conservative."  The  leaders  of  the  Demo- 
crats, like  the  leaders  of  the  Federalists,  were  for 
the  most  part  representatives  of  old  families. 
Madison  and  Monroe  bore  as  respectable  names  as 
Washington  or  Adams.  Aaron  Burr,  arch-democrat 
and  corrupter  of  society,  who  taught  Tammany 
Hall  the  methods  which  have  made  New  York 
politics  a  byword,  was  of  as  good  social  standing 
as  Alexander  Hamilton,  friend  of  "Washington  and 
founder  of  the  republic's  fiscal  system. 

To  make  America  a  democracy,  in  fact  as  well 
as  in  name,  it  was  not  enough  for  one  party  to  pass 
out  of  power.  It  was  necessary  for  one  whole 
generation  to  pass  off  the  stage  and  give  place  to 

*  The  apparent  change  of  front  by  the  Democratic  leaders 
in  the  years  immediately  following  the  adoption  of  the 
United  States  Constitution  was  due  to  two  causes. 

In  the  first  place,  the  formation  of  a  centralized  govern- 
ment under  the  new  constitution  was  actually  followed  by 
a  high  degree  of  prosperity.  The  years  preceding  1788  had 
been  a  time  of  depression.  The  decade  that  immediately 
followed  was  one  of  commercial  expansion.  It  was  natural, 
and  in  fact  inevitable,  that  this  change  from  depression 
to  prosperity  should  be  attributed  to  the  Constitution  and 
that  that  instrument  should  become  popular  with  everybody 
who  benefited  by  the  commercial  improvement. 

The  views  of  the  extreme  Democrats  were  further  dis- 


14        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

a  new  generation  with  other  antecedents  and  other 
ideals.  Until  about  the  year  1820  the  citizens  of 
the  United  States  were  British  subjects  who  had 
accidentally  transferred  their  allegiance  without 
correspondingly  altering  their  political  instincts. 
The  United  States  remained  in  many  essential 
features  a  group  of  English  colonies,  separated 
from  the  mother  country  in  1776,  somewhat  against 
their  will,  by  the  want  of  tact  of  George  the  Third 
and  his  ministers,  and  united  with  one  another  in 
1788,  also  somewhat  against  their  will,  by  the 
extraordinary  tact  of  the  leaders  of  the  Consti- 
tutional Convention.  Colonial,  however,  they 
remained  in  feeling,  and  separate  also  to  a  large 
degree  in  feeling,  for  twenty  or  thirty  years 
afterward. 

But  with  the  advent  of  a  new  generation  things 
were  altered.     Farrand,  who  among  all  our  histo- 

credited  by  the  history  of  the  French  Eevolution  in  1792 
and  1793.  The  excesses  of  the  Eeign  of  Terror  gave 
conservatives  in  America  as  well  as  in  England  strong 
arguments  against  putting  unrestricted  power  in  the  hands 
of  the  masses,  and  made  Democrats  themselves  doubt 
whether  their  own  theories  of  popular  government  were  as 
good  practical  guides  as  they  had  previously  supposed. 
Jefferson  and  his  immediate  followers  never  abandoned 
their  belief  in  the  people,  but  they  modified  to  some  extent 
their  desire  to  trust  the  people  with  the  direct  exercise  of 
administrative  authority. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   15 

rians  is  probably  best  qualified  to  judge  of  this 
point,  dates  the  real  beginning  of  distinctively 
American  history,  not  from  the  declaration  of 
independence  in  1776  nor  from  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution  in  1788,  but  from  the  close  of 
the  War  of  1812.  The  years  following  this  war 
witnessed  the  birth  of  a  true  national  spirit,  which 
was  at  once  American  and  democratic. 

Several  causes  combined  to  produce  this  change. 
First  among  them  was  the  effect  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence  itself  upon  boys  who  were  taught 
to  read  it.  ""We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self- 
evident,"  said  the  writers  of  the  Declaration, 
"that  all  men  are  created  equal,  that  they  are 
endowed,  by  their  Creator,  with  certain  unalien- 
able  rights,  that  among  these  are  life,  liberty,  and 
the  pursuit  of  happiness."  To  the  men  of  1776 
this  sentence  was  simply  a  convenient  phrase  for 
justifying  acts  of  armed  resistance  to  England 
which  had  been  committed  by  the  several  colonies 
in  the  past  and  were  likely  to  be  continued  on  a 
larger  scale  and  with  more  organized  purpose  in 
the  immediate  future.  The  writers  believed  them 
in  the  same  way  that  they  believed  other  political 
doctrines  of  Locke  or  Rousseau ;  that  is,  they  gave 
them  a  sufficient  measure  of  intellectual  assent  to 
be  able  to  use  them  as  a  basis  of  argument  without 


16        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

violating  their  consciences.  But  they  were  not 
ready  to  accept  them  as  part  of  the  sentiment  which 
underlay  their  estimate  of  their  fellow  men  and 
the  conduct  of  their  own  daily  life.  "With  the  next 
generation  the  case  was  different.  "What  had  been 
a  phrase  to  the  fathers  was  an  article  of  faith  to 
the  sons.  They  had  learned  in  their  earliest  and 
most  impressionable  years  that  this  was  the  prin- 
ciple upon  which  the  American  nation  was  founded. 
It  was  this,  they  were  taught,  which  more  than 
anything  else  differentiated  American  society  from 
European  society.  "What  had  been  at  first  a  mere 
proposition  regarding  equality  became  under  such 
influences  a  sentiment  in  favor  of  equality.  The 
feeling  of  patriotism  was  enlisted  to  drive  out  the 
old  feeling  of  caste  prejudice.  The  sentiments  of 
human  equality  and  of  national  pride  were  in  fact 
so  closely  bound  up  with  one  another  that  whatever 
strengthened  the  second  strengthened  the  first. 
The  war  against  England  from  1812  to  1815, 
unfortunate  as  it  was  in  many  of  its  incidents,  laid 
the  foundation  for  a  new  intensity  of  patriotic 
feeling  and  new  enthusiasm  for  human  equality. 

Of  equal  importance  in  promoting  the  spirit  of 
democracy  was  the  system  of  land  laws  under 
which  the  "West  was  settled. 

The  greater  part  of  the  actual  area  of  the  United 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   17 

States  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  was 
the  property  of  the  national  government,  unen- 
cumbered by  claims  of  individuals  or  corporations. 
The  thirteen  states  that  formed  the  Union  occupied 
only  a  small  fringe  along  the  Atlantic  coast.  Some 
of  them  held  grants  of  land  in  the  interior  by 
virtue  of  their  colonial  charters ;  but  the  total  area 
effectively  covered  by  these  grants  was  not  large 
in  amount.  Speaking  broadly,  the  immense  domain 
in  the  valleys  of  the  Ohio  and  the  Mississippi  was 
at  the  disposal  of  the  federal  authorities.  The 
power  thus  held  by  the  United  States  Government 
was  wisely  used.  Alexander  Hamilton,  Washing- 
ton's secretary  of  the  treasury,  was  a  man  who 
understood  the  larger  principles  of  statesmanship 
better  than  any  other  American  of  his  age.  He 
saw  that  in  the  disposal  of  this  land  fiscal  consid- 
erations should  be  subordinated  to  political  ones; 
that  the  most  valuable  thing  which  a  democracy 
could  do  with  a  public  domain  was  to  settle  it  with 
as  large  a  number  as  possible  of  actual  freeholders. 
In  pursuance  of  this  policy,  arrangements  were 
made  for  the  survey  of  the  public  lands  at  as  early 
a  date  as  possible.  Lines  were  run  at  intervals  of 
half  a  mile,  both  from  north  to  south  and  from 
east  to  west,  dividing  the  country  into  square 
sections  of  the  area  of  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  or  one 


18        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

hundred  and  sixty  acres,  each.  These  are  the 
quarter  sections  so  constantly  alluded  to  in  the 
land  laws  of  the  United  States.  On  the  lands  thus 
surveyed  the  price  was  first  fixed  at  $2.00  an  acre, 
which  was  afterwards  generally  reduced  to  $1.25. 

But  this  cheap  rate  was  not  the  only  inducement 
offered  to  settlers.  By  a  series  of  "preemption 
acts"  from  1801  to  1841  a  man  who  had  actually 
settled  upon  public  land  without  paying  for  it  was 
given  prior  claim  to  its  ultimate  ownership.  It 
was,  as  it  were,  reserved  for  a  time  when  he  might 
be  ready  to  purchase.  Nobody  could  buy  it  over 
his  head.  The  result  of  these  Preemption  Acts  was 
that  a  man  who  did  not  have  the  money  to  buy  the 
land  could  enter  and  take  possession  of  it,  with  the 
assurance  that  if  he  made  proper  improvements  he 
would  be  given  a  chance  not  only  to  get  the  benefit 
of  his  improvements,  but  ultimately  to  buy  the 
land  itself  out  of  the  proceeds  of  his  successful 
farming. 

Hamilton  built  even  better  than  he  knew.  The 
political  consideration  that  he  felt  most  strongly 
was  the  danger  of  foreign  invasion.  The  United 
States  held  the  central  and  western  parts  of  the 
continent  by  rather  a  precarious  tenure.  The 
colonies  that  had  revolted  from  England  were 
stretched  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  A  range 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   19 

of  mountains,  not  very  high  but  rugged  and  almost 
unbroken,  separated  them  from  the  interior  valleys. 
The  first  settlement  in  these  interior  valleys  had 
been  made,  not  across  the  mountains  but  by  the 
Mississippi  on  the  south  or  the  St.  Lawrence  on 
the  north.  Spain  held  the  lower  Mississippi; 
England  held  the  lower  St.  Lawrence.  Most  of 
the  permanent  white  residents  of  the  Mississippi 
valley  were  French.  The  names  of  the  older  towns 
show  the  kind  of  population  with  which  we  had 
to  deal:  Vincennes,  Terre  Haute,  St.  Louis.  The 
ideals  and  institutions  of  the  newly  founded 
United  States  had  no  particular  attraction  for  the 
inhabitants  of  towns  with  names  like  these.  A  war 
with  either  England  or  Spain — or,  for  that  matter, 
a  war  with  France — might  easily  have  deprived 
the  states  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard  of  the  slender 
hold  they  had  on  the  interior.  As  a  result 
of  Hamilton's  land  policy  the  interior  valleys  of 
the  West  were  rapidly  settled  by  a  population 
distinctively  American  in  its  ideals  and  senti- 
ments. This  settlement,  taken  in  conjunction  with 
Jefferson's  purchase  of  Louisiana  and  the  upper 
Mississippi  valley  from  the  French  and  Spanish 
claimants,  secured  the  country  against  the  danger 
of  war  on  the  western  frontier. 

This  was  the  immediate  and  obvious  effect  of 


20        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

Hamilton's  policy.  But  it  had  also  an  effect  on 
our  internal  constitution,  less  obvious  but  much 
more  fundamentally  important.  It  created  a  type 
of  commonwealth  and  type  of  man  which  was 
distinctively  American.  Our  lands  were  occupied 
by  a  body  of  men  of  great  ability  and  enterprise 
but  small  capital;  men  who  were  ready  to  work 
and  respected  others  in  proportion  to  their  readi- 
ness to  work.  In  the  region  beyond  the  Alleghany 
mountains  the  sort  of  equality  contemplated  by 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  was  in  large 
measure  realized.  In  the  valleys  on  either  side  of 
the  Ohio  river  America  witnessed  for  the  first  time 
the  growth  of  commonwealths  that  had  never  been 
colonies  but  grew  up  to  statehood  independently; 
communities  that  had  never  known  crown  governors 
and  crown  grants,  but  had  developed  under  the 
American  flag  and  the  preemption  law.  Owing 
to  the  conditions  under  which  they  were  founded, 
these  western  communities  were  intensely  patriotic 
and  intensely  convinced  of  the  essential  equality 
of  all  mankind. 

Under  the  operation  of  these  causes  there  arose 
a  new  democracy,  different  from  anything  which 
was  readily  conceivable  by  an  earlier  generation. 
Of  this  new  American  democracy  Andrew  Jackson, 
elected  to  the  presidency  in  1828,  was  the  chosen 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   21 

representative.  Of  all  the  presidents  of  the  United 
States  he  was  the  one  who  sprang  most  directly 
from  the  people;  and  the  years  of  his  triumph 
were  marked  by  the  development  of  the  distinctive 
features  which  we  have  been  accustomed  to  regard 
as  characteristic  of  American  political  life — the 
adoption  of  universal  suffrage,  the  multiplication 
of  elective  offices,  and  the  complex  system  of  party 
organization  which  has  lasted  with  but  slight 
change  until  the  present  time.* 

*  It  is  somewhat  singular  that  the  democratic  America 
of  a  later  generation  should  have  so  occupied  the  minds  of 
historians  as  to  crowd  out  the  memory  of  the  aristocratic 
America  of  earlier  times.  There  are  several  reasons  which 
may  serve  to  account  for  this. 

In  the  first  place,  the  foreign  observers  of  America  whose 
accounts  were  most  widely  read  saw  the  country  after  the 
change  instead  of  before  it.  The  earliest  of  these  accounts 
was  that  by  Chevalier,  who  investigated  the  American  trans- 
portation system  and  published  his  results  in  a  masterly 
work,  "Les  Voies  de  Communication  en  Amerique. "  The 
political  change  was  not  complete  at  the  date  of  Chevalier's 
visit,  but  the  parts  of  the  country  which  he  saw  were  those 
where  development  was  most  active  and  the  new  spirit  of 
democracy  most  manifest. 

Another  Frenchman  whose  books  were  more  widely  read 
and  whose  views  had  much  larger  influence  than  Chevalier's 
was  Alexis  de  Tocqueville.  De  Tocqueville  studied  America 
carefully  and  was  a  man  of  eminent  ability  both  as  an 
observer  and  as  a  critic;  but  he  was  a  thorough  Frenchman, 
and  he  had  a  Frenchman's  fondness  for  brilliant  generali- 
zation. Taking  the  America  of  the  fourth  decade  of  the 


22        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

These  developments  were  not  consciously  intro- 
duced as  party  measures  by  the  national  govern- 
ment. Under  the  American  Constitution  they 
could  not  be.  The  several  states  have  to  decide 
for  themselves  what  qualifications  shall  be  required 
of  their  voters  and  how  their  officers  shall  be 
elected  or  appointed.  It  is  all  the  more  significant, 
therefore,  that  such  a  fundamental  change  in  public 
opinion  should  have  taken  place  in  so  many 
commonwealths  at  the  same  time,  and  that  a  nation, 
till  then  predominantly  aristocratic  in  its  social 
constitution,  should  have  become  so  thoroughly 
democratic  in  so  short  a  period. 

In  the  two  decades  from  1820  to  1840  new  states 
were  organized  which  gave  full  rights  of  sover- 

nineteenth  century  as  he  saw  it,  he  reasoned  that  the  prin- 
ciples of  political  action  which  then  prevailed  were  an 
inherent  result  of  the  American  character,  foreordained  and 
predestined  from  the  beginning.  His  observations  concern- 
ing the  times  of  which  he  wrote  were  so  just  that  people 
attached  undue  weight  to  his  statements  of  antecedent  con- 
ditions, which  were  not  based  upon  his  own  observation  and 
were  in  some  instances  not  correct.  If  De  Tocqueville 'a 
judgments  had  been  unflattering  to  the  American  public, 
some  of  his  historical  generalizations  would  have  been  more 
readily  challenged.  But  De  Tocqueville,  though  not  a  ful- 
some critic,  was  a  friendly  one.  His  explanations  furnished 
American  readers  with  plausible  excuses  for  many  of  the 
faults  of  their  social  system.  When  Mrs.  Trollope  criticised 
American  manners  malignantly,  or  when  Charles  Dickens  did 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   23 

eignty  to  all  men  who  were  personally  free;  and 
older  states  like  New  York  and  Massachusetts 
abolished  property  qualifications  for  the  franchise 
that  had  previously  existed.  The  number  of  officers 
directly  chosen  by  the  people  was  multiplied. 
The  pecuniary  qualification  required  for  the  various 
offices  was  lessened  or  abolished.  The  whole  sys- 
tem of  nomination  and  election  was  so  modified 
as  to  give  more  immediate  influence  to  the  will  of 
the  people  and  less  to  that  of  the  leading  families. 
Even  for  those  offices  whose  incumbents  were 
appointed  by  the  executive  instead  of  being  elected, 
the  old  principle  of  fixity  of  tenure  during  good 
behavior  was  quite  generally  abolished,  and  the 
office  itself  made  a  reward  of  party  service. 

the  same  thing  more  goodnaturedly  and  humorously,  it  was 
a  pleasure  to  fall  back  on  De  Tocqueville  and  to  say  that 
these  evils  were  but  the  incidental  defects  of  an  inherent 
spirit  of  democracy  which  had  always  prevailed  in  the 
United  States  and  which  made  people  disregard  the  niceties 
of  custom  and  convention  in  order  to  appraise  men  at  their 
true  value. 

This  is  not  intended  as  a  criticism  of  De  Tocqueville,  who 
next  to  Bryce  and  possibly  Ostrogorski,  is  the  ablest  foreign 
writer  on  American  affairs;  but  to  show  why  some  of  the 
less  essential  parts  of  his  work  gained  undue  influence  over 
the  public  mind  and  contributed  to  a  misunderstanding  of 
earlier  American  history  from  which  hardly  any  of  our 
modern  writers  except  Farrand  and  McMaster  have  been 
able  to  keep  themselves  wholly  free. 


24        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

These  changes  were  more  rapid  and  complete  in 
the  northern  and  central  states  than  in  the 
southern  ones;  but  every  section  felt  the  effect  of 
this  movement  in  greater  or  less  degree.  With 
surprising  speed  and  thoroughness  the  country  as 
a  whole  passed  from  a  political  system  which  was 
in  its  essentials  aristocratic  and  English  to  one 
which  was  democratic  and  American. 

Even  more  remarkable  than  the  rapidity  of  the 
change  itself  was  the  absence  of  any  reaction  of 
feeling  or  retrogression  of  practice  such  as  usually 
follows  in  the  wake  of  rapid  reform  movements 
of  this  sort.  When  the  Democrats  went  out  of 
office  and  their  opponents,  now  called  Whigs 
instead  of  Federalists,  came  into  power,  there  was 
no  attempt  to  bring  government  back  to  its  old 
basis.  Parties  divided  on  other  lines.  The 
Democrats  stood  for  free  trade,  the  Whigs  for 
protection.  The  Democrats  stood  for  home  rule, 
the  Whigs  for  national  authority.  A  few  years 
later,  as  a  result  of  the  struggle  between  home  rule 
and  nationalism,  the  Democrats  stood  for  slavery 
and  the  Republicans  (who  had  succeeded  the  old 
Whig  party)  for  emancipation.  But  in  none  of 
these  American  political  conflicts  of  the  middle  of 
the  nineteenth  century  could  one  party  claim  the 
title  of  conservative  and  the  other  that  of  liberal, 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   25 

as  these  titles  were  understood  and  used  in  the 
politics  of  contemporary  European  states.  The 
political  triumph  of  democracy  was  complete. 

This  transformation  of  the  political  order  was 
attended  by  a  similar  change  in  the  social  order; 
though  the  social  change  was  for  various  reasons 
less  rapid  and  complete  than  the  political  one. 

The  society  of  the  "West  had  been  from  the  first 
quite  as  democratic  as  its  politics.  There  was  but 
one  important  class  distinction — that  between 
workers  and  idlers.  If  a  settler  was  willing  to 
work  he  could  get  large  returns  with  very  little 
capital ;  if  he  was  not  willing  to  work  there  was  no 
place  for  him.  Under  such  circumstances  a  man 
could  achieve  social  position  in  three  ways  only: 
by  hospitality,  by  professional  efficiency,  or  by 
securing  public  office.  "Wealth  without  hospitality, 
education  without  efficiency,  honorable  descent 
without  public  service,  were  not  regarded  as  social 
qualifications.  They  were  despised  rather  than 
admired. 

These  social  standards — or,  if  you  please,  this 
absence  of  social  standards — of  the  West  had  a 
marked  effect  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  Almost  every 
Eastern  family  numbered  among  its  members  one 
or  two  who  had  "gone  "West";  who  had  proved 
their  fitness  as  men  under  the  new  conditions,  and 


26        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

were  inclined  to  despise  the  social  order  of  older 
communities  as  artificial.  These  men  were  apt  to 
be  of  a  type  strong  enough  to  modify  the  views, 
not  only  of  their  own  family  circles,  but  of  the 
whole  community  from  which  they  came. 

In  the  northern  Atlantic  states  this  modification 
was  very  rapid.  In  the  southern  states  it  was 
slower.  The  North  had  been  an  aristocracy  of 
small  farmers  who  cultivated  their  own  ground. 
The  South  had  been  an  aristocracy  of  large 
planters  who  lived  on  the  produce  of  the  slaves. 
When  members  of  slave-holding  families  moved 
westward  they  often  carried  their  slaves  with  them, 
and  by  this  means  succeeded  to  some  extent  in 
perpetuating  in  the  new  country  the  class  dis- 
tinction which  had  subsisted  in  the  old.  While  the 
general  structure  of  Northern  social  life  began  to 
change  in  1820,  that  of  the  South  remained  un- 
changed for  a  generation  more;  until  the  civil 
war  of  1861,  with  the  resulting  enfranchisement 
of  the  negro  and  impoverishment  of  the  large  land- 
holders, had  taken  away  the  physical  basis  on  which 
it  had  rested  for  more  than  a  century  so  securely. 

But  these  changes  in  the  political  and  social 
order  were  not  accompanied  by  any  corresponding 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   27 

change  in  the  industrial  order.  It  has  been  a 
perpetual  surprise  to  observers  of  American  insti- 
tutions that  complete  political  enfranchisement  has 
not  resulted  in  attempts  to  restrict  the  power  of 
capital.  For  at  least  sixty  years  after  the  adoption 
of  universal  suffrage  the  tendency  was  all  in  the 
other  direction — to  legislate  for  the  property  owner 
rather  than  against  him;  to  strengthen  the  powers 
of  capital  rather  than  to  diminish  them.  Demo- 
crats, Whigs,  and  Republicans  differed  as  to  their 
aims  and  methods,  but  they  vied  with  one  another 
in  protecting  the  rights  of  property.  Even  on  the 
remote  and  comparatively  lawless  western  frontier, 
where  a  man  might  kill  a  dozen  of  his  fellow  men 
with  impunity  and  enjoy  the  continued  respect 
of  those  about  him,  the  stealing  of  a  horse  was 
punished  by  immediate  hanging  and  by  the  for- 
feiture of  all  claim  to  social  standing  in  this  world 
or  the  next. 

The  small  protection  given  to  the  rights  of  man, 
as  compared  with  that  which  was  accorded  to  the 
rights  of  property,  is  a  salient  feature  in  the  early 
history  of  every  American  state — and  sometimes 
in  its  later  history  also.  While  England  was 
developing  a  large  and  on  the  whole  highly 
beneficent  body  of  factory  Acts,  the  United  States 
was  doing  nothing.  It  is  only  forty  years  since  the 


28        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

first  effective  law  regarding  hours  of  labor  was 
passed  by  the  state  of  Massachusetts,  limiting 
the  hours  of  women  and  children  to  about  ten  a 
day ;  and  even  this  was  regarded  at  the  time  of  its 
passage  as  a  piece  of  somewhat  dangerous  humani- 
tarianism.  As  late  as  1885  the  attempt  to  keep 
children  out  of  factories  until  they  were  twelve 
years  old  was  considered  by  many  people  a  radical 
measure  of  interference  with  economic  freedom. 
While  England  had  been  developing  a  system  of 
employers'  liability  adequate  to  protect  the  work- 
men under  modern  conditions,  the  United  States 
stood  for  many  years  idle.  The  old  common  law 
doctrine  that  the  employee  assumed  the  risks  of 
his  employment,  and  that  the  employer  was  not 
liable  for  damages  for  an  injury  to  one  workman 
resulting  from  the  carelessness  of  another,  remained 
in  full  force  in  America  for  many  years  after  it 
had  been  done  away  with  in  England.  The 
employer  was  encouraged  by  his  immunity  from 
responsibility  to  maintain  antiquated  methods  and 
practices  dangerous  to  life  and  limb,  which  he  alone 
could  change  and  for  whose  ill  effects  he  was 
morally  though  not  legally  responsible.  Systems 
of  industrial  insurance  were  devised  in  monarchies 
like  Prussia ;  they  were  unknown  in  the  democratic 
commonwealths  of  America,  Progressive  taxation 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   29 

has  been  used  by  nearly  every  country  of  Europe 
as  a  means  of  correcting  the  inequalities  of 
wealth.  Not  until  the  most  recent  times  has  the 
American  democracy  attempted  to  employ  it  for 
this  purpose.* 

These  are  but  a  few  among  the  many  instances 
of  democratic  concern  for  the  interests  of  the 
property  owner  and  democratic  unconcern  for  the 
interests  of  humanity.  Even  in  those  exceptional 
cases  where  the  Americans  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury passed  laws  to  restrict  the  power  of  capital, 
we  generally  find  that  they  were  intended  to  pro- 
tect one  class  of  capitalists  against  the  encroach- 
ments of  another.  Forty  years  ago  there  was  a 
successful  agitation  to  abolish  the  practice  indulged 
in  by  many  manufacturers  of  maintaining  "com- 
pany stores"  at  which  their  workmen  were  com- 
pelled to  trade ;  but  the  reform  was  carried  through 
not  so  much  because  of  the  injury  to  the  workmen 
who  had  to  trade  at  the  stores,  as  because  of  the 
injury  to  other  stores  that  did  not  belong  to  the 
company.  There  was  during  the  same  period  an 
active  and  widespread  attempt  to  reduce  the  rates 

*  There  was  a  certain  amount  of  progression  in  the  income 
taxes  of  the  Civil  War.  But  these  taxes  were  introduced  as 
revenue  measures  under  stress  of  fiscal  necessity,  and  were 
abolished  amid  general  rejoicing  from  all  parties  as  soon 
as  possible  after  the  close  of  the  war. 


30        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

charged  by  railroads  in  the  upper  Mississippi 
valley;  but  this  was  avowedly  based  on  the  fact 
that  the  higher  rates  prevented  the  farmers  whom 
the  railroads  served  from  paying  interest  on  their 
mortgages. 

From  time  to  time  we  find  traces  of  discontent 
with  the  industrial  system  as  a  whole.  From  time 
to  time  socialist  leaders  would  arise  who  attempted 
to  organize  the  laboring  classes  of  the  community 
for  a  war  against  capital.  Agitators  of  this  kind 
made  their  most  forcible  appeal  to  immigrants 
who  had  recently  arrived  in  the  country  and  were 
not  familiar  with  American  laws  and  customs. 
There  was  a  widespread  socialistic  movement  of 
this  kind  in  1833;  there  have  been  sporadic  ones 
ever  since.  Some  of  this  agitation  aroused  a  good 
deal  of  public  interest  and  a  little  fear  among  the 
more  timid  capitalists.  But  as  long  as  there  was 
plenty  of  free  land  in  the  United  States  the  socialist 
agitators  were  at  a  disadvantage.  The  immigrant 
felt  that  he  had  more  to  gain  by  settling  down  and 
trying  to  become  a  capitalist  than  by  going  to  war 
and  trying  to  fight  the  capitalist.  He  was  inclined 
to  say  to  the  agitators  what  the  boy  said  to  the 
lady  who  offered  him  sponge  cake  at  a  party,  "I 
can  get  as  good  as  that  at  home."  He  might  be 
ready  to  applaud  the  men  who  declaimed  against 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DEMOCRACY   31 

the  injustice  of  this  or  that  particular  arrange- 
ment of  industrial  society;  he  was  not  ready  to 
declare  war  against  an  industrial  society  which 
offered  him  so  many  inducements  to  become  one 
of  its  members.  It  was  the  rule  all  through  the 
nineteenth  century  that  as  long  as  the  socialist 
orators  stuck  to  words  the  multitude  applauded 
them,  but  whenever  their  words  were  followed  by 
deeds  the  multitude  shrank  from  them.  At  bye- 
elections  the  socialists  won  occasional  victories;  at 
elections  of  national  importance  their  vote  was 
habitually  a  disappointment  to  the  leaders  of  the 
party. 

I  propose  in  the  next  lecture  to  examine  the 
reasons  why  democracy  did  not  lead  to  socialism; 
why  universal  suffrage  was  not  used  to  impair  the 
dominance  of  the  property  owner;  why  the  legal 
and  constitutional  position  of  property  in  America 
remained  for  a  series  of  years  stronger  than  it  was 
in  England  in  the  same  period.  In  the  third  lecture 
I  propose  to  examine  the  effect  of  certain  changes 
in  the  United  States  during  recent  years  which 
have  brought  America,  for  the  first  time  in  its 
history,  face  to  face  with  what  Europe  knows  as 
the  social  question. 


n 

THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  POSITION  OF 
THE  PEOPEETY  OWNEE 

European  observers  of  American  politics  are  apt 
to  be  surprised  at  a  certain  weakness  of  action  in 
industrial  matters  on  the  part  of  our  public 
authorities.  The  legislatures  are  often  ready  to 
pass  individual  measures  of  regulation;  they  are 
rarely  willing  to  pursue  a  consistent  and  carefully 
developed  policy  for  the  attainment  of  an  economic 
end.  The  people  frequently  declaim  against  the 
extent  of  the  powers  of  corporate  capital ;  they  are 
seldom  disposed  to  put  that  capital  under  the  direct 
management  of  the  government  itself.  The  man 
who  talks  loudest  of  the  abuses  of  private  railroad 
administration  often  shrinks  from  the  alternative 
of  having  railroads  owned  and  managed  by  the 
state. 

In  spite  of  frequent  acts  of  adverse  legislation, 
the  constitutional  position  of  the  property  owner 
in  the  United  States  has  been  stronger  than  in  any 
country  in  Europe.  However  much  public  feeling 
may  at  times  move  in  the  direction  of  socialistic 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      33 

measures,  there  is  no  nation  which  is  so  far  removed 
from  socialism  as  ours  by  its  organic  law  and  its 
habits  of  political  action.  I  propose  to  trace,  as 
far  as  is  possible  within  the  limits  of  a  single 
lecture,  the  reasons  for  this  somewhat  anomalous 
condition;  to  show  why  the  rights  of  property 
were  so  strongly  protected  in  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution, as  originally  adopted  by  the  several  states 
and  as  subsequently  interpreted  by  the  courts ;  and 
why  as  a  matter  of  history  the  change  of  the  social 
and  political  order  from  an  aristocracy  to  a  democ- 
racy has  not  been  accompanied  by  anything  like 
a  corresponding  change  in  the  industrial  order.* 

I  shall  begin  with  a  proposition  which  may  sound 
somewhat  startling,  but  which  I  believe  to  be 
literally  true.  The  whole  American  political  and 
social  system  is  based  on  industrial  property  right, 
far  more  completely  than  has  ever  been  the  case  in 
any  European  country.  In  every  nation  of  Europe 
there  has  been  a  certain  amount  of  traditional 
opposition  between  the  government  and  the  indus- 
trial classes.  In  the  United  States  no  such 
tradition  exists.  In  the  public  law  of  European 
communities  industrial  freeholding  is  a  compara- 

*  For  a  suggestive  treatment  of  this  subject  from  a  some- 
what different  standpoint,  see  W.  E.  Weyl,  The  New 
Democracy. 


34        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

tively  recent  development.  In  the  United  States, 
on  the  contrary,  industrial  freeholding  is  the 
foundation  on  which  the  whole  social  order  has 
been  established  and  built  up. 

Let  us  examine  the  reasons  for  this  in  detail. 

Down  to  the  thirteenth  century  the  system  of 
land  tenure  in  every  country  of  Europe  was  a 
feudal  one.  It  was  based  upon  military  service. 
A  man  held  a  larger  or  smaller  estate  on  account 
of  his  larger  or  smaller  amount  of  fighting  effi- 
ciency. There  were  many  rival  claimants  for  the 
land.  The  majority  of  those  who  wanted  to 
cultivate  the  soil  were  unable  to  protect  themselves 
against  spoliation.  In  the  absence  of  an  efficient 
protector  or  overlord  no  industry  was  productive 
and  no  large  accumulation  of  capital  was  possible. 
The  services  of  the  military  chieftain  were  indis- 
pensable as  a  basis  for  the  toil  of  the  laborer  or 
the  forethought  of  the  capitalist.  It  was  the 
military  chieftain,  therefore,  who  enjoyed  the 
largest  measure  of  respect  socially,  and  the 
strongest  position  politically. 

As  the  conditions  of  public  security  grew  better 
these  things  changed.  From  the  fourteenth  cen- 
tury to  the  nineteenth  Europe  witnessed  a  gradual 
substitution  of  industrial  tenures  for  military 
tenures;  a  gradual  development  of  a  system  of 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      35 

property  law  intended  to  encourage  the  activities 
of  the  laborers  and  the  capitalists,  rather  than  to 
reward  the  services  of  the  successful  military 
chieftain.*  But  down  to  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century  this  capitalistic  or  industrial  sort  of  pri- 
vate property  represented  a  superadded  element 
rather  than  an  integral  basis  of  society.  And  even 
the  developments  of  the  last  hundred  years  have 
not  been  sufficient  to  obliterate  a  certain  sense  of 
newness  when  we  contrast  the  position  of  the 
aristocracy  of  wealth  with  that  of  the  aristocracy 
of  military  rank. 

In  the  American  colonies  conditions  were  wholly 
different.  There  was  no  marked  separation  of 
military  and  industrial  classes.  The  working 
power  and  the  fighting  power  were  in  the  hands 
of  the  same  or  nearly  the  same  persons.  The  land 
owner  held  his  property  by  a  title  which  was  at 
once  military  and  industrial.  He  was  prepared 
to  defend  it;  he  was  also  prepared  to  work  upon 
it,  or  at  any  rate  to  direct  the  labor  of  others  who 
worked  upon  it.  There  was  no  excuse  from  mili- 
tary duty  except  physical  weakness.  There  was  no 
excuse  from  industrial  duty  except  public  service. 

*  The  experience  of  England  in  this  matter  has  been  well 
set  forth  in  the  earlier  chapters  of  Ashley's  English 
Economic  History. 


36        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

Of  course  there  was  a  certain  differentiation  of 
employment.  There  were  some  men,  like  Leather- 
stocking  in  Cooper's  tales,  who  were  specially 
skilled  in  the  ways  of  Indian  fighting;  and  when 
trouble  with  the  Indians  was  anticipated,  as  it 
quite  frequently  was,  it  was  understood  that  these 
men  might  leave  their  farms  to  be  tilled  by  others. 
But  when  peace  returned  the  Indian  fighter  went 
to  work  like  his  neighbors.  Aristocratic  as  the 
colonies  were  in  many  of  their  habits  and  feelings, 
they  would  not  tolerate  the  growth  of  a  leisure 
class.  If  a  man  had  more  land  than  his  fellows, 
or  enjoyed  more  authority  than  his  fellows,  it  was 
expected  that  he  would  work  harder  and  fight 
harder.  And  this  expectation  was  generally 
realized.  There  was  a  well-defined  aristocracy; 
but  there  was  no  military  aristocracy  as  distin- 
guished from  an  industrial  one,  except  in  the 
immediate  entourage  of  the  governors  sent  over 
from  England.  And  the  effect  of  the  aristocratic 
circle  surrounding  these  governors  was  to  weaken 
rather  than  to  strengthen  the  claims  of  military 
authority,  because  its  members  made  themselves  so 
unpopular  by  their  habitual  exclusiveness  and 
intolerance  that  they  united  the  colonists  in  a  spirit 
of  resistance  to  all  such  claims  and  pretensions. 

At  the  time,  therefore,  when  the  United  States 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      37 

separated  from  England,  respect  for  industrial 
property  right  was  a  fundamental  principle  in  the 
law  and  public  opinion  of  the  land.  How  far  this 
respect  for  property  right  would  have  continued 
unimpaired  if  the  several  colonies  had  remained 
separate  from  one  another  is  an  uncertain  and 
profitless  question.  They  did  not  remain  separate. 
They  adopted  a  federal  constitution  which  con- 
tained a  number  of  guarantees  for  the  permanence 
of  property  right — some  intentional,  some  probably 
accidental — which  made  it  difficult  for  legislatures 
in  subsequent  generations  to  alter  the  legal  condi- 
tions of  the  earlier  period,  except  when  such 
alterations  secured  the  approval  of  the  courts. 

I  have  spoken  in  the  previous  lecture  of  the  cir- 
cumstances which  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  Federal 
Constitution.  During  the  war  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, from  1775  to  1782  and  in  the  years  imme- 
diately thereafter,  the  American  Union  had  been 
a  league  of  independent  states,  and  a  very  loose 
one.  These  states  had  formed  an  organization 
for  mutual  protection  in  carrying  on  a  war  against 
England.  But  this  organization  was  very  weak 
indeed.  While  the  war  lasted,  the  imminence  of 
perils  which  threatened  to  involve  all,  and  the 
personality  of  a  few  leaders,  of  whom  George 
Washington  was  the  most  conspicuous,  enabled  the 


38        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

different  colonies  to  act  with  some  degree  of 
coherence.  "We  must  all  hang  together,"  said 
one  of  the  signers  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, "or  we  shall  all  hang  separately. ' '  But 
when  independence  was  conceded  by  England  in 
1782  and  the  restraints  of  common  danger  were 
removed,  the  hopeless  inefficiency  of  the  central 
government  became  obvious.  From  1783  to  1789 
the  United  States  had  no  means  of  securing  concert 
of  action  at  home  or  respect  and  influence  abroad. 
Clear-headed  men  saw  the  absolute  necessity  of 
centralization.  The  members  of  the  Constitutional 
Convention  of  1787  felt  these  considerations  very 
strongly.  A  large  majority  of  them  were  men  of 
substance;  a  considerable  minority  were  men  of 
wealth.  They  had  viewed  with  apprehension  the 
readiness  of  their  fellow  countrymen  to  issue  paper 
money,  to  scale  down  debts,  or  to  interpret  the 
obligation  of  contract  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
render  large  investments  of  capital  precarious.  It 
was  at  once  a  matter  of  personal  interest  and  of 
public  interest  to  them  to  prevent  this ;  of  personal 
interest  because  acts  of  this  kind  would  impair 
their  own  enjoyment  and  success ;  of  public  interest 
because  it  was  vitally  necessary  to  America  to  have 
its  industry  and  commerce  managed  in  the  most 
efficient  and  far-sighted  way. 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      39 

This  fact  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  account  for  the 
general  tone  of  the  Constitution  on  matters  of 
property  right.  But  there  are  certain  clauses  in 
that  instrument  which  have  been  even  more 
effective  in  securing  the  property  holders  against 
adverse  legislation  than  the  Convention  itself  in- 
tended or  expected.  The  reason  for  this  is  some- 
what curious.  The  whole  document  was  the  result 
of  a  series  of  compacts,  agreements,  and  com- 
promises, between  two  pretty  evenly  balanced 
parties — a  states  rights  party,  which  wished  to 
limit  the  powers  of  the  federal  government,  and  a 
national  party,  which  was  anxious  to  set  some 
practical  control  on  the  autonomy  of  the  states. 
In  meeting  the  wishes  of  these  two  parties  and 
limiting  the  powers  of  both  state  and  federal 
governments,  the  Convention  more  or  less  unwit- 
tingly* gave  the  property  owners  as  a  body  certain 

*  There  has  been  a  tendency  in  recent  years  to  represent 
the  makers  of  the  Constitution  as  engaged  in  a  deliberate 
attempt  to  tie  the  hands  of  legislators  with  regard  to  their 
future  action  in  matters  of  property  right.  A  study  of 
the  debates  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  shows  that  a 
good  deal  of  what  they  did  in  this  way  was  accidental 
rather  than  deliberate.  This  is  well  illustrated  by  the 
history  of  the  clause  in  Article  I,  section  10,  which  prohibits 
the  passage,  by  any  of  the  states,  of  laws  impairing  the 
obligation  of  contract.  No  such  prohibition  was  suggested 
by  the  Convention  to  the  Committee  of  Detail  for  its  con- 
sideration, nor  is  there  any  trace  of  it  in  the  final  report 


40        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

guaranties  against  legislative  interference  of  any 
kind. 

It  was  in  the  first  place  provided  that  there 
should  be  no  taking  of  private  property  without 
due  process  of  law.  The  states  rights  men  feared 
that  the  federal  government  might,  under  the  stress 
of  military  necessity,  pursue  an  arbitrary  policy 
of  confiscation.  The  federalists,  or  national  party, 
feared  that  one  or  more  of  the  states  might  pursue 
the  same  policy  under  the  influence  of  sectional 
jealousy.  To  avoid  this  double  danger  both  parties 
united  on  a  constitutional  provision  which  pre- 
vented the  legislature  or  executive,  either  of  the 
nation  or  of  the  individual  states,  from  taking 
property  without  allowing  judicial  inquiry  into 
the  public  necessity  involved,  and  without  making 
full  compensation  even  in  case  the  result  of  such 

made  by  that  Committee.  During  the  discussion  of  this 
report  (which  constitutes  the  basis  of  the  Constitution  as 
finally  passed)  the  insertion  of  such  a  clause  was  suggested; 
but  it  was  opposed  by  Mr.  Gouverneur  Morris  and  others 
as  unwise,  and  was  not  pressed  to  a  vote.  What  the 
Convention  ultimately  adopted  instead  of  this,  was  a  motion 
to  prohibit  "retrospective"  laws.  This  at  any  rate  was 
the  entry  in  the  journal,  though  there  is  some  doubt  whether 
it  was  transmitted  in  that  shape  to  the  committee  of  final 
revision,  known  as  the  Committee  on  Style.  This  committee 
seems  to  have  taken  the  responsibility  of  changing  the 
phraseology  of  this  section  on  its  own.  account;  so  that 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      41 

inquiry  was  favorable  to  the  government;  and  it 
was  further  provided,  by  another  equally  impor- 
tant clause  in  the  Constitution,  that  no  state  should 
pass  a  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts. 

No  man  foresaw  what  would  be  the  subsequent 
effect  of  these  provisions  in  preventing  a  majority 
of  voters,  acting  in  the  legislature  or  through  the 
executive,  from  disturbing  existing  arrangements 
with  regard  to  railroad  building  or  factory  opera- 
tion until  the  railroad  stockholders  or  factory 
owners  had  had  the  opportunity  to  have  their  case 
tried  in  the  courts.  Clauses  which  were  at  first 
intended  to  prevent  sectional  strife,  and  to  protect 
the  people  of  one  locality  against  arbitrary  legis- 
lation in  another,  became  a  means  of  strengthening 
vested  rights  as  a  whole  against  the  possibility  of 
legislative  or  executive  interference.  Nor  was  the 

when  the  whole  instrument  was  last  submitted  to  the  Con- 
vention and  rather  hurriedly  passed,  the  clause  was  made 
to  read :  ' '  any  ex  post  facto  law  or  law  impairing  the 
obligation  of  contract."  A  motion  made  by  Elbridge 
Gerry  to  extend  this  prohibition  to  the  Federal  Government 
as  well  as  to  the  states  was  not  seconded.  Indeed,  the 
Convention  at  that  stage  of  proceedings  seems  to  have  been 
not  unnaturally  impatient  of  further  delay  and  anxious  to 
pass  anything  which  the  Committee  on  Style  recommended. 
The  whole  matter  can  be  followed  out  in  detail  in  Farrand  'a 
Eecords  of  the  Federal  Convention,  by  the  aid  of  his  excel- 
lent index  to  the  successive  sections  of  the  Constitution. 


42        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

direct  effect  of  these  clauses  in  preventing  specific 
acts  on  the  part  of  the  legislature  the  most  impor- 
tant result  of  their  existence.  They  indirectly 
became  a  powerful  means  of  establishing  the 
American  courts  in  the  position  which  they  now 
enjoy  as  arbiters  between  the  legislature  and  the 
property  owner.  For  whenever  an  act  of  the 
legislature  violated,  or  even  seemed  to  violate,  one 
of  these  clauses,  it  came  before  the  court  for 
review;  and  in  case  the  court  found  that  such 
violation  existed,  the  law  was  blocked — rendered 
powerless  by  a  dictum  of  the  judges  declaring  it 
unconstitutional. 

An  Act  of  the  British  Parliament  is  authorita- 
tive. It  is  law,  ipso  facto,  as  soon  as  it  is  regularly 
passed.  It  cannot  be  resisted  except  by  revolution. 
But  an  Act  of  the  United  States  Congress  or  of 
a  state  legislature  is  not  law  except  as  it  lies  within 
the  limits  allowed  by  the  Constitution.  Whether 
it  transgresses  these  limits  is  a  matter  for  the  courts 
to  decide.  Any  restriction  of  property  right  by 
legislative  act  is  therefore  null  and  void  unless  the 
courts  decide  that  due  process  of  law  has  been 
followed  and  that  no  obligation  of  contract  is 
impaired. 

The  power  thus  granted  to  the  courts  to  render 
acts  of  the  legislature  inoperative  is  perhaps  the 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      43 

most  distinctive  feature  of  the  American  Consti- 
tution; it  is  certainly  the  one  which  English 
publicists  find  it  the  most  difficult  to  understand. 

The  jurisprudence  of  England  is  founded  on  the 
theory  that  there  must  be  in  every  country  some 
sovereign,  some  designated  person  or  body  of 
persons  whose  deliberately  expressed  will  must  be 
obeyed.  The  older  writers  based  this  sovereignty 
upon  a  supposititious  social  contract.  Hobbes,  for 
instance,  said  that  the  evils  of  anarchy  were  so 
great  that  the  people  had  entered  into  an  agree- 
ment to  obey  a  common  superior  who  could  main- 
tain order,  and  that,  as  long  as  the  superior 
maintained  order,  the  people  were  bound  by  their 
agreement.  To  philosophers  of  this  school,  the 
assumption  of  this  compact,  fictitious  though  it 
was,  was  the  fundamental  justification  of  state 
authority. 

Bentham  and  his  followers  rejected  Hobbes' 
fiction  of  a  social  compact.  Bentham  said  that  the 
authority  of  the  state  rested,  not  on  a  fictitious 
agreement  supposed  to  have  been  made  by  our 
remote  ancestors,  but  on  an  actual,  present-day 
fact  that  the  people  recognize  a  common  superior 
and  render  him  habitual  obedience.  It  is  the  fact 
of  obedience,  not  the  fiction  of  a  compact,  that 
makes  him  sovereign.  But  Bentham  insisted  just 


44        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

as  clearly  as  Hobbes  did  that  there  were  no  logical 
limits  to  the  sovereign's  power.  There  might  be 
practical  limits.  Things  might  be  so  badly  man- 
aged that  continued  obedience  was  intolerable.  In 
that  case  we  had  a  revolution,  a  temporary  state 
of  anarchy,  followed  by  the  acceptance  of  a  new 
sovereign;  but  as  long  as  there  was  any  sovereign 
at  all  it  was,  in  Bentham's  view,  absurd  to  talk 
of  theoretical  restraints  upon  the  exercise  of  his 
power. 

The  American  view  of  sovereignty  differs  from 
that  of  Bentham  in  one  or  two  important  respects. 
The  American  constitutional  lawyer  holds  that  we 
habitually  obey  a  common  superior  within  certain 
limits.  It  recognizes  that  the  authority  of  the  state 
is  based  on  the  fact  of  habitual  obedience  on  the 
part  of  its  members.  "A  just  government  exists 
by  consent  of  the  governed.  But  that  obedience, 
and  that  consent,  which  are  accorded  as  long  as 
government  keeps  within  what  we  regard  as  the 
sphere  of  its  authority,  cease  when  it  tries  to  go 
outside  of  that  sphere."  When  the  acts  of  the 
legislature  or  executive  are  kept  within  certain 
constitutional  lines,  and  follow  certain  rules  laid 
down  by  the  public  opinion,  we  obey  the  govern- 
ment. Within  these  bounds  it  is  de  facto  sover- 
eign. When  it  transgresses  those  bounds,  we  do 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      45 

not  obey  it.  If  it  attempts  to  extend  its  power 
beyond  the  limits  which  public  opinion  has  fixed, 
its  acts  are  nullified ; — set  at  nought  by  the  refusal 
of  the  public  to  cooperate  in  their  enforcement. 
We  do  not  attempt  to  change  the  sovereign  by  a 
process  of  revolution;  we  leave  him  undisturbed 
within  the  domain  of  his  traditional  authority. 
But  we  refuse  the  active  help  which  is  necessary 
to  enable  him  to  extend  that  authority  into  an 
unauthorized  domain. 

The  doctrine  of  passive  resistance  has  been 
treated  with  a  good  deal  of  unmerited  ridicule. 
We  are  told  that  it  is  only  another  name  for 
revolution;  that  if  any  body  of  men  assumes  to 
tell  the  sovereign  that  he  cannot  pass  certain  limits, 
they  themselves  are  claiming  sovereignty  by  that 
very  act.  This  is  not  necessarily  true.  If  a  man 
prevents  a  policeman  from  doing  something  which 
lies  outside  of  the  limits  of  his  office,  he  is  not 
assuming  sovereignty.  He  is  not  even  trying  to 
lessen  the  respect  for  the  police.  He  is  simply 
keeping  the  police  authority  within  traditional 
bounds.  Whether  such  acts  do  result  in  over- 
throwing the  authority  of  the  police  is  a  matter 
for  the  historian  to  determine.  The  experience  of 
the  United  States  shows  that  very  sharp  limits 
can  be  set  to  the  exercise  of  the  authority  of  a 


46        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

governing  body  without  in  the  least  impairing  its 
power  and  efficiency  within  those  limits. 

It  is  sometimes  argued  that  if  the  American 
courts  can  limit  the  powers  of  both  national  and 
state  legislatures,  the  courts  themselves  are  sover- 
eign. This  appears  to  be  a  misleading  use  of 
language.  The  courts  certainly  do  not  claim  or 
exercise  the  kind  of  sovereignty  which  is  exercised 
by  the  English  Parliament.  It  is  a  truer  descrip- 
tion of  the  situation  to  say  that  America  under  the 
Constitution  witnesses  an  actual  exercise  of  divided 
sovereignty;  that  the  people  live  under  a  con- 
current jurisdiction  of  state  and  nation,  obeying 
each  in  some  things;  and  that  the  authoritative 
position  of  the  courts  in  determining  the  limits  of 
this  sovereignty  is  not  itself  a  transcendent  exercise 
of  sovereign  power,  but  a  highly  skilled  exposition 
of  public  opinion — in  other  words,  that  the 
authority  of  American  judges  rests  on  the  same 
sort  of  basis  as  the  authority  of  English  judges — 
on  their  power  of  interpretation  of  precedents  and 
customs. 

The  early  history  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  furnishes  strong  confirmation  of  this 
statement.  While  the  clauses  of  the  Constitution 
left  the  federal  courts  large  duties  and  powers, 
their  ability  to  fulfil  those  duties  and  to  exercise 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      47 

those  powers  was  not  shown  until  a  chief  justice 
of  the  first  rank — John  Marshall — was  by  his 
almost  unrivalled  power  of  exposition  able  to  enlist 
the  opinion  both  of  lawyers  and  of  laymen  in 
support  of  the  judicial  authority.  It  is  to  the  work 
of  judges  like  Marshall  and  Story  and  Kent 
that  the  actual  position  of  the  courts  under  the 
American  Constitution  is  mainly  due. 

But  constitutional  restraints  of  this  kind,  while 
they  strengthened  the  position  of  the  property 
holder  in  American  politics,  could  not  give  him 
permanent  security  in  case  public  opinion  de- 
manded a  change.  For  the  Constitution  itself  can 
be  amended,  and  will  be  amended,  when  there  is 
a  consensus  of  voters  in  different  parts  of  the 
country  in  favor  of  amendment.  Alteration  of  the 
Federal  Constitution  is  a  slower  and  more  formal 
thing  than  alteration  of  the  law,  or  than  alteration 
of  the  constitution  of  any  single  state.  But  it 
comes  when  there  is  a  demand  for  it.  Why  did 
not  this  demand  make  itself  felt?  Why  did  the 
intensely  democratic  America  of  the  nineteenth 
century  rest  satisfied  with  constitutional  provisions 
regarding  property  right  which  were  devised  by 
representatives  of  an  aristocratic  society  in  the 
eighteenth  under  circumstances  which  strengthened 
the  hands  of  the  conservatives  ? 


48        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

The  first  cause  for  this  persistence  of  property 
right  is  to  be  found  in  the  land  policy  of  the 
United  States.  We  saw  in  the  previous  lecture 
how  the  method  adopted  in  the  disposal  of  the 
public  lands  promoted  democracy.  Side  by  side 
with  this  effect,  and  in  curious  contrast  to  it,  was 
an  equally  marked  effect  in  promoting  industrial 
conservatism. 

The  immigrant  who  settled  in  the  western  states 
was  offered  two  things:  the  vote,  and  the  chance 
of  becoming  a  landowner.  The  fact  that  votes 
were  bestowed  so  freely  upon  large  bodies  of 
settlers,  many  of  whom  were  of  alien  race  and 
traditions,  caused  serious  apprehension  in  many 
quarters.  "Where  so  many  of  the  individual 
settlers  were  personally  reckless  and  uncontrolled 
by  tradition,  there  was  good  reason  to  fear  that 
they  would  organize  their  governments  in  a  reck- 
less and  untraditional  fashion,  and  thus  pave  the 
way  for  the  abuse  of  democratic  power.  These 
fears  proved  to  be  unfounded.  The  opportunity 
to  own  farms  in  freehold  made  ambitious  settlers 
conservative.  Men  with  a  hundred  and  sixty 
acres  of  land  were  not  likely  to  pass  laws  which 
would  interfere  with  the  rights  of  property,  and 
particularly  of  landed  property.  The  prospect  of 
becoming  landowners  had  the  same  sort  of  steady- 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      49 

ing  effect  upon  men  who  framed  the  constitutions 
of  new  states  in  1820  or  1830  that  the  fact  of 
already  being  landowners  had  upon  the  men  who 
framed  the  Federal  Constitution  forty  years 
earlier. 

But  Hamilton's  policy  of  giving  a  home  at  a 
nominal  price  to  every  bona  fide  settler,  though  it 
was  the  most  important  single  element  in  securing 
the  rights  of  property  against  measures  of  legis- 
lative interference,  was  by  no  means  the  only 
influence  of  the  kind. 

The  immigrant  found  it  easy  to  get  land;  he 
found  it  hard  to  get  capital.  Natural  resources 
were  present  in  abundance.  The  accumulated 
supplies  of  machinery,  fuel,  and  food  which  enable 
man  to  utilize  those  natural  resources  effectively 
were  conspicuous  by  their  absence.  Each  addition 
to  the  capital  of  the  community,  however  small, 
represented  a  large  addition  to  its  productiveness. 
The  savings  of  the  settlers  and  the  investments  of 
citizens  who  lived  in  other  states  contributed  alike 
to  this  end. 

Under  these  circumstances  there  was  a  tendency 
to  grant  all  possible  privileges  to  those  who  had 
capital  for  investment  and  to  free  them  from 
arbitrary  restrictions  of  every  kind.  No  community 
would  enforce  a  usury  law  which  limited  the  rate 


50        UNDERCURBENTS  IN  POLITICS 

of  interest  to  six  per  cent,  when  people  who 
borrowed  capital  at  eight  or  at  ten  per  cent  made 
large  and  legitimate  profits  over  and  above  the 
interest  rate.  The  dangers  lay  in  the  opposite 
direction.  All  through  the  period  from  1830  to 
1860  the  western  states  of  the  Union  tended  to 
encourage  every  sort  of  scheme  which  would 
attract  capital  or  the  semblance  of  capital,  without 
much  regard  to  its  present  or  prospective  sound- 
ness. Banking  laws  were  so  loosely  and  carelessly 
drawn  that  a  board  of  directors  could  issue  large 
amounts  of  notes  upon  small  amounts  of  reserve. 
The  bank  notes,  so  long  as  they  circulated  from 
hand  to  hand,  appeared  to  increase  the  working 
capital  of  the  community;  and  any  man  who 
undertook  to  examine  too  closely  the  nature  of 
the  security  that  lay  behind  the  note  was  regarded 
as  an  unpatriotic  member  of  society,  who  in  an 
excess  of  selfish  over-caution  questioned  the  validity 
of  a  bill  which  he  might  just  as  easily  have  passed 
on  to  the  next  man  without  inquiry.*  Not  until 

*  I  have  been  told  on  what  appears  to  be  good  authority 
that  the  bank  examiners  of  many  of  the  western  states  in 
the  years  prior  to  1857  always  made  their  visits  of  inspec- 
tion in  a  certain  order;  so  that  a  very  small  amount  of  gold 
reserve,  by  being  passed  from  bank  to  bank  at  the  opportune 
moment,  could  do  duty  in  protecting  a  large  number  of 
separate  note  issues.  And  when  I  asked  one  of  my  inform- 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      51 

the  time  of  the  Civil  War,  when  the  United  States 
government  needed  to  use  the  banks  as  a  means 
in  carrying  out  its  own  fiscal  policies,  was  this 
state  of  things  effectively  remedied. 

Among  many  means  employed  by  the  states  of 
the  Union  toward  rapid  development  of  their 
resources,  the  joint  stock  company  or  industrial 
corporation  was  most  prominent. 

The  incorporation  acts  of  the  colonies  at  the  end 
of  the  eighteenth  century  were  based  almost 
entirely  upon  English  models.  The  American  law, 
like  the  English  law  of  the  same  period,  was 
reluctant  to  allow  people  to  avail  themselves  of  the 
principle  of  limited  liability  until  there  had  been 
a  special  examination  of  the  circumstances  by  some 
public  authority.  But  as  time  went  on  this  state 
of  things  changed  rapidly.  There  were  in  America 
almost  no  large  capitalists  who  could  finance 
industrial  enterprises  on  an  extensive  scale.  To 

ants  what  would  have  happened  to  the  bank  if  the  bank 
examiner  had  deviated  from  the  regular  routine,  I  was  told 
that  he  would  probably  have  had  to  quit  the  country.  It 
is  at  any  rate  quite  probable  that  the  consequences  of  a 
departure  from  the  regular  routine  would  have  been  as 
disastrous  both  to  him  and  to  the  banks  as  those  which  we 
find  when  a  teacher  who  has  for  a  series  of  exercises  called 
his  class  in  alphabetical  order  suddenly  departs  from  this 
practice  without  notice. 


52        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

build  factories  or  canals  it  was  necessary  to  get  a 
large  number  of  small  investors  united;  and  these 
investors  could  not  safely  plan  to  unite  their  for- 
tunes for  the  promotion  of  speculative  enterprises 
unless  limited  liability  was  assured  them  as  a 
matter  of  course.  A  few  states,  notably  Massa- 
chusetts, held  to  the  principles  of  the  older 
English  law.  But  Massachusetts,  though  better 
provided  with  capital  than  most  other  parts  of 
the  Union,  found  that  this  policy  interfered  with 
its  development,  and  that  states  which  had  more 
liberal  laws  made  more  rapid  progress  in  the 
introduction  of  the  necessary  improvements. 
Investors  sought  other  localities  for  investment; 
the  growth  of  Massachusetts  business  was  hindered ; 
its  character  was  not  greatly  improved.  The 
ultimate  result  in  Massachusetts,  as  in  other  states, 
was  the  passage  of  general  laws  under  which  any 
group  of  individuals  could  associate  their  capital 
for  industrial  enterprise  and  obtain  the  privileges 
of  limited  liability  from  the  state. 

Some  men  were  awake  to  the  danger  that  might 
arise  from  the  growth  of  corporations.  Andrew 
Jackson  was  one  of  these  men ;  and  his  contest  with 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States  is  a  well-known 
episode  in  American  financial  history.  But  such 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      53 

fears  as  Jackson's  were  exceptional.*  Most  people 
were  too  much  occupied  with  the  necessity  of 
getting  capital  for  their  several  communities  to 
trouble  their  minds  very  much  about  what  might 
be  done  with  the  capital  when  it  was  once  invested. 
There  was  far  more  tendency  to  help  the  corpora- 
tions by  subsidies  and  special  privileges  than  to 
limit  them  by  laws  whose  immediate  necessity  was 
not  very  obvious.  Charters  were  granted  with  the 
utmost  freedom  by  almost  every  state  in  the  Union ; 
and  charter  powers  once  given  could  not  easily  be 
restricted. 

The  control  of  the  government  over  corporations 
was  weakened,  and  the  rights  and  immunities 
of  the  property  holders  were  correspondingly 
strengthened,  by  two  developments  of  constitu- 
tional law  whose  effect  upon  the  modern  industrial 
situation  may  be  fairly  characterized  as  fortuitous. 
One  of  these  was  the  decision  in  the  celebrated 
Dartmouth  College  case  in  1819 ;  the  other  was  the 
passage  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  in  1868. 

I  call  their  effect  fortuitous,  because  neither  the 
judges  who  decided  the  Dartmouth  College  case 

*  Even  Jackson  's  quarrel  with  the  Bank  appears  to  have 
been  based  on  personal  grounds  quite  as  much  as  on 
constitutional  ones. 


54        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

nor  the  legislators  who  passed  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  had  any  idea  how  these  things  would 
affect  the  modern  economic  situation.  The  Dart- 
mouth College  case  dealt  with  an  educational 
institution,  not  with  an  industrial  enterprise.  The 
Fourteenth  Amendment  was  framed  to  protect  the 
negroes  from  oppression  by  the  whites,  not  to 
protect  corporations  from  oppression  by  the  legis- 
lature. It  is  doubtful  whether  a  single  one 
of  the  members  of  Congress  who  voted  for  it 
had  any  idea  that  it  would  touch  the  question 
of  corporate  regulation  at  all.  Yet  the  two 
together  have  had  the  effect  of  placing  the  Ameri- 
can industrial  corporation  in  a  constitutional 
position  of  extraordinary  vantage. 

In  1816  the  New  Hampshire  legislature  attempted 
to  abrogate  the  charter  of  Dartmouth  College. 
Daniel  "Webster  was  employed  by  the  College  in 
its  defense.  His  reasoning  so  impressed  the 
members  of  the  court  that  they  committed  them- 
selves to  the  position  that  a  charter  was  a  contract ; 
that  a  state,  having  induced  people  to  invest 
money  by  certain  privileges  and  immunities,  could 
not  at  will  modify  those  privileges  and  immunities 
thus  granted.  Whether  the  court  would  have  taken 
such  broad  ground  if  the  matter  had  come  before 
it  thirty  or  forty  years  later,  when  the  abuses  of 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      55 

ill-judged  industrial  charters  had  become  more 
fully  manifest,  is  not  sure;  but  having  once 
adopted  this  view  and  maintained  it  in  a  series  of 
decisions,  the  courts  could  not  well  abandon  it. 
Inasmuch  as  many  of  the  corporate  charters 
granted  by  state  legislatures  had  an  unlimited 
period  to  run,  the  theory  that  these  instruments 
were  contracts  binding  the  state  for  all  time  had 
a  very  important  bearing  in  limiting  the  field 
within  which  a  legislature  could  regulate  the 
activity  of  such  a  body,  or  an  executive  interfere 
with  it. 

Again,  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the 
Federal  Constitution  the  states  were  forbidden  to 
interfere  with  the  civil  rights  of  any  person  or 
to  pass  discriminating  laws  which  should  treat 
different  persons  unequally.  This  amendment, 
passed  just  after  the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  was 
intended  simply  to  protect  the  negro;  to  prevent 
the  southern  states  which  were  in  the  act  of  being 
readmitted  to  the  Union  from  abridging  the  rights 
of  the  blacks.  A  number  of  years  elapsed  before 
the  probable  effect  of  this  clause  upon  the  consti- 
tutional position  of  industrial  corporations  seems 
to  have  been  realized.  But  in  1882  the  Southern 
Pacific  Railroad  Company,  having  been,  as  it 
conceived,  unfairly  taxed  by  the  assessors  of  a 


56        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

certain  county  in  California,  took  the  position  that 
a  law  of  the  state  of  California  taxing  the  property 
of  corporations  at  a  different  rate  from  that  of 
individuals  was  in  effect  a  violation  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  to  the  Constitution,  because  a 
corporation  was  a  person  and  therefore  entitled  to 
the  same  kind  of  treatment  as  any  other  person. 
This  view,  after  careful  consideration,  was  upheld 
by  the  federal  courts.  A  corporation,  therefore, 
under  the  law  of  the  United  States,  is  entitled  to 
the  same  immunities  as  an  individual;  and  since 
the  charter  creating  it  is  a  contract,  whose  terms 
cannot  be  altered  at  the  will  of  the  legis- 
lature which  is  a  party  thereto,  its  constitutional 
position  as  a  property  holder  is  much  stronger  in 
America  than  it  is  anywhere  in  Europe. 

This  effect  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was 
all  the  more  important  because  it  came  at  a  time 
when  men's  political  conservatism  had  been  a  good 
deal  unsettled  by  the  incidental  consequences  of 
the  Civil  War. 

The  dominant  power  of  the  large  landholders  of 
the  South  had  been  destroyed.  These  landholders 
had  remained  more  essentially  an  aristocracy  than 
any  other  social  group  in  the  United  States;  and 
like  most  aristocracies,  they  had  been  essentially 
conservative  in  all  questions  affecting  property 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      57 

right.  When  a  body  of  men  like  these,  as  con- 
spicuous for  their  political  ability  as  had  been  the 
Roman  landed  aristocracy  two  thousand  years 
earlier,  was  suddenly  reduced  from  affluence  to 
poverty,  an  important  bulwark  for  the  stability  of 
property  rights  was  taken  away. 

The  Civil  War  had  accustomed  people  to  the  use 
of  depreciated  paper  money,  dependent  for  its 
value  upon  the  order  of  the  government  making 
it  a  legal  tender  for  the  payment  of  debts.  The 
over-issue  of  United  States  treasury  notes,  or 
greenbacks,  had  been  so  great  that  a  dollar  in 
paper  in  1864  was  worth  less  than  half  a  dollar 
in  gold.  This  had  had  a  considerable  effect  on 
wages  and  prices  in  every  line  of  industry.  It 
had  encouraged  speculators  to  contract  obligations 
recklessly  because  they  hoped  to  pay  them  in  a 
currency  that  would  have  become  still  further 
depreciated.  In  districts  where  such  speculators 
were  numerous  the  voters  frequently  urged  their 
congressional  representatives  to  oppose  any  attempt 
to  restore  specie  payments  after  the  war  had  come 
to  an  end.  For  twelve  years  after  its  close  debtors 
and  creditors  contended  against  one  another  to 
secure  action  by  the  United  States  government 
regarding  its  treasury  notes  which  should  be  favor- 
able to  their  several  interests.  After  it  became 


58        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

evident  that  no  more  paper  would  be  issued,  and 
that  the  government  could  and  would  accumulate 
a  sufficient  gold  reserve  to  resume  payment  of  its 
notes  in  1879,  the  debtors  joined  with  the  silver 
mine  owners  to  renew  the  coinage  of  the  old  silver 
dollar,  which  was  now  worth  less  than  the  gold 
dollar.  The  fact  that  the  government  was  thus 
constantly  importuned  to  legislate  against  one 
class  of  property  owners  for  the  benefit  of  another 
prepared  the  public  for  the  more  radical  suggestion 
of  legislation  against  property  owners  as  a  body, 
in  the  interest  of  those  who  had  little  or  nothing. 

The  tariff  legislation  in  the  years  following  the 
Civil  "War  had  a  somewhat  similar  history.  During 
the  war  all  taxes  had  been  high.  There  were  heavy 
excise  rates  which  the  home  producer  had  to  pay. 
To  give  him  some  measure  of  protection  the  import 
duty  on  foreign  products  which  came  to  the 
American  market  was  made  higher  still.  In  the 
years  immediately  following  the  war  the  excise 
duties  were  abolished.  The  import  duties,  through 
a  disagreement  between  the  Senate  and  the  House 
as  to  details,  remained  unchanged.  The  result  was 
that  many  industries  were  given  the  benefit  of 
extraordinarily  high  rates  of  protection  which 
nobody  had  ever  really  intended  to  bestow.  Some 
of  the  concerns  called  into  being  by  this  unwise 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      59 

policy  were  dependent  upon  its  continuance  for 
their  very  existence,  while  others  more  favorably 
situated,  which  could  have  maintained  themselves 
with  moderate  duties  or  perhaps  with  no  duties  at 
all,  were  enabled  to  make  extravagant  profits  for 
their  stockholders.  All  this  accustomed  people  to 
the  idea  that  prosperity  was  dependent  on  Acts  of 
Congress,  rather  than  on  the  operation  of  intelli- 
gent self-interest,  and  paved  the  way  for  the 
advocate  of  more  energetic  state  control  over 
property  holders  as  a  body. 

Nevertheless,  the  tendency  to  rely  on  competition 
remained  very  strong.  The  American  people  had 
seen  so  much  good  that  came  from  competition  that 
it  was  inclined  to  trust  it  unduly,  and  to  feel  that 
where  competition  failed  to  protect  the  consumer 
or  laborer  special  legislation  to  regulate  industry 
would  probably  make  matters  worse  instead  of 
better.  Where  one  corporation  had  a  monopoly 
and  abused  it,  it  was  thought  that  such  monopoly 
and  such  abuse  would  be  only  temporary.  It  was 
confidently  believed  that  unfair  and  exorbitant 
profits  would  invite  a  rival  corporation  into  the 
field,  so  that  rates  would  go  down  and  abuses 
correct  themselves.  Even  in  matters  like  railway 
transportation,  where  monopoly  was  requisite  in 
the  interest  both  of  public  convenience  and  eco- 


60        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

nomical  administration,  people  clung,  in  the  face 
of  adverse  experience,  to  the  hope  that  competition 
must  somehow  be  made  to  act. 

Some  of  this  irrational  belief  in  competition 
existed  in  England;*  but  it  was  never  quite  so 
strong  as  in  the  United  States.  There  had  always 
been  a  great  many  lines  of  business  in  which  Eng- 
land did  not  tolerate  the  imposition  of  competitive 
rates,  while  America  accepted  them  as  a  matter  of 
course.  Contrast  the  attitude  of  the  two  countries 
in  the  matter  of  rentals  for  agricultural  land. 
The  English  landowner  who  deprived  an  old 
tenant  of  possession  because  a  new  tenant  was 
ready  and  able  to  pay  a  higher  rental,  forfeited 
social  consideration.  In  America  the  landowner 
was  subject  to  no  such  restriction.  If  he  rented  his 
land  he  was  expected  to  get  what  he  could.  If  he 

*  The  history  of  English  railway  legislation  furnishes 
marked  instances  of  this  sort  of  opposition.  From  1830  to 
1850  Parliamentary  committees  were  constantly  trying  to 
arrange  toll  systems  by  which  independent  carriers  could 
have  their  trains  hauled  by  the  railway  company,  and 
running  powers  under  which  different  companies  could 
compete  with  one  another  upon  the  same  line  of  rails. 
The  Eailway  and  Canal  Traffic  Act  of  1854,  though  it  was 
based  on  careful  study  and  was  in  many  respects  a  well- 
drawn  measure,  shows  a  most  obstinate  adherence  to  the 
belief  that  the  competition  of  different  carriers  on  the  same 
line  of  rails  must  somehow  be  possible  if  the  proper  way 
of  enforcing  it  could  be  discovered. 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER      61 

sold  it  he  was  expected  to  sell  it  at  the  highest 
price  obtainable.  As  long  as  he  did  not  rent  his 
property  to  people  who  would  use  it  for  immoral 
purposes,  or  sell  it  to  notoriously  undesirable 
citizens,  the  public  would  not  condemn  him  for 
seeking  the  best  market  he  could  get. 

Again,  contrast  the  conditions  affecting  the  rate 
of  wages  in  the  two  countries.  In  England  labor 
was  comparatively  immobile.  Migration  from 
district  to  district  was  the  exception,  rapid  change 
from  one  occupation  to  another  a  still  rarer  excep- 
tion. The  consequence  was  that  wages  in  most 
districts  and  in  many  occupations  were  to  a  large 
measure  fixed  by  custom.  Even  in  those  industries 
where  competitive  wages  might  otherwise  have  been 
paid,  the  effect  of  the  trades  unions  was  to  limit 
the  output  of  the  individual  laborer,  and  therefore 
to  prevent  him  from  competing  with  his  fellows; 
to  substitute  the  principle  of  collective  bargaining 
for  that  of  competition.  In  America  the  case  was 
wholly  different.  The  mobility  of  the  laborer  was 
very  great.  He  went  where  he  could  get  the 
highest  wages.  If  he  was  paid  by  the  piece,  as  he 
generally  preferred  to  be,  he  worked  as  hard  as  he 
could  to  increase  his  earnings.  Other  members  of 
the  community  looked  on  with  satisfaction,  because 
he  was  doing  all  he  could  to  increase  productivity. 


62        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

They  were  glad  to  have  him  do  as  much  as  he  could. 
They  wished  to  have  him  dispose  of  his  labor  in  the 
best  market.  Under  these  circumstances  competi- 
tive wages  were  not  only  paid  and  earned,  but 
approved  by  society  as  a  standard. 

This  indicates  the  fundamental  reason  why 
competition  was  viewed  with  so  much  favor  in  the 
United  States.  It  put  a  premium  on  economic 
efficiency.  It  tended  to  give  the  direction  of  indus- 
trial affairs  to  the  men  who  could  obtain  the  largest 
product  with  the  smallest  labor.  This  was  vitally 
necessary  for  the  United  States  in  the  first  half 
of  its  history — more  necessary,  I  believe,  than  to 
any  European  country.  For  the  immediate  prob- 
lems that  lay  before  the  United  States  at  that  time 
were  predominantly  industrial  ones.  We  had  a 
new  country  to  develop.  We  had  to  attract 
capital  by  every  possible  means.  We  had  to 
employ  a  moderate  amount  of  labor  and  a  very 
scanty  amount  of  inherited  wealth  in  industrial 
competition  with  the  nations  of  Europe.  This  was 
for  a  long  time  the  only  line  in  which  we  could 
compete  with  them ;  it  was  on  our  efficiency  in  this 
particular  that  we  based  our  claim  to  national 
importance.  We  had  no  army  or  navy  comparable 
with  that  of  European  states.  Our  public  service, 
except  in  one  or  two  departments,  was  rudimen- 


POSITION  OF  PROPERTY  OWNER,      63 

tary.  Our  work  in  literature  and  in  science  showed 
promise  rather  than  performance.  But  in  the 
intelligent  conduct  of  industry  and  the  develop- 
ment of  inventions  connected  therewith,  we  had  no 
rival  but  England.  England  had  the  advantage 
of  accumulated  capital  and  sound  business  tradi- 
tions ;  America  had  the  advantage  of  a  competitive 
system  that  brought  progressive  men  and  methods 
to  the  front  and  thereby  equalized  the  struggle. 
Small  wonder  that  the  patriotic  American  looked 
with  favor  on  an  institution  that  enabled  him  to 
hold  his  own  in  the  industrial  race.  Small  wonder 
that  a  republic  predominantly  composed  of  strong 
men  should  overlook  the  abuses  of  a  system  under 
which  the  weak  members  suffered,  when  it  con- 
tributed so  much  to  the  standing  of  the  nation 
as  a  whole. 


Ill 

RECENT  TENDENCIES  IN  ECONOMICS 
AND  IN  LEGISLATION 

We  saw  in  the  last  lecture  why  the  adoption  of 
universal  suffrage  in  the  United  States  was  not 
followed  by  a  movement  in  the  direction  of 
socialism.  Most  of  the  voters  expected  to  become 
property  owners;  this  made  them  regard  any 
restriction  of  the  rights  of  property  as  undesirable. 
Nearly  all  of  them  believed  that  free  competition 
would  protect  the  community  against  extortion  or 
abuse  by  the  property  owner;  this  made  them 
regard  such  restriction  as  unnecessary.  These 
were  the  sentiments  and  ideals  which  prevailed 
among  the  great  body  of  the  American  people 
until  the  time  of  the  Civil  War  in  1861. 

The  war  did  not  weaken  the  belief  in  competition, 
nor  lessen  the  desire  of  the  average  American  to 
become  a  property  owner;  but  it  made  people 
more  ready  to  see  the  functions  of  government 
extended,  and  less  conservatively  tenacious  of  legal 
tradition.  Under  stress  of  military  necessity  the 
state  and  national  authorities  had  indulged  in  a 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION        65 

good  deal  of  arbitrary  interference  with  personal 
liberty  and  private  property.  People  had  become 
so  used  to  this  sort  of  conduct  on  the  part  of 
government  officials  that  a  great  many  things 
which  would  have  been  resented  as  usurpations  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war  were  tolerated  as  ordinary 
incidents  of  life  at  the  end  of  it.  The  class  that 
would  have  been  most  inclined  to  resent  such 
usurpation — the  large  landowners  of  the  South — 
had  been  reduced  from  affluence  to  poverty. 
"While  the  conservative  planters  had  been  losing 
their  money,  and  with  it  a  good  deal  of  their 
political  power,  enterprising  and  often  reckless 
speculators  had  fallen  heir  to  their  wealth  and 
influence. 

When  matters  were  in  this  condition  a  large 
section  of  the  community  found  its  faith  in  com- 
petition somewhat  rudely  shaken  by  what  is  known 
as  the  Granger  movement. 

No  states  had  done  as  much  to  attract  outside 
capital  in  the  years  preceding  the  Civil  "War  as 
those  of  the  upper  Mississippi  valley.  Land  was 
fertile,  labor  was  efficient;  opportunities  for  pro- 
ductive industry  of  every  kind  were  abundant. 
The  only  disadvantages  under  which  the  region 
suffered  were  lack  of  capital  and  remoteness  from 
market;  and  the  people  strove  to  overcome  these 


66        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

disadvantages  by  borrowing  money  and  building 
railroads  with  the  utmost  rapidity.  Grants  of 
public  domain  were  offered  on  a  large  scale  to  any 
group  of  capitalists  that  would  build  a  new  line. 
"Each  community  wanted  railroads  at  any  price. 
Each  railroad  offered  glowing  inducements  to 
settlers.  The  result  was  that  railroads  and  settlers 
both  moved  too  far  west,  and  ran  heavily  in  debt 
to  do  it." 

In  England  and  in  some  of  the  older  parts  of 
the  United  States  railroads  were  built  to  accom- 
modate traffic  already  existing.  Cities  were  already 
there.  Markets  were  already  there.  The  people 
had  had  means  of  trading  with  one  another  before 
the  railroad  came.  The  railroad  merely  facilitated 
the  process  of  exchange  and  increased  the  growth 
and  prosperity  of  the  community.  But  in  the 
newer  parts  of  America  the  railroads  were  built  to 
create  traffic.  Men  went  west  to  occupy  land  that 
the  railroads  had  made  accessible.  They  had 
frequently  borrowed  money  to  improve  that  land. 
Unless  they  shipped  their  grain  to  market  by  rail 
they  had  no  power  to  sell  their  products  or  pay 
interest  on  their  loans.  If  the  price  of  wheat  in 
the  markets  of  Europe  or  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
was  high,  the  railroad  could  charge  rates  that 
would  pay  interest  on  its  bonded  indebtedness  and 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION       67 

leave  the  farmer  enough  to  meet  his  obligations 
also ;  but  if  for  any  reason  the  price  fell,  one  or  the 
other  must  go  to  the  wall.  If  the  railroad  kept  its 
rates  high  the  farmers  suffered.  If  it  reduced  its 
rates  its  own  security  holders  suffered. 

This  was  the  dilemma  which  the  communities  in 
the  upper  Mississippi  valleys  faced  in  1869  and 
1870.  Up  to  that  time  the  European  demand  for 
grain  had  been  so  large  that  prices  were  well 
maintained  in  spite  of  the  increased  American 
wheat  acreage.  When  prices  fell  railroad  rates 
were  reduced  to  a  very  low  figure  at  competitive 
points;  but  they  were  kept  at  a  high  figure  at 
intermediate  points,  where  the  shipper  had  but  a 
single  railroad  to  deal  with  and  was  forced  to  use 
that  or  see  his  grain  go  to  waste.  Free  competition 
helped  the  city  but  not  the  country. 

The  railroads  claimed  that  it  was  necessary  for 
them  to  make  their  local  rates  high;  that  if  they 
did  not  they  would  have  to  go  out  of  business. 
The  farmer  was  by  no  means  satisfied  with  this 
answer.  He  thought  that  if  the  railroads  could 
afford  to  do  business  cheaply  for  the  city  they 
could  afford  to  do  it  cheaply  for  the  country;  and 
in  any  event  he  needed  to  pay  his  interest  as  much 
as  they  needed  to  pay  theirs.  In  the  years  from 
1869  to  1877  the  farmers'  organizations,  or  granges, 


68        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

insisted  that  their  representatives  in  the  legislature 
should  compel  railroads  to  make  cheap  rates  for 
country  districts.* 

How  could  this  result  best  be  accomplished? 
This  was  the  question  on  which  there  was  no  con- 
sensus of  opinion.  The  radicals  favored  govern- 
ment ownership  of  railroads  as  the  best  solution 
of  the  problem.  But  the  civil  service  of  the  United 
States  in  1870  was  in  such  bad  condition  that  very 
few  men,  whatever  their  prepossessions  in  favor  of 
government  ownership  as  a  theory,  believed  that 
the  United  States  was  in  a  position  to  put  that 
theory  into  effect.  Public  office  was  regarded  as  a 
reward  for  partisan  activity.  Efficient  men  were 
turned  out  of  their  places  in  order  to  make  room  for 
less  efficient  candidates  who  had  rendered  political 

*  This  organized  attempt  to  control  railroad  rates  by 
representatives  of  farmers'  organizations  is  known  as  the 
Granger  movement.  It  is  noteworthy  as  having  aroused 
the  attention  of  the  American  people  to  the  fact  that  there 
was  a  railroad  problem  which  free  competition  would  not 
solve;  and  as  having  been  the  first  considerable  attempt  to 
use  representative  government  as  a  means  of  limiting  the 
power  of  property  owners  to  manage  their  business  in  their 
own  way.  Strictly  speaking,  it  was  not  an  attempt  to 
attack  the  rights  or  interests  of  property  owners  as  a  class. 
It  was  an  attempt  to  limit  the  rights  of  one  set  of  property 
owners,  the  railroad  security  holders,  in  favor  of  another 
set  of  property  owners,  the  farmers  of  the  Mississippi 
valley. 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION       69 

services,  sometimes  of  a  very  questionable  charac- 
ter, to  help  the  dominant  party  to  triumph  at  the 
preceding  election.  It  was  proverbial  that  it  cost 
the  government  two  or  three  times  as  much  as  it 
cost  a  private  individual  to  get  any  piece  of 
work  done,  and  that  when  the  work  was  done  it 
was  not  well  cared  for  or  efficiently  managed. 
To  entrust  an  agency  like  the  railroad,  on  which 
the  industrial  life  of  the  country  depended,  to 
such  unfit  hands  as  those  of  the  United  States 
officeholders  in  1870,  was  to  say  the  least  a 
dangerous  experiment. 

Reformers  who  were  not  quite  so  radical  advo- 
cated laws  prescribing  the  rates  which  railroads 
could  charge — the  tariff  itself  being  usually  ar- 
ranged by  a  special  commission  appointed  for  the 
purpose.  Such  laws  were  in  fact  passed  and  such 
commissions  appointed  in  a  large  number  of  states. 
The  most  thoroughgoing  experiments  of  this  kind 
were  made  in  the  upper  Mississippi  valley.  The 
commissions  usually  took  the  rates  which  railroads 
charged  at  competitive  points  as  a  standard  of 
what  the  railroads  could  afford,  and  then  reduced 
the  rates  at  intermediate  points  to  a  corresponding 
figure  per  mile.  The  railroads  protested  that  this 
was  confiscation ;  that  an  equal  mileage  system  was 
wholly  inapplicable  to  railroad  business;  that  the 


70        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

rates  at  competitive  points  did  not  pay  a  fair 
share  of  the  fixed  charges ;  and  that  the  application 
of  this  standard  to  other  parts  of  the  system  would 
reduce  them  to  bankruptcy.  The  courts,  however, 
upheld  the  right  of  the  commissions  to  prescribe 
railroad  tariffs;  quoting  the  words  of  Lord  Hale 
De  Portibus  Maris  to  the  effect  that  when  any 
business  was  in  fact  a  monopoly  the  state  had  the 
right  and  duty  to  fix  prices,  and  holding  that  the 
capitalists  had  invested  their  money  subject  to 
this  disability. 

This  was  regarded  as  a  heavy  blow  to  the  security 
owners.  It  apparently  deprived  them  of  their  one 
safeguard  against  reckless  legislation.  But  a  more 
powerful  force  than  that  of  the  courts  was  working 
to  protect  the  investor.  As  soon  as  the  capitalists 
found  that  certain  states  would  not  allow  them 
to  earn  interest  on  railroad  investments  they 
refused  to  invest  more  money  in  those  states.  No 
new  roads  were  constructed;  the  equipment  that 
wore  out  was  not  replaced.  The  rates  at  which 
wheat  was  carried  to  market  remained  low;  but  a 
great  deal  of  wheat  did  not  get  carried  to  market 
at  all,  because  the  physical  means  to  transport  it 
were  lacking.  The  legislatures  could  prevent  high 
charges,  but  they  could  not  prevent  deficient  ser- 
vice; and  deficient  service  was  a  worse  evil  than 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION        71 

high  charges.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
farmers  found  themselves  compelled1  to  allow  the 
railroads  fair  profits.  The  very  men  who  had  been 
most  active  in  passing  rate  laws  from  1870  to  1874 
were  readiest  to  repeal  them  in  1878. 

While  these  experiments  were  being  tried  in  the 
"West,  another  and  more  permanent  solution  was 
devised  in  the  East  by  far-sighted  railroad  men 
like  Albert  Fink  and  publicists  like  Charles 
Francis  Adams.  These  men  pointed  out  that 
while  the  temporary  interests  of  investors  and 
shippers  were  often  different,  the  permanent 
interests  were  very  nearly  or  quite  the  same. 
They  believed  that  the  American  law  should 
be  more  nearly  modeled  on  that  of  England; 
providing  for  publicity  of  accounts  and  rates, 
forbidding  preferences  of  every  kind,  and  directing 
the  railroads,  in  consultation  with  state  railway 
commissioners,  to  prepare  tariffs  by  which  the 
permanent  interests  of  the  investors  and  of  the 
shippers  should  both  be  secured.  On  the  whole, 
the  states  that  adopted  this  plan,  which  was  known 
as  the  Massachusetts  system,  got  better  railroad 
service  and  dealt  with  railroad  abuses  more  effect- 
ively than  those  which  tried  to  prescribe  tariffs 
of  charges.  When  the  first  national  measure  of 
railroad  regulation,  or  interstate  commerce  law, 


72        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

was  passed  in  1887,  it  was  inspired  mainly  by  the 
Massachusetts  idea.  Although  the  Act  was  the 
result  of  a  compromise,  its  general  tenor  was 
conservative  rather  than  radical. 

But  about  this  time  people  discovered  that  there 
were  other  industries  besides  railroads  in  which 
competition  did  not  operate.  The  telegraph  ser- 
vices of  the  country  were  being  consolidated  and 
monopolized  as  completely  as  the  railroad  service. 
The  same  thing  was  true  of  the  telephone,  of 
electric  light  and  power,  and  of  the  gas  and  water 
supply  of  various  cities  whenever  these  were 
controlled  by  private  corporations.  Nor  was  this 
condition  confined  to  the  so-called  "public  utili- 
ties." The  system  of  monopoly  had  extended 
itself  to  productive  enterprise  of  almost  every 
kind.  The  storage  and  refining  of  petroleum  was 
centralized  in  the  hands  of  the  Standard  Oil 
Company.  Other  industries  were  controlled  and 
monopolized  by  corporations  less  widely  known  to 
the  public  but  not  less  effective  and  often  much 
more  arbitrary  in  their  action.  No  longer  could 
we  regard  the  railroad  as  an  exception  to  a  general 
law,  to  be  dealt  with  by  exceptional  means.  The 
very  existence  of  the  competitive  system  of  industry 
was  threatened.  The  question  seemed  to  be  not 
whether  competition  could  be  made  to  work  uni- 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION       73 

versally,  but  whether  it  could  be  made  to  work 
at  aU. 

"With  regard  to  public  services  like  gas  or  water 
or  telephone  communication,  people  quickly  ac- 
cepted the  idea  that  they  must  almost  necessarily 
be  monopolies,  and  took  measures  accordingly. 
The  existence  of  two  rival  gas  or  water  companies 
obviously  involved  unnecessary  expense  on  account 
of  the  duplication  of  pipes.  The  maintenance  of 
two  rival  telephone  companies  caused  less  obvious 
but  more  burdensome  expense,  because  everybody 
had  to  pay  subscriptions  to  two  different  exchanges 
and  had  the  added  inconvenience  of  looking  up 
addresses  in  two  different  books. 

Having  once  squarely  recognized  the  impossi- 
bility of  enforcing  competition  in  these  lines,  the 
problem  of  control  was  comparatively  simple.  The 
various  states  frankly  admitted  that  monopoly  was 
inevitable,  and  appointed  public  utilities  commis- 
sions with  power  to  fix  rates  which  should  be  fair 
both  to  investor  and  to  consumer.  But  it  was 
difficult  to  deal  with  the  ordinary  forms  of  pro- 
ductive industry  in  this  way.  It  would  have  been 
impossible  to  select  a  commission  sufficiently  intel- 
ligent in  its  judgment  and  encyclopaedic  in  its 
knowledge  to  fix  the  prices  of  all  sorts  of  market- 
able commodities.  Nor  did  the  public  wish  to  have 


74        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

things  managed  in  this  fashion.  Whatever  might 
happen  with  railroads  or  telephones,  people  wanted 
factories  and  stores  to  be  competitive. 

Contracts  in  restraint  of  trade  and  other  arrange- 
ments to  prevent  competition  have  always  been 
treated  by  the  common  law  as  against  public  policy 
and  therefore  unenforceable.  But  many  of  the 
states  of  the  Union  went  farther  than  this,  and 
made  such  combinations  misdemeanors  and  pun- 
ished them  accordingly.  In  the  year  1890  Congress 
passed  a  federal  law  of  this  kind,  commonly  known 
as  the  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Act,  which  declared 
illegal  and  criminal,  punishable  by  fine  or  impris- 
onment or  both,  every  contract  or  combination,  in 
the  form  of  trust  or  otherwise,  or  conspiracy  in 
restraint  of  trade  and  commerce  among  the  several 
states  or  with  foreign  nations,  and  any  monopo- 
lizing or  attempt  to  monopolize  any  part  of  trade 
or  commerce  among  the  states. 

It  is  a  little  difficult  to  know  just  how  the  framers 
of  the  Act  of  1890  expected  it  to  be  carried  out. 
It  was  explicitly  stated  during  the  debates  in 
Congress  which  preceded  its  passage  that  it  was 
not  intended  to  apply  to  railroads,  for  these  were 
already  regulated  by  the  Act  of  1887  under  the 
reserved  police  power  of  the  state.  Probably  half 
of  those  who  voted  for  the  Sherman  Act  supposed 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION        75 

that  it  would  remain  a  dead  letter — like  the  man 
who,  when  asked  for  his  views  on  prohibition,  said 
that  he  was  in  favor  of  the  law  and  against  its 
enforcement.  The  Republicans  were  in  power  at 
the  time,  and  the  Republicans  were  friendly  rather 
than  hostile  to  organized  capital.  But  the  Republi- 
can party  managers  were  frightened  by  the  public 
indignation  against  monopolies,  and  thought  that 
they  could  save  the  next  presidential  election  by 
the  passage  of  a  rather  sweeping  law  which  they 
were  confident  that  their  friends  could  evade  if 
they  wished  to. 

They  did  not  succeed  in  carrying  the  election; 
but  when  the  Democrats  came  into  power  in  1893 
the  law  still  remained  unenforced.  Other  issues 
occupied  the  public  mind — tariff  reduction,  the 
currency,  relation  to  European  powers.  Curiously 
enough,  the  first  important  cases  decided  under 
the  Sherman  Act  dealt  with  railroads,  to  which 
its  framers  had  not  intended  it  to  apply.  In  spite 
of  the  presence  of  the  law  upon  the  statute  books, 
the  years  from  1898  to  1901,  which  marked  the 
recovery  of  business  after  the  long  depression  that 
had  preceded  it,  witnessed  a  development  of 
combinations  of  producers  which  for  number, 
variety,  and  over-capitalization  far  surpassed  any- 
thing which  America  had  previously  experienced. 


76        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

For  a  time  it  seemed  as  though  nothing  would 
be  done  to  restrict  the  power  of  these  combinations. 
The  years  named  constituted  a  time  of  general 
prosperity  and  of  advancing  wages.  No  one — 
manufacturer,  farmer,  or  workman — was  inclined 
to  quarrel  very  seriously  with  a  system  which 
appeared  to  contribute  to  his  own  prosperity.  But 
with  the  advent  of  a  period  of  trade  depression  in 
1903  people  at  once  assumed  a  more  critical  atti- 
tude toward  combinations  of  capital;  and  they 
have  continued  to  maintain  that  attitude  down  to 
the  present  time.  During  the  last  decade  the 
United  States  has  witnessed  a  movement  in  the 
direction  of  state  socialism  which,  though  less 
thoroughgoing  than  the  corresponding  movements 
in  Germany  or  France  or  even  England,  is  never- 
theless very  different  in  character  from  anything 
which  occurred  in  the  century  preceding. 

The  reasons  why  no  such  movement  developed 
in  the  nineteenth  century  were  explained  in  the 
previous  lecture.  They  may  be  summed  up  in  a 
single  sentence.  "Where  every  man  of  energy  and 
enterprise  expected  to  become  a  property  owner, 
the  community  was  not  inclined  to  favor  legislation 
that  restricted  the  rights  of  property.  Of  course 
there  were  exceptions,  and  numerous  ones.  All 
through  the  later  years  of  the  century  there  was 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION        77 

a  strong  humanitarian  movement  in  favor  of 
protection  to  the  weak.  There  was  a  growing 
sentiment,  which  found  expression  in  state  laws, 
that  children  must  be  kept  out  of  factories  until 
a  reasonable  age ;  that  hours  of  labor,  particularly 
for  women  and  minors,  must  be  duly  regulated; 
that  unsanitary  or  unsafe  modes  of  doing  business 
must  be  stopped;  and  that  the  crowding  of  popu- 
lation in  the  tenements  of  our  large  cities  must  be 
regulated  as  effectively  as  possible.  Permanent 
labor  commissions,  to  devise  and  enforce  such 
legislation,  were  organized  in  a  large  number  of 
the  states  of  the  Union;  and  a  national  Depart- 
ment of  Labor  with  the  same  ends  in  view  was 
established  in  1888. 

Side  by  side  with  this  humanitarian  movement 
among  property  holders  there  had  been  an  increas- 
ing amount  of  agitation  for  government  control 
of  industry  among  the  workmen  themselves.  With 
the  development  of  immigration  from  eastern 
Europe  there  was  a  growing  proportion  of  laborers 
in  the  United  States  who  did  not  understand  or 
appreciate  the  individualistic  traditions  of  an 
earlier  generation  and  had  neither  the  expectation 
nor  the  ambition  to  become  property  owners  and 
take  their  places  in  the  ranks  of  the  capitalist 
class.  As  the  public  land  of  the  United  States  was 


78        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

used  up,  the  opportunity  of  securing  a  freehold 
grew  less  attractive.  As  manufacturing  establish- 
ments increased  in  size,  the  prospect  of  reaching 
the  headship  of  such  an  establishment  and  becom- 
ing an  independent  employer  of  labor  grew  more 
remote.  Under  these  circumstances  a  kind  of 
antagonism  of  classes  grew  up  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  nineteenth  century  which  had  not  been 
possible  a  generation  or  two  earlier.  Many  active 
and  intelligent  workmen  preferred  to  take  their 
chances  of  becoming  leaders  of  their  own  class  in 
a  struggle  against  the  capitalist,  instead  of  trying 
to  pass  from  the  ranks  of  the  laborers  to  those  of 
the  employers. 

But  this  growth  of  class  antagonisms,  though  it 
increased  the  dangers  of  industrial  conflict,  did 
not  of  itself  produce  any  constructive  changes  in 
the  social  order.  The  Knights  of  Labor  were  able 
to  organize  strikes  and  boycotts  on  a  large  scale 
in  1885,  and  again  in  1893.  They  were  able  to 
secure  the  passage  of  arbitration  laws  in  various 
states,  culminating  in  the  Federal  Act  of  the  year 
1898.  But  they  were  not  able,  either  alone  or  in 
conjunction  with  the  leaders  of  the  humanitarian 
movement,  to  carry  the  country  with  them  in  any 
organized  effort  to  overthrow  the  competitive 
system  or  seriously  impair  its  dominance.  The 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION       79 

efforts  of  the  laborers  as  a  class  to  secure  their 
rights,  or  what  they  deemed  to  be  their  rights, 
aroused  antagonism  in  other  equally  important 
classes  of  the  community,  particularly  among  the 
small  farmers.  What  modern  sociologists  call  the 
creation  of  class  consciousness  has  done  more  harm 
than  good  to  the  labor  movement  in  the  United 
States.  To  accomplish  their  ends  laboring  classes 
must  work  with  other  classes,  not  against  them. 
The  attempt  of  the  Knights  of  Labor  to  boycott 
everybody  that  did  not  obey  the  dictates  of  their 
organization  resulted  after  two  years  in  a  virtual 
boycott  of  the  Knights  of  Labor  by  the  community. 
The  employment  of  foreign  socialistic  literature  to 
excite  workmen  against  the  traditional  laws  and 
institutions  of  America  has  on  the  whole  done 
much  more  harm  to  those  who  used  it  than  to  those 
whom  it  was  intended  to  injure.  Affiliations 
between  the  more  radical  wing  of  the  American 
labor  leaders  and  the  Industrial  Workers  of  the 
World  have  been  a  source  of  weakness  to  the  labor 
movement  rather  than  of  strength. 

The  most  serious  mistake  of  the  American  labor 
leaders  of  the  nineteenth  century,  from  the  stand- 
point of  practical  politics,  was  that  they  ignored 
and  antagonized  the  farmers. 

In  the  year  1879  Henry  George  published  his 


80        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

remarkable  book  on  Progress  and  Poverty,  which 
attracted  wide  attention  not  only  in  America  but 
throughout  the  whole  civilized  world.  It  was 
brilliantly  written;  it  had  great  loftiness  of  pur- 
pose. It  promised  the  country  deliverance  from 
the  worst  economic  evils  under  which  it  labored. 
Its  sales  ran  up  into  the  hundreds  of  thousands. 
While  its  conclusions  were  not  accepted  by  the 
thoroughgoing  socialists,  brought  up  in  the  school 
of  Marx,  they  were  popular  with  nearly  all  Ameri- 
can workmen  who  were  actively  engaged  in  labor 
agitation.  It  was  George's  fundamental  principle 
that  all  necessary  reforms  could  be  secured  by 
taxing  the  unearned  increment  of  land  to  its  full 
amount.  This  conclusion  was  for  obvious  reasons 
exceedingly  unpopular  with  landowners  of  every 
kind;  with  the  small  farmer  or  the  owner  of  a 
little  home  no  less  than  with  the  large  proprietor. 
The  fact  that  the  labor  party  committed  itself  so 
generally  to  an  endorsement  of  Henry  George's 
views  made  it  impossible  for  that  party  to  be 
successful  in  a  democracy  where  a  great  number 
of  the  voters  lived  on  land  which  they  owned  or 
hoped  to  own. 

A  quarter  of  a  century  later  all  this  had  changed. 
In  1903  the  main  attacks  of  the  labor  men  were 
no  longer  directed  against  land  ownership,  but 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION       81 

against  organized  capital.  The  alignment  of 
parties  was  therefore  quite  different.  The  smaller 
landed  proprietors,  in  the  city  and  in  the  country, 
had  changed  sides.  The  owners  of  farms  and 
homes  did  not  regard  the  attempts  to  control  large 
combinations  of  capital  as  attacks  upon  themselves, 
but  rather  as  measures  conducive  to  their  interest. 

Two  main  causes  had  combined  to  produce  this 
attitude  of  hostility  on  the  part  of  the  farmers 
toward  the  organizations  of  capital.  In  the  first 
place,  the  farmers  believed  that  combinations  of 
capitalists,  by  suppressing  competition,  were  en- 
abled to  charge  more  for  their  goods  than  they 
otherwise  would  have  received,  and  that  the  men 
who  bought  goods  from  the  manufacturers  or 
services  from  the  transportation  agencies  were  by 
this  means  unfairly  taxed ;  and  in  the  second  place 
they  felt  a  strong  and  somewhat  unreasoning 
jealousy  of  the  "money  power"  which  was  behind 
these  organizations. 

Prices  of  all  goods  and  services  had  risen  very 
rapidly  in  the  years  from  1899  to  1903.  The  profits 
of  industrial  monopolies  during  the  same  period 
had  also  been  very  large.  It  was  therefore  natural 
that  the  buyers  should  attribute  the  increase  of 
price  to  the  existence  of  monopoly,  and  should 
regard  the  profit  as  having  been  obtained  mainly 


82        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

by  unfair  measures  of  extortion  from  the  public 
which  competition  would  have  prevented.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  this  view  was  only  partly  correct. 
The  period  from  1899  to  1903  was  one  when  prices 
rose  in  nearly  all  industries,  whether  monopolized 
or  competitive.  This  was  a  necessary  result  of  the 
increase  in  gold  production  in  the  closing  years 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  followed  by  the  sudden 
expansion  of  banking  credits  at  the  beginning  of 
the  twentieth.  Every  man  who  was  engaged  in 
the  production  of  goods  or  services  which  took 
time — every  one,  in  short,  who  had  invested  capital 
at  the  beginning  of  this  period  to  get  returns  at 
the  end  of  it — got  more  than  a  normal  rate  of 
profit,  because  currency  conditions  enabled  him  to 
sell  his  goods  at  higher  prices  than  anybody 
expected.  The  prosperity  of  the  large  corporations 
was  partly  due  to  this  cause;  it  was  partly  due  to 
economies  of  method  and  organization  which  they 
were  able  to  effect  as  a  result  of  their  combination ; 
and  it  was  partly  also  due  to  their  power  to  fix 
prices  without  fear  of  competition  on  a  large  scale. 
But  it  was  natural  enough  that  this  last  element 
had  exaggerated  importance  in  the  public  mind. 
People  saw  that  the  cost  of  living  had  greatly 
increased;  they  saw  that  many  articles  which  had 
been  sold  at  low  prices  under  competition  in  1899 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION       83 

were  sold  at  high  prices  under  combination  in  1903 ; 
and  they  naturally  thought  that  the  difference  was 
due  to  the  suppression  of  competition. 

Even  more  potent  than  their  dislike  for  high 
prices  was  their  jealousy  of  the  money  power 
which  was  supposed  to  be  behind  these  combina- 
tions. The  South  and  West  have  an  inherent 
distrust  of  New  York.  They  believe  that  the 
financial  institutions  in  and  around  Wall  Street 
exercise  a  baleful  influence  upon  the  business  of 
the  country  as  a  whole.*  I  shall  not  try  to  discuss 
how  far  there  was  any  real  antagonism  of  interests 
between  the  West  and  the  East  in  these  matters. 
There  was  at  any  rate  a  feeling  of  antagonism; 
and  many  things  happened  to  accentuate  that 
feeling  in  the  opening  years  of  the  twentieth 
century. 

Chief  among  these  was  the  development  of  inter- 
locking directorates.  In  combining  the  manufac- 
turing and  transportation  interests  of  the  country 
on  a  large  scale,  the  banks  of  New  York  and  other 
eastern  cities  were  extremely  active.  Sometimes 
the  bankers  themselves  took  the  initiative;  some- 

*  "  If  a  man  finds  a  discrepancy  between  the  face  value 
of  a  share  of  stock  and  the  amount  actually  paid  in  by  the 
subscriber,"  said  a  prominent  and  high-minded  New  York 
banker,  "the  West  at  once  believes  that  the  difference  was 
stolen,  and  probably  in  Wall  Street ! ' ' 


84        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

times  the  manufacturers  who  wanted  to  make  a 
combination  went  to  the  bankers  to  secure  their 
help.     But  in  either  case  the  financiers  of  New 
York  and  Boston  and  other  eastern  cities  were 
active  agents  in  the  work  of  combination  and  the 
exchange  of  securities  incident  thereto.    As  a  con- 
sequence the  banks  had  a  large  representation  in 
the  directorates  of  the  new  concerns.     The  same 
man  might  be  a  director  of  twenty,  fifty,  or  even 
a  hundred  large  combinations ;  not  because  he  was 
familiar  with  their  work  from  the  operating  side, 
but  because  he  could  give  them  financial  strength 
and  support.    Under  these  circumstances  the  people 
who  were  not  included  in  such  combinations — the 
small    farmer,    the    salaried    official,    the    wage- 
earner — assumed  that  all  these  great  enterprises 
were  managed  from  one  common  center,  and  that 
the  purpose  that  controlled  their  management  was 
gain  for  the  financial  world  at  the  expense  of  the 
industrial  one. 

These  views  were  reflected  in  the  public  press. 
Journals  of  every  kind — daily,  weekly,  and 
monthly — published  articles  which  stimulated  this 
suspicion  by  fair  means  and  foul.  Gradually  the 
people  came  to  believe  that  there  was  an  alliance 
between  the  money  power  in  Wall  Street  and  the 
conservative  element  in  the  halls  of  Congress. 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION        85 

There  were  plausible  grounds  for  this  belief. 
There  has  always  been  a  certain  amount  of  unwise 
congressional  legislation  in  behalf  of  various  indus- 
trial enterprises,  and  a  great  deal  of  improper 
employment  of  lobbyists  to  secure  such  ends.  All 
this  was  made  the  subject  of  attack;  and  it  was  a 
kind  of  attack  that  was  peculiarly  effective.  When 
President  Cleveland  in  1888  tried  to  show  the 
farmer  that  the  high  protective  tariff  injured  the 
economic  interests  of  the  country,  the  farmers  did 
not  listen  to  his  arguments.  But  when  it  was 
suggested  twenty  years  later  that  the  tariff  had 
been  devised  in  the  interest  of  a  money  power 
which  the  farmer  hated,  the  suggestion  at  once 
found  ready  credence. 

Dislike  of  high  prices  and  jealousy  of  the  money 
power  thus  combined  to  put  the  small  property 
owners  on  the  side  of  those  who  had  no  property, 
rather  than  on  the  side  of  those  who  had  large 
property.  It  was  in  this  respect  that  the  indus- 
trial movements  of  1903  differed  from  those  of 
1883  or  1873.  In  the  year  1873  the  farmers  were 
agitating  for  state  control,  but  the  laborers  were 
not.  In  the  year  1883  the  laborers  were  agitating 
for  state  control,  but  the  farmers  were  not.  The 
year  1903  for  the  first  time  saw  these  two  large 
elements  ranged  on  the  same  side. 


86        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

The  effect  of  this  has  been  seen  both  in  the  law 
and  in  the  politics  of  the  country.  The  decade 
from  1903  to  1913  has  witnessed  the  passage  of  a 
number  of  measures  which  twenty  years  ago  would 
have  been  regarded  as  distinctly  socialistic  in  tenor. 
Where  state  control  already  existed  it  has  been 
made  more  strict.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Law 
of  1887  was  supplemented  by  the  Elkins  Act  of 
1903,  the  Hepburn  Act  of  1906,  and  the  Mann 
Act  of  1910.  These  measures  had  the  support  of 
conservatives  who  saw  the  necessity  of  bowing  to 
public  opinion,  as  well  as  of  progressives  who  had 
helped  to  create  that  opinion.  Nor  was  the  atten- 
tion of  Congress  confined  to  rate  regulation.  A 
Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor  was  estab- 
lished in  1903,  with  powers  much  wider  than  those 
of  the  old  Labor  Bureau.  A  federal  Employers' 
Liability  Act  was  passed  in  1906.  An  Hours  of 
Service  Act  went  into  effect  in  1907.  And  mean- 
time the  experiments  of  individual  states  in  these 
matters  went  far  beyond  what  was  done  by 
federal  authority. 

But  of  even  more  consequence  than  the  passing 
of  new  laws  was  the  increased  activity  shown  in 
enforcing  old  laws.  By  the  mere  action  of  public 
sentiment  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor 
in  the  Federal  Government  was  given  an  impor- 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION       87 

tance  which  its  sponsors  hardly  anticipated.  By 
the  same  force  of  public  opinion,  statutes  which 
at  first  had  been  little  more  than  dead  letters  were 
brought  into  active  use  as  agencies  of  industrial 
control.  When  the  federal  arbitration  Act  of  1898 
was  originally  passed  it  was  regarded  both  by  its 
advocates  and  by  its  opponents  as  a  thing  of  slight 
consequence — a  piece  of  machinery  which  could  be 
invoked  only  in  occasional  instances.  Today  public 
opinion  virtually  compels  railroad  corporations 
doing  interstate  business  to  submit  their  disputes 
to  federal  arbitration.  Of  still  greater  significance 
is  the  history  of  the  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Act  of 
1890.  In  the  first  twelve  years  during  which  this 
law  was  on  the  statute  t>ooks,  only  two  or  three 
decisions  adverse  to  industrial  combinations  were 
rendered,  and  these  were  not  of  great  importance. 
But  in  the  years  following  1903  prosecutions  and 
decisions  under  the  Sherman  Act  followed  one 
another  in  rapid  succession.  A  climax,  though 
not  an  end,  was  reached  in  1911,  when  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  ordered  the  dissolution  of 
two  of  the  largest  and  strongest  industrial 
combinations  in  the  country — the  Standard  Oil 
Company  and  the  American  Tobacco  Company. 
Nor  was  this  movement  confined  to  industrial 
combinations.  Railroad  companies  were  made  to 


88        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

feel  the  effect  of  the  new  policy  and  the  disposition 
of  the  Supreme  Court  to  extend  its  application  to 
an  increasing  range  of  cases;  a  disposition  which 
reflected  the  progress  of  public  opinion  in  the 
country  as  a  whole.* 

"While  all  political  parties  in  the  United  States 
claimed  credit  for  the  principles  of  the  Sherman 
Act  and  professed  a  wish  to  enforce  it,  the  Demo- 
cratic party  was  most  consistently  active  in  this 
direction;  and  the  triumph  of  the  Democrats  at 
the  presidential  election  of  1912,  whatever  may 
have  been  the  other  causes  which  contributed 
thereto,  represented  a  victory  for  those  who 
desired  a  rigid  enforcement  of  the  laws  against 
organized  capital  and  a  return  to  a  system  of 
smaller  industrial  units. 

But  though  the  action  of  legislatures  and  courts 
during  recent  years  has  been  satisfactory  to  the 
public  from  a  political  standpoint,  it  has  not  been 
so  from  an  economic  one.  The  dissolution  of  large 
companies  has  not  been  followed  by  a  reduction 
in  charges.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  been  attended 
in  many  instances  by  an  increase.  This  increase 
is  partly  due  to  the  general  rise  of  wages  through- 

*  The  student  of  American  constitutional  history  will  find 
this  progress  set  forth  in  detail  in  F.  N.  Judson,  The  Law 
of  Interstate  Commerce. 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION       89 

out  the  country ;  partly  to  the  increased  cost  of  the 
methods  of  doing  business  imposed  by  recent  Acts 
of  Congress  and  of  the  several  states;  and  partly 
also  to  the  fact  that  the  work  of  separate  concerns 
is  in  many  respects  less  economical  than  that  of  a 
large  combination.  Manufacturers  who  have  been 
forced  to  dissolve  their  combinations  have  raised 
their  prices  in  order  to  cover  this  increased  cost. 
Whatever  good  enforced  competition  may  have 
done,  it  has  not  brought  the  expected  reduction  in 
the  expense  of  living.  Dissolution  appears  to  have 
hurt  the  consumers  more  than  the  investors. 

"With  railroads  the  case  has  been  different. 
When  railroad  expenses  are  increased  either  by 
wage  arbitrations  or  by  new  governmental  require- 
ments, the  companies  are  not  allowed  to  raise  their 
charges  in  order  to  meet  the  loss  unless  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  gives  its  consent;  and 
this  at  best  involves  prolonged  delay.  The  financial 
results  to  the  railroads  arising  from  their  inability 
to  raise  rates  have  already  been  very  grave,  and 
the  results  to  the  public  are  beginning  to  be 
equally  bad.  Not  only  has  there  been  loss  of 
dividends  and  interest,  but  there  has  been  decided 
reduction  in  quality  of  service,  diminished  demand 
for  iron  and  steel  products,  and  widespread  dis- 


90        UNDERCUEEENTS  IN  POLITICS 

tress  among  large  numbers  of  men  thrown  out  of 
work  in  transportation  and  allied  industries. 

This  state  of  things  seems  likely  to  grow  worse 
instead  of  better  in  the  immediate  future.*  It  has 
become  clear  that  the  enforced  reintroduction  of 
competition  by  authority  of  the  government  does 
not  do  for  the  public  in  the  way  of  service,  economy, 
and  rapid  investment  of  capital  what  the  old- 
fashioned  automatic  competition  did  for  our 
fathers.  In  order  to  get  adequate  service  and  low 
rates,  inducement  must  be  afforded  for  added 
investments  of  capital.  This  inducement  does  not 
exist  today,  and  the  country  is  suffering  from  the 
consequences.  The  immediate  future  will  un- 
doubtedly see  a  reaction.  There  will  be  a  move- 
ment either  in  the  direction  of  greater  freedom 
to  the  capitalist  or  of  more  intelligent  supervision 
on  the  part  of  the  government.  The  conservative 
wing  of  the  Republican  party  hopes  for  the  former ; 
the  progressive  wing  desires  the  latter. 

In  a  rather  remarkable  passage  of  the  Politics 
Aristotle  says  that  the  permanence  of  a  common- 
wealth or  organized  body  of  citizens  requires  the 
reconciliation  of  two  somewhat  inconsistent  aims. 
The  laws  must  correspond  to  the  wishes  and  the 

*  I  leave  this  sentence  as  it  was  uttered  in  May,  1914. 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION       91 

judgment  of  the  great  body  of  freemen;  the  con- 
duct of  the  business  of  the  nation  must  be  in  the 
hands  of  men  who  are  more  skilled  than  the  great 
body  of  freemen  can  be,  and  who  will  probably 
do  things  for  the  community  as  a  whole  which  are 
not  understood  or  approved  at  the  time. 

During  the  first  century  of  the  American 
republic  the  first  of  these  results  was  secured,  at 
the  sacrifice  of  the  second.  The  means  on  which 
the  framers  of  the  Constitution  relied  in  order  to 
obtain  expert  conduct  of  public  affairs — the  system 
of  indirect  election,  for  instance — proved  futile  for 
the  purpose.  During  the  greater  part  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  the  only  way  to  secure  skilful  man- 
agement of  public  business  was  to  keep  it  out  of 
the  hands  of  the  government  and  put  it  into  the 
hands  of  the  property  holder.  Many  things  which 
European  nations  did  through  government  agencies 
were  left  undone  in  America.  Many  other  things 
were  left  to  private  capital. 

As  long  as  there  was  even  a  semblance  of  free 
competition,  the  American  nation  as  a  whole  was 
well  content  to  have  most  of  its  business  done  by 
private  capital  because  in  that  way  it  could  be  done 
efficiently  and  progressively,  while  under  the  exist- 
ing conditions  of  the  American  civil  service 
government  management  would  have  meant  waste 


92        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

and  stagnation.  Now  that  competition  is  found 
to  be  impossible  in  many  of  the  important  lines 
of  business,  the  public  is  not  so  well  content  to 
leave  things  in  private  hands  and  is  willing  to 
experiment  with  state  control,  even  at  some  sacrifice 
of  efficiency.  But  our  experiments  in  this  line  are 
proving  very  costly;  more  costly  than  the  general 
public  even  yet  appreciates.  The  solution  of  the 
problem  will  not  be  reached  until  the  public 
demand  for  state  control  of  industry  and  for 
trained  civil  service  go  hand  in  hand. 

America  must  learn  the  overwhelming  cost  to 
the  consumer  and  the  public  of  inexpert  control. 
We  have  made  some  progress  in  that  direction  since 
1870 ;  but  we  are  far  from  having  reached  the  point 
which  a  great  nation  needs  to  attain.  Outside  of 
the  army,  the  navy,  and  the  judiciary,  the  standard 
of  administrative  intelligence  in  America  is  lower 
than  it  is  in  Europe,  and  the  public  appreciation 
of  the  need  of  administrative  intelligence  a  great 
deal  lower.  High  positions  in  the  public  service,  in 
spite  of  many  honorable  exceptions,  are  still  given 
as  political  rewards.  High  positions  in  private  or 
corporate  business,  with  some  dishonorable  excep- 
tions, are  still  given  as  rewards  for  efficiency. 
Until  these  conditions  are  altered  and  the  public 
appreciates  expert  work  in  the  offices  of  state. 


ECONOMICS  AND  LEGISLATION        93 

industrial  control  in  the  United  States  is  likely 
to  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  property  owner,  on 
such  terms  as  will  give  adequate  inducement  for 
the  saving  of  capital  and  adequate  guarantees  for 
its  intelligent  use. 


POLITICAL  METHODS  OLD  AND  NEW 


IV 
THE  GROWTH  OF  PAETT  MACHINEEY 

It  is  the  intent  of  every  nation,  whatever  its 
form  of  government,  to  have  that  government 
administered  in  the  public  interest.  It  is  the  per- 
petual danger  of  every  governing  body — monarchy, 
aristocracy,  or  democracy — that  its  powers  will  be 
used,  not  for  the  public  interest  but  for  the 
interests  of  certain  individuals  or  classes. 

Each  form  of  government  is  liable  to  its  own 
peculiar  perversion.  A  true  monarchy  is  a  govern- 
ment by  a  king  for  the  benefit  of  the  people.  "When 
he  governs  for  the  benefit  of  himself  and  his  friends, 
he  perverts  monarchy  into  tyranny.  A  true 
aristocracy  is  a  government  by  the  wealthy  and 
intelligent  classes  for  the  benefit  of  the  people. 
When  they  begin  to  govern  for  their  own  benefit 
they  pervert  aristocracy  into  oligarchy.  A  true 
democracy  is  a  government  by  the  whole  body  of 
citizens  for  the  benefit  of  the  people.  When  for 
any  reason  whatever  they  pursue  some  less  complete 
or  more  shortsighted  end,  they  pervert  democracy 
into  demagogy.  These  dangers  are  as  serious  today 


98        UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

as  they  were  when  Aristotle  called  attention  to 
them  two  thousand  years  ago. 

It  was  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  these  dangers 
that  many  publicists  recommended  a  sharp  sepa- 
ration of  the  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial 
departments  of  the  government.  If  one  group  of 
men  controlled  public  business,  another  made  the 
laws,  and  a  third  supervised  their  administration, 
it  seemed  unlikely  that  any  one  of  the  three  groups 
could  manage  the  affairs  of  state  for  its  own  selfish 
purposes.  This  division  of  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment, with  the  resulting  system  of  "checks  and 
balances,"  was  a  favorite  device  of  English  states- 
men in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries. 
It  was  warmly  commended  by  Montesquieu.  It 
found  expression  in  American  colonial  charters. 
It  was  carried  out  quite  fully  in  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States.  The  framers  of  that  instru- 
ment hoped  that  these  checks  and  balances  would 
prevent  the  use  of  the  powers  of  government  in 
behalf  of  any  single  dominant  politician  or  group 
of  politicians. 

To  a  large  extent  they  were  successful.  They 
created  a  government,  strong  enough  to  do  the 
work  required  of  it  at  home  and  abroad,  which  has 
lasted  for  a  century  and  a  quarter  without  becom- 
ing either  a  tyranny,  an  oligarchy,  or  a  demagogy. 


PARTY  MACHINERY  99 

They  enabled  us  to  avoid  the  charted  rocks  and 
shoals  on  which  other  ships  of  state  have  been 
wrecked.  But  there  was  an  uncharted  shoal  that 
they  did  not  avoid — a  form  of  perversion  of 
popular  government  of  which  they  knew  nothing, 
and  which  has  been  a  serious  and  increasing 
menace  to  our  institutions.  This  is  the  perversion 
of  party. 

The  word  "party"  has  two  quite  distinct 
meanings.  It  may  be  an  organization  whose 
primary  object  is  to  promote  certain  measures  and 
policies,  and  which  seeks  to  place  its  members  in 
office  as  a  means  to  that  end;  or  it  may  be  one 
whose  primary  purpose  is  to  secure  office  for  its 
leaders  and  rewards  for  their  followers,  valuing 
measures  and  policies  according  to  their  utility 
in  promoting  that  result.  The  former  represents 
the  legitimate  function  and  use  of  party ;  the  latter, 
its  terribly  frequent  perversion. 

Writers  like  Elihu  Root  or  Abbott  Lawrence 
Lowell  habitually  think  of  parties  in  the  first  of 
these  two  senses.  According  to  Mr.  Root,  the 
essential  thing  which  the  party  system  does  is  to 
organize  public  opinion  so  that  the  important 
issues  can  be  squarely  presented  to  the  citizens  at 
successive  elections.  The  casting  of  a  vote  is  but 
the  last  and  often  the  least  important  part  of  the 


100      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

citizen's  political  activity.  If  each  man  went  to 
the  polls  on  election  day  to  vote  for  the  candidates 
he  regarded  as  best  or  for  the  measures  that  he 
deemed  most  important,  the  votes  would  be  so 
scattered  that  nothing  could  be  done.  Preliminary 
organization  is  needed  to  make  this  vote  effective ; 
to  determine  what  measures  interest  a  large  part 
of  the  citizens  instead  of  a  small  part,  and  what 
men  will  command  confidence  as  advocates  of  those 
measures.  It  is  by  their  influence  within  such 
parties  in  helping  to  make  up  the  statements  of 
principle,  even  more  than  by  their  vote  at  elections 
in  determining  which  party  is  to  prevail,  that 
intelligent  men  contribute  to  the  work  of  demo- 
cratic government.  This  view  of  Mr.  Root  has 
been  illustrated  and  in  some  respects  supple- 
mented by  the  pregnant  phrase  of  President 
Lowell  in  which  he  compares  politicians  with 
brokers.  "The  process  of  forming  public  opinion 
involves  bringing  men  together  in  masses  on  some 
middle  ground  where  they  can  combine  to  carry 
out  a  common  policy.  In  short,  it  requires  a  species 
of  brokerage,  and  one  of  the  functions  of  politicians 
is  that  of  brokers.  Perhaps  it  is  their  most 
universal  function  in  a  democracy." 

But  the  actual  party  organizations  as  we  see 
them   at  the  present   day  seldom  conform  fully 


PARTY  MACHINERY  101 

to  the  descriptions  of  Mr.  Root  or  Mr.  Lowell,  and 
often  depart  from  them  very  widely.  It  frequently 
happens  that  the  chief  purpose  of  parties  is  to 
utilize  the  offices  of  the  country  as  a  means  of 
power  and  influence  and  livelihood  for  the  party 
leaders.  They  seize  upon  principles  and  embody 
them  in  the  party  platform,  not  on  account  of  the 
public  importance  of  these  principles  in  securing 
national  prosperity,  but  on  account  of  their  private 
importance  in  attracting  votes  to  the  organization. 
The  main  object  of  such  a  party  is  the  control  of 
the  government  for  its  own  purposes,  rather  than 
the  use  of  the  government  for  what  it  deems  to 
be  the  needs  of  the  people.  When  a  party  has 
taken  this  shape  the  politician  is  no  longer  a 
broker  in  opinions;  he  is  a  broker  in  offices,  in 
appropriations,  in  privileges. 

Any  one  who  looks  at  the  history  of  party 
politics  in  the  United  States  in  recent  years  will 
see  to  how  great  an  extent  this  second  meaning 
of  the  term  "party"  has  supplanted  the  first.  I 
propose  in  this  lecture  to  trace  the  development 
of  this  perverted  conception  of  party  and  to  show 
the  evils  which  have  resulted  from  it.  In  the  next 
lecture  I  shall  discuss  some  of  the  remedies  for 
this  evil  which  have  recently  been  introduced  or 
advocated.  In  the  concluding  lecture  I  shall  try  to 


102      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

show  what  changes  in  our  political  life  are  needed 
for  the  successful  operation  of  these  remedies. 

If  the  men  who  in  September  1787  signed  the 
proposed  constitution  of  the  United  States  had 
returned  to  the  scene  of  their  labors  in  September 
1912,  they  would  have  been  astonished  to  find  that 
only  two  alterations  had  been  made  in  their 
original  work.  By  the  Eleventh  Article  of  Amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution,  jurisdiction  over  suits 
brought  against  a  state  by  citizens  of  other  states 
or  of  foreign  countries  had  been  taken  out  of  the 
federal  courts.  By  the  Twelfth  Article  the  presi- 
dential electors,  in  voting  for  two  persons,  were 
compelled  to  specify  on  their  ballots  which  they 
named  for  president  and  which  for  vice-president. 
This  was  all.  The  other  so-called  Amendments  to 
the  Constitution  were  supplements  rather  than 
amendments.  They  dealt  with  things  outside  of 
the  original  scope  of  the  instrument.  Some  of 
them  were  trivial  in  their  effects,  some  were  of 
far-reaching  importance;  but  whether  trivial  or 
important,  they  did  not  alter  the  machinery  of 
federal  government  which  was  provided  in  the 
Constitution  itself. 

Since    the    date    named    there    have    been    two 


PAETY  MACHINERY  103 

further  changes  in  our  constitutional  machinery 
which  are  of  somewhat  greater  importance  than 
those  that  I  have  named ;  one  removing  restrictions 
upon  the  levy  of  direct  taxes  by  federal  authority, 
and  the  other  requiring  that  United  States  senators 
be  elected  by  the  people  of  the  several  states 
instead  of  by  their  legislatures.  Yet  even  when 
these  changes  are  taken  into  account,  the  alteration 
is  small  in  comparison  with  the  size  and  importance 
of  the  body  of  the  instrument. 

To  this  permanence  of  constitutional  machinery 
I  doubt  whether  the  history  of  any  other  active 
and  growing  state  can  offer  a  parallel.  Certainly 
no  democracy  of  ancient  or  medieval  times  can 
show  anything  like  it,  nor  can  any  contemporary 
state  of  Europe  point  to  a  similar  experience. 
During  a  period  in  which  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  remained  virtually  unaltered,  Eng- 
land had  by  successive  acts  changed  almost  beyond 
recognition  the  manner  of  election  of  one  house 
of  Parliament  and  the  range  of  powers  of  the 
other;  France  had  made  at  least  seven  radical 
breaks  in  the  continuity  of  her  government,  with 
corresponding  changes  in  her  constitutional  provi- 
sions; the  Holy  Roman  Empire  had  gone  to 
destruction,  and  had  gradually  been  reconstructed 
into  a  new  Germany  and  a  new  Austria;  Russia 


104      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

had  made  vigorous  and  partially  successful  at- 
tempts to  reorganize  its  political  system.  It  has 
been  and  is  a  matter  of  perpetual  wonder  that  a 
group  of  men  with  limited  experience  of  public 
affairs,  chosen  somewhat  hurriedly  and  hampered 
at  every  stage  by  the  necessity  of  compromise  in 
order  to  get  any  constitution  at  all,  should  have 
created  so  enduring  a  structure. 

But  while  the  machinery  of  the  Constitution  has 
remained  unaltered,  the  working  of  that  machinery 
has  changed  radically.  If  James  Madison  came 
back  today  he  would  find  President  and  Congress 
and  courts  elected  or  appointed  in  the  same  ways 
and  clothed  with  substantially  the  same  powers 
that  were  contemplated  in  the  debates  of  the 
Constitutional  Convention.  But  side  by  side  with 
the  familiar  names  and  authorities  of  these  offices 
he  would  find  a  number  of  unfamiliar  names  and 
authorities  of  equal  importance.  He  would  hear 
of  platforms  and  primaries,  of  caucuses  and 
nominees,  of  conventions  and  bosses.  He  would 
be  confronted  with  a  strange  set  of  powers  and 
restrictions,  nowhere  mentioned  in  the  Constitu- 
tion, but  coordinate  or  at  times  superior  in  prac- 
tical importance  to  the  powers  and  restrictions 
which  the  Constitution  itself  provided.  Most  of 
these  new  names  would  mean  little  or  nothing  to 


PARTY  MACHINERY  105 

his  mind.  The  few  that  he  did  understand,  like 
"nominee,"  would  seem  like  appalling  importa- 
tions from  the  effete  monarchies  of  Europe.  He 
would  find  himself  in  a  country  whose  legal  forms 
of  government  were  familiar  but  whose  extra-legal 
customs  and  habits  of  government  were  wholly 
strange. 

The  anomaly  itself  is  startling;  but  the  reasons 
for  the  anomaly  are  quite  simple.  The  framers 
of  the  Constitution  had  arranged  with  great  care 
and  skill  the  mode  of  election  of  public  officers  and 
the  duties  of  those  officers  after  they  were  chosen. 
They  had  not  attempted  to  arrange  in  any  way 
the  mode  in  which  these  officers  should  be  nomi- 
nated or  the  pledges  that  might  be  exacted  of 
them  before  they  were  chosen.  A  remarkable 
instance  of  this  is  seen  in  the  provisions  regarding 
presidential  electors.  It  was  the  obvious  expecta- 
tion of  the  Constitutional  Convention  that  the 
members  of  the  electoral  college  would  exercise 
independent  judgment  in  the  selection  of  candi- 
dates for  president  and  vice-president,  instead  of 
merely  ratifying  a  nomination  which  had  been 
prepared  for  them  in  advance.  It  took  but  four, 
or  at  most  eight,  years  to  show  how  futile  was  that 
expectation.  There  may  have  been  a  few  people 
who  were  willing  to  give  the  electors  discretionary 


106      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

power  to  use  their  best  judgment  in  voting  for  a 
president.  The  great  majority  wished  to  know  in 
advance  the  names  of  men  for  whom  the  several 
electors  were  going  to  vote.  They  insisted  that 
this  matter  should  be  settled  before  the  electors 
were  chosen  instead  of  afterward.  They  wished 
their  representatives  in  the  electoral  college  to  be 
pledged  to  vote  for  the  candidate  they  liked  best. 

This  change  was  gradually  followed  by  another 
of  the  same  character.  The  old  theory  of  repre- 
sentative government  was  that  the  citizens  in  each 
district  would  send  to  the  legislature  a  man  in 
whose  judgment  they  had  confidence,  in  order  that 
he  might  discuss  with  other  members  the  questions 
that  came  before  that  body  and  then  vote  in  the 
way  that  he  thought  wisest.  This  was  what  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution  expected.  But  the 
people  were  not  satisfied  with  this  way  of  doing 
things.  They  had  ideas  of  their  own  on  public 
questions.  They  wanted  to  know  which  way  a 
candidate  for  Congress  was  going  to  vote  on  the 
subjects  that  were  likely  to  come  up  for  discussion. 
They  often  preferred  to  cast  their  ballots  for  a 
second-rate  man  who  would  reflect  his  constituents ' 
opinions  rather  than  for  a  first-rate  man  who 
might  look  at  things  differently.  Measures,  not 
men,  was  the  cry.  Not  content  with  having  their 


PARTY  MACHINERY  107 

electors  instructed  in  advance  as  to  their  vote  for 
president,  they  insisted  on  having  their  congress- 
men pledged  in  advance  as  to  the  legislative 
measures  which  they  would  support. 

This  change  took  place  more  slowly  than  the 
other,  because  it  is  relatively  easy  to  determine 
what  names  are  coming  before  the  presidential 
elector  for  his  choice,  and  relatively  hard  to 
determine  what  measures  are  coming  before  the 
congressman  for  his  vote.  Nor  did  it  come  with 
equal  rapidity  in  all  parts  of  the  country.  The 
change  was  slower  where  the  old-fashioned  aristo- 
cratic traditions  were  stronger.  It  was  slower  in 
the  East  than  in  the  West,  slower  in  the  South 
than  in  the  North.  It  is  only  within  the  present 
generation  that  it  has  become  substantially  com- 
plete. In  my  undergraduate  days  it  was  still  a 
debated  question  whether  a  congressman  should 
vote  according  to  his  own  judgment  or  that  of  his 
constituents ;  and  on  a  memorable  occasion  in  1878 
Mr.  Lamar  of  Mississippi,  one  of  the  last  and  best 
of  the  political  leaders  of  the  old  school,  cour- 
ageously defied  both  the  caucus  of  his  party  and 
the  public  opinion  of  his  district  by  voting  as  he 
thought  best.  But  as  a  general  rule  of  political 
practice  our  congressmen  as  early  as  1850  found 
themselves  deprived  of  the  right  of  independent 


108      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

judgment  on  main  issues  almost  as  completely  as 
were  the  presidential  electors. 

But  who  should  nominate  the  candidates  or 
define  the  issues  to  which  congressmen  should  be 
pledged  ? 

The  actual  work  of  nominating  candidates  for 
president  was  at  first  done  by  the  members  of 
Congress  at  the  last  session  preceding  the  election. 
The  Federalists  did  this  in  1796;  the  Democrats 
followed  their  example  in  1800.  For  twenty  years 
thereafter  the  members  of  the  electoral  college, 
whatever  their  personal  preference,  found  them- 
selves pledged  in  advance  by  an  obligation,  which 
had  no  constitutional  sanction  but  which  was  too 
strong  for  them  to  break,  to  vote  for  the  man  that 
had  been  named  by  the  members  of  their  own 
party  in  the  previous  Congress. 

This  way  of  doing  things  was  not  liked  by  the 
people.  It  was  felt  to  be  against  the  spirit  of  the 
Constitution.  But  as  long  as  there  was  active 
opposition  between  Federalists  and  Democrats,  the 
tactical  advantages  of  having  a  strong  party 
organization  were  so  great  that  no  one  ventured 
to  break  away  from  the  custom.  When,  however, 
the  old  parties  began  to  dissolve  after  the  close  of 
the  "War  of  1812  public  sentiment  against  nomi- 
nation by  congressional  caucus  made  itself  increas- 


PAETY  MACHINERY  109 

ingly  felt;  and  the  year  1824  witnessed  the  death 
of  this  extra-constitutional  agency. 

The  downfall  of  the  caucus  was  regarded  as  a 
great  triumph  for  constitutional  principles.  The 
whole  theory  of  the  Constitution  demanded  that 
the  executive  and  legislative  powers  be  kept 
separate.  The  attempt  of  members  of  Congress 
to  name  the  men  for  whom  people  should  vote 
for  president  was  a  violation  of  this  principle ;  the 
abandonment  of  that  attempt  was  hailed  as  a 
triumph  of  good  government.  The  example  that 
was  set  in  Congress  was  rapidly  followed  if  not 
actually  anticipated  in  the  legislatures  of  the 
several  states.  Up  to  1820  candidates  for  the 
governorship  were  frequently  and  perhaps  habitu- 
ally nominated  by  a  caucus  of  the  representatives 
of  the  party  in  the  previous  legislature.  In  the 
decade  that  followed  the  caucus  gave  place  to  the 
nominating  convention. 

All  this  movement  was,  outwardly  at  least,  an 
effort  to  conform  to  the  principles  of  the  Consti- 
tution. It  is,  however,  very  doubtful  whether  it 
contributed  to  good  government.  It  had  the  effect 
of  transferring  the  power  of  presidential  nomi- 
nation from  the  congressmen  to  the  men  who 
nominated  the  congressmen.  It  did  not  destroy 
the  connection  between  the  two  branches  of  the 


110      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

government.  It  simply  substituted  a  subterranean 
connection  for  an  open  and  public  one.  Previously 
men  had  "pulled  wires;"  afterwards  they  "laid 
pipe. ' '  The  f ramers  of  the  Constitution  had  tried 
to  prevent  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
departments  of  the  government  from  influencing 
one  another  unduly.  They  succeeded  in  preventing 
the  responsible  officers  of  the  government  from 
exercising  that  influence,  but  by  the  very  act  of 
so  doing  they  transferred  it  to  less  responsible 
hands — to  the  hands  that  directed  the  machinery 
of  nomination.* 

From  the  very  first  there  had  been  astute 
observers  who  saw  how  easy  it  was  for  a  small  and 
unscrupulous  group  of  men  to  control  nominations 
in  either  party  and  restrict  the  choice  of  the  voters 
to  candidates  of  their  own  liking.  In  this,  as  in 
other  byways  of  American  politics,  Aaron  Burr 
was  a  pioneer.  Burr  worked  in  many  states  and 
by  many  means ;  but  the  most  enduring  monument 
of  his  political  sagacity  was  Tammany  Hall. 
When  the  Society  of  Saint  Tammany  was  founded 
in  1789  its  purposes  were  chiefly  social  and 

*  This  idea  has  been  worked  out  with  great  care  by  H.  J. 
Ford  in  his  Rise  and  Growth  of  American  Politics.  Much 
valuable  material  on  the  subject  is  contained  in  Gustavus 
Myers'  History  of  Tammany  Hall. 


PARTY  MACHINERY  111 

patriotic.  Under  Burr's  tutelage  it  became  a 
dominant  power  in  party  politics.  The  leaders 
understood  the  theory  as  well  as  the  practice  of 
the  means  they  used.  "The  nominating  power," 
said  Teunis  "Wortman  in  1809,  "is  an  omnipotent 
one.  Though  it  approaches  us  in  the  humble 
attitude  of  the  recommendation,  its  influence  is 
irresistible.  Every  year's  experience  demonstrates 
that  its  recommendations  are  commands;  that 
instead  of  presenting  a  choice  it  deprives  us  of 
all  option." 

The  lesson  taught  in  New  York  had  been  learned 
by  politicians  of  other  cities  and  states.  The 
dethronement  of  the  congressional  caucus  in  1824 
simply  opened  the  way  for  the  application  of 
Aaron  Burr's  methods  to  the  affairs  of  the  nation 
as  a  whole. 

In  this  widened  application  of  the  principles  of 
Tammany  Hall,  Martin  Van  Buren  was  the  leader. 
The  effect  of  this  change  upon  the  character  and 
position  of  the  presidential  office  was  soon  seen. 
Down  to  the  time  of  Andrew  Jackson  every 
president  had  been  a  man  with  a  policy  of  his 
own.  From  the  time  of  Van  Buren  until  the  Civil 
War,  every  president  was  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent  a  creature  of  the  party  organization.  The 
seven  occupants  of  the  White  House  who  preceded 


112      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

Van  Buren  were  men  of  distinction.  The  seven 
who  followed  him  were  not.  So  far  was  the  con- 
vention system  from  expressing  the  popular  will 
that  it  prevented  a  man  like  Henry  Clay,  idolized 
by  his  party  and  admired  by  his  opponents,  from 
realizing  the  object  of  his  ambition.  Bitterly  did 
Clay  exclaim  at  last  that  he  was  made  the  candidate 
of  his  party  for  president  whenever  it  was  going 
to  be  defeated  and  was  deprived  by  chicanery  of 
the  nomination  whenever  the  election  of  the  Whig 
candidate  was  certain. 

But  how  was  it  possible  for  a  few  politicians  to 
control  conventions  and  nominations,  in  defiance 
of  the  wish  of  the  majority  of  their  party?  I  can 
only  reply  as  the  pessimistic  Scotchman  replied  to 
the  minister  who  assured  him  that  God  was 
stronger  than  the  devil.  "The  devil,"  said  the 
Scotchman,  "makes  up  for  his  inferior  strength 
by  his  superior  activity."  Men  who  could  not 
themselves  have  been  elected  to  high  public  office 
could  by  activity  and  trickery  control  the  machin- 
ery which  nominated  men  for  office.  Both  state 
and  nation  regarded  nominating  conventions  as 
something  extra-constitutional.  The  result  was 
that  the  law  had  for  many  years  very  little  control 
over  the  election  of  delegates  or  the  proceedings 
of  delegates  after  they  were  elected.  In  cities  like 


PARTY  MACHINERY  113 

New  York  the  professional  politicians  made  use 
of  barefaced  fraud  and  sometimes  of  actual  force 
to  achieve  their  ends.  In  other  places  they  were 
content  with  trickery.  In  still  others  they  found 
a  skilful  use  of  the  arts  of  persuasion  sufficient. 
But  whether  the  contest  was  decided  by  force  or 
by  fraud,  by  trickery  or  by  persuasion,  the  pro- 
fessional politician  and  his  henchmen  under  him, 
acting  all  the  time  and  thoroughly  organized,  were 
in  these  early  days  at  least  more  than  a  match  for 
a  much  larger  body  of  independent  citizens  who 
had  their  own  business  to  attend  to  and  could 
devote  but  moderate  time  to  the  devious  ways  of 
politics. 

What  rewards  were  offered  to  the  men  who 
engaged  in  this  sort  of  subterranean  political 
activity  ? 

A  few  gained  high  office,  but  only  a  few;  of  the 
men  who  have  occupied  the  presidential  chair  since 
the  time  of  Van  Buren,  not  more  than  two  have 
been  active  in  the  details  of  political  management. 
A  somewhat  larger  number  of  our  American  poli- 
ticians have  been  so  constituted  that  they  were 
content  to  do  the  work  for  the  mere  enjoyment  of 
the  power  it  gave  them.  It  was  reward  enough 
for  them  to  be  in  control  of  the  affairs  of  their 
city  or  state,  whether  the  public  recognized  their 


114      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

dominance  or  not.  But  to  the  majority  of  the 
leaders  and  to  an  overwhelming  majority  of  their 
followers,  some  more  tangible  compensation  was 
necessary.  If  they  gave  their  time  to  politics  they 
must  be  paid  for  it.  If  they  were  successful  in 
placing  their  candidates  in  office  they  expected  to 
be  rewarded  for  their  success; — out  of  the  public 
treasury,  if  necessary. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century 
almost  the  only  chance  for  such  reward  was  found 
in  municipal  offices  and  municipal  contracts.  The 
mayor,  the  board  of  aldermen,  and  even  the  judges, 
of  a  city  had  it  in  their  power  to  give  valuable 
favors.  The  fundamental  principle  on  which 
Tammany  appealed  for  support  all  through  the 
nineteenth  century  was  that  membership  in  the 
Society  and  work  for  its  candidates  was  a  means 
to  establish  a  claim  for  such  favors.  A  municipal 
official,  said  Tammany,  owed  his  primary  obliga- 
tions and  duties  to  the  part  of  the  community  that 
nominated  and  elected  him.  His  duties  to  the  rest 
of  the  community  were  of  little  or  no  importance. 
The  same  theory  was  applied  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent  in  almost  every  city.  The  possibility  of 
using  state  offices  as  political  rewards  developed 
more  slowly;  but  with  the  establishment  and 
development  of  public  works  on  a  large  scale,  the 


PARTY  MACHINERY  115 

patronage  and  contracts  and  franchises  which  were 
at  the  disposal  of  New  York  or  Pennsylvania 
became  pecuniary  prizes;  prizes  of  great  value  to 
a  politician  who  could  nominate  a  governor  or  a 
legislator  that  was  weak  enough  to  be  dependent 
upon  him.  By  the  year  1825  the  prostitution  of 
state  as  well  as  municipal  offices  to  party  purposes 
had  become  a  familiar  spectacle. 

National  politics  were  kept  clean  for  a  longer 
period.  Until  the  beginning  of  Andrew  Jackson's 
administration  federal  offices  had  not  been  regarded 
as  a  field  for  the  emolument  of  the  professional 
politician.  There  had  been  instances  where  corrupt 
men  had  misused  national  offices,  but  they  were 
exceptions  and  were  regarded  as  exceptions.  Un- 
fortunately, just  at  the  very  moment  when  the 
overthrow  of  the  caucus  system  left  the  field  free 
for  the  intervention  of  the  professional  politician 
in  national  politics,  two  events  occurred,  one 
chargeable  to  the  "Whigs  and  the  other  to  the 
Democrats,  which  distinctly  lowered  the  character 
of  both  legislative  and  executive  branches  of  the 
national  government.  In  1828,  Congress  passed  a 
tariff  law — the  tariff  of  abominations,  as  it  was 
popularly  called — which  was  in  many  of  its  pro- 
visions so  clearly  a  sacrifice  of  the  general  interests 
of  the  country  to  the  special  interests  of  individual 


116      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

districts  that  Congress  seemed  for  the  time  being 
to  have  made  politics  rather  than  statesmanship  its 
ideal.  In  the  years  immediately  following,  the 
President  removed  a  large  number  of  federal  office- 
holders, although  they  had  done  their  duty  prop- 
erly, in  order  to  be  able  to  give  their  offices  to  his 
political  supporters.  In  the  forty  years  before 
Jackson's  election  there  had  been  but  seventy-four 
removals  from  office.  In  the  first  year  after  his 
election  there  were  two  thousand.  Jackson  himself 
was  perfectly  frank  as  to  the  character  of  this 
transaction.  He  was  ready  to  accept  and  act  on 
Marcy's  phrase,  "To  the  victor  belong  the  spoils." 
Patriotic  and  public  spirited  though  he  was,  he 
failed  to  see  the  evils  which  would  result  from 
the  adoption  of  the  principle  that  public  office  was 
a  reward  for  partisan  service. 

The  control  of  the  federal  offices  as  a  prize  of 
successful  activity  gave  the  party  leaders  a  sub- 
stantial addition  to  the  rewards  that  they  were 
able  to  offer  their  followers.  It  was  not  merely 
the  immediate  money  value  of  the  positions  that 
counted.  The  incumbent  of  a  post  office  or  a 
collectorship,  no  matter  how  it  was  obtained,  had 
a  certain  social  standing  which  was  more  valuable 
than  the  salary  of  the  office.  It  was  a  visible  result 
of  successful  endeavor,  and  one  of  which  he  was 


PARTY  MACHINERY  117 

proud.  Moreover,  the  control  of  offices  was  a 
prize  whose  value  was  enhanced  as  the  country 
expanded.  Each  decade  has  seen  a  growth  in  the 
number  and  importance  of  our  public  functionaries. 
The  aggregate  of  salaries  paid  by  the  government 
has  increased  much  faster  than  the  population. 
The  aggregate  influence  of  the  officeholders  has 
increased  even  faster  than  their  salaries.  For  over 
half  a  century  the  administrative  offices  of  the 
United  States,  outside  of  the  army,  the  navy,  and 
the  judiciary,  continued  to  be  treated  as  rewards 
for  party  services;  and  even  within  these  three 
departments  political  influence  made  itself  felt  to 
the  advantage  of  the  politicians  and  their  friends 
and  to  the  detriment  of  the  public. 

Thus  was  established,  in  spite  of  the  Constitution, 
that  connection  between  legislature  and  executive 
which  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  had  sought 
to  prevent.  The  administrative  officers  of  the 
government  had  received  their  places  as  rewards 
for  their  services  to  the  party  organization.  The 
members  of  the  legislative  branch  owed  their 
nomination  and  election  to  office  to  the  same 
consideration.  The  executive  could  not  dictate  to 
the  legislature,  nor  could  the  legislature  dictate  to 
the  executive;  but  each  was  bound  to  the  nomi- 
nating power  which  was  behind  them  by  ties  of 


118      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

gratitude  for  the  past  and  of  apprehension  for 
the  future. 

And  the  list  of  men  who  were  thus  bound  to  the 
party  organization  did  not  end  with  the  office- 
holders and  legislators.  Every  one  who  had 
benefited  by  a  partisan  measure  was  interested 
to  keep  the  men  that  had  passed  it  in  power. 
Each  valuable  franchise  or  lucrative  subsidy  which 
was  granted  enlisted  the  recipient  in  the  service 
of  the  party  which  gave  it  to  him.  The  less  the 
grant  could  be  justified  on  grounds  of  public 
policy,  the  more  abject  was  his  dependence  on  the 
politicians  for  its  continuance.  The  gravity  of 
this  danger  in  national  politics  did  not  become 
fully  apparent  until  after  the  Civil  War.  Prior 
to  that  time  there  had  been  a  good  deal  of  unwise 
special  legislation  by  the  states  and  some  by 
Congress;  but  it  had  seldom  taken  such  a  shape 
that  it  could  become  a  party  issue.  The  years  from 
1850  to  1857  saw  a  great  many  wasteful  grants 
of  public  land  in  aid  of  railroads ;  but  this  was  an 
abuse  which  Democrats  and  Republicans  had  vied 
with  one  another  in  promoting,  and  for  which 
North  and  South  were  equally  responsible.  Neither 
organization  and  neither  section  could  point  the 
finger  of  scorn  at  the  other. 

But  the   course   of  tariff  legislation   after  the 


PAETY  MACHINERY  119 

Civil  "War  was  such  that  large  financial  interests 
became  concerned  to  keep  the  Republican  party  in 
power.  During  the  war  the  North  had  imposed 
heavy  internal  revenue  taxes  on  all  manufacturing 
industries;  and  it  had  at  the  same  time  laid  duties 
on  imports  considerably  higher  than  the  internal 
revenue  taxes.  The  amount  of  protection  actually 
given  was  not  represented  by  the  whole  duty,  but 
by  the  difference  between  the  duty  on  things 
produced  abroad  and  the  internal  revenue  tax  on 
the  same  things  produced  at  home.  After  the  close 
of  the  war  nearly  all  the  internal  revenue  taxes 
were  abolished.  It  was  expected  that  duties  on 
imports  would  be  correspondingly  reduced  at  the 
same  time.  Measures  to  this  effect  were  introduced 
in  1867.  They  failed  of  passage,  not  because  there 
was  any  difference  of  opinion  on  the  general  policy, 
but  because  the  Senate  and  House  could  not  agree 
on  details. 

"With  the  internal  revenue  tax  abolished  and  the 
duty  on  imports  maintained,  many  industries 
enjoyed  an  amount  of  protection  which  had  never 
been  intended.  The  immediate  result  was  a  great 
apparent  prosperity  in  those  particular  lines  of 
industry.  The  secondary  result  was  in  many 
instances  overproduction  and  disaster.  "Which- 
ever way  the  law  worked,  the  representatives  of 


120      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

the  business  in  question  found  themselves  in  pos- 
session of  plausible  arguments  against  a  change. 
"Will  you  destroy  an  industry  which  employs  so 
many  men  at  high  wages?"  said  the  prosperous 
ones.  "Will  you  add  to  the  burdens  of  an  industry 
which  is  already  in  trouble?"  said  the  unpros- 
perous  ones.  The  fact  was  that  the  abnormal 
degree  of  protection  had  created  an  artificial  set 
of  industrial  conditions,  and  that  when  those 
conditions  were  removed  some  one  was  bound  to 
suffer. 

The  alignment  on  the  question  of  tariff  reduction 
was  not  at  first  a  strictly  partisan  one.  The 
Pennsylvania  Democrats  were  for  the  most  part 
protectionists.  The  Western  Republicans  were  in 
many  instances  free  traders.  But  as  time  went 
on  the  Republican  party  became  more  and  more 
committed  to  the  maintenance  of  the  tariff  in 
substantially  its  existing  shape;  or,  more  accu- 
rately, to  the  principle  that  duties  should  not  be 
reduced  unless  the  representatives  of  the  protected 
industries  themselves  approved.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances the  Republican  party  organization 
could  count  on  the  support,  not  merely  of  the 
officeholders  it  had  rewarded  or  the  congressmen 
it  had  nominated,  but  of  the  industries  to  which 


PARTY  MACHINERY  121 

it  had  given  protective  duties  that  were  or  appeared 
to  be  exorbitant. 

In  a  somewhat  similar  way  the  silver  mining 
interests  became  affiliated  with  those  who  controlled 
the  councils  of  the  Democratic  party,  and  more 
than  once  brought  the  monetary  system  of  the 
country  into  grave  financial  peril  as  a  means  of 
promoting  their  own  particular  industry.  I  do 
not  mean  that  all  or  a  majority  of  those  who 
advocated  free  silver  coinage  were  consciously 
intending  to  sacrifice  the  interest  of  the  whole  to 
that  of  the  part.  Most  of  the  Democratic  leaders 
had  persuaded  themselves  that  free  silver  would 
be  good  for  the  country  as  completely  as  the 
Republican  leaders  had  persuaded  themselves  that 
a  high  protective  tariff  was  good  for  the  country. 
It  is  extraordinarily  easy  for  a  man  to  become 
convinced  that  a  thing  that  will  put  him  and  his 
friends  in  public  office  is  good  for  every  one  else. 

This  was  what  constituted  the  most  dangerous 
feature  of  the  whole  situation.  For  under  in- 
fluences like  these,  good  men  as  well  as  bad  lent 
themselves  to  that  perversion  of  the  party  system 
which  made  them  brokers  in  privileges  rather  than 
brokers  in  opinions  and  led  them  to  govern  in  the 
interest  of  special  classes  rather  than  in  the 
interest  of  the  whole  body  politic. 


V 

THE   EEACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE 
CONTROL 

In  the  previous  lecture  I  explained  in  some 
detail  the  causes  which  led  to  an  abnormal  develop- 
ment of  party  government  in  the  United  States. 
All  will  admit  that  this  development  has  been 
attended  with  grave  evils.  Our  cities  have  been 
made  the  prey  of  political  organizations  with 
rather  notorious  frequency.  Our  states  have  at 
times  fared  no  better.  In  the  administration  of 
our  national  government  there  have  been  fewer 
open  scandals,  but  there  has  been  much  dangerous 
partisanship. 

Though  people  have  recognized  the  evils,  they 
have  not  recognized  how  deeply  they  were  rooted 
in  our  system  of  government ;  and  when  they  have 
tried  to  correct  them  they  have  usually  been  con- 
tent with  superficial  or  partial  remedies  which  did 
not  go  to  the  heart  of  the  matter.  There  have  been 
frequent  movements  for  reform  in  individual  cities 
and  states.  There  has  been  a  wave  of  agitation 
against  machine  control  of  politics  which  has 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE       123 

spread  over  the  country  within  the  last  few  years. 
But  the  great  majority  of  the  proposed  reforms 
deal  with  symptoms  and  manifestations  of  the  evil 
under  which  we  suffer,  rather  than  with  the  under- 
lying causes  that  produce  that  evil.  They  offer 
palliatives  rather  than  remedies. 

The  first  and  simplest  palliative  for  the  misuse 
of  party  government  is  to  put  the"  other  party  into 
office.  ' '  Turn  the  rascals  out ! "  is  the  popular  cry 
whenever  any  extraordinary  breach  of  public  trust 
is  discovered  in  city  or  state.  This  is  undoubtedly 
a  good  policy  as  far  as  it  goes.  If  politicians  think 
that  they  are  going  to  be  turned  out  of  office  when 
they  are  found  to  have  abused  public  confidence, 
it  will  make  them  more  careful  to  avoid  flagrant 
or  notorious  misuse  of  their  power.  This  penalty 
therefore  has?  great  use  as  a  deterrent.  As  a 
remedy  its  value  is  less  clear.  "When  the  repre- 
sentatives of  one  party  are  turned  out  the  repre- 
sentatives of  another  party  come  in — sometimes 
immediately,  sometimes  after  a  brief  spasm  of 
nonpartisan  government.  The  old  political  ma- 
chinery is  at  hand  for  the  use  of  the  other  party. 
The  old  temptations  are  there,  and  the  old  oppor- 
tunities are  there.  The  public  has  simply  sub- 
stituted one  political  machine  for  another.  It  is 
better  off,  in  so  far  as  the  new  incumbents  are 


124      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

frightened  by  the  fate  of  their  predecessors;  it  is 
worse  off,  in  so  far  as  the  new  incumbents  are 
hungrier  than  their  predecessors.  Whether  the  net 
result  will  be  good  or  bad  depends  upon  the  cir- 
cumstances of  each  individual  case.  As  a  general 
rule,  however,  the  policy  of  turning  the  rascals  out 
while  leaving  the  organization  of  the  body  politic 
unchanged  has  an  outcome  which  has  been  aptly 
described  in  the  eleventh  chapter  of  the  Gospel  of 
St.  Luke: 

"When  the  unclean  spirit  is  gone  out  of  a  man, 
he  walketh  through  dry  places,  seeking  rest;  and 
finding  none,  he  saith,  I  will  return  unto  my  house 
whence  I  came  out. 

"And  when  he  cometh,  he  findeth  it  swept  and 
garnished. 

"Then  goeth  he,  and  taketh  to  him  seven  other 
spirits  more  wicked  than  himself;  and  they  enter 
in,  and  dwell  there :  and  the  last  state  of  that  man 
is  worse  than  the  first. ' ' 

Some  who  see  the  futility  of  substituting  one 
party  machine  for  another  try  to  go  one  step 
further  back,  and  strike  at  the  sources  of  the 
corruption  by  penalizing  the  men  who  have  bene- 
fited by  bad  government.  "Punish  predatory 
wealth!"  is  the  cry  of  these  reformers.  It  was 
this  that  gave  force  to  the  Granger  movement  in 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE       125 

1870,  when  the  farmers  of  the  upper  Mississippi 
valley  were  aroused  by  the  misuse  of  the  powers 
of  the  railroads  to  take  the  matter  of  legislation 
into  their  own  hands  and  pass  drastic  laws  con- 
cerning rates.  It  is  this  same  cry  which  makes 
itself  heard  in  both  Democratic  and  Progressive 
parties  today. 

But  the  punishment  of  predatory  wealth  is  an 
easier  thing  to  promise  than  to  perform.  The 
wealthy  depredators  almost  always  manage  to  turn 
their  profits  into  hard  cash  months  or  perhaps  years 
before  the  public  is  aroused  to  any  serious  action. 
By  this  time  the  only  persons  that  can  be  reached 
are  the  small  investors,  who  have  had  no  part  in 
the  ill-gotten  profits  and  whose  only  sin  is  that 
they  have  been  too  easily  deceived.  Alas  for  these 
small  investors!  "Better  a  wrong  victim  than 
none  at  all,"  says  the  public;  "we  do  not  know 
who  is  to  blame,  but  we  know  that  somebody  ought 
to  suffer;"  and  the  politician  takes  his  choice 
between  sacrificing  the  interests  of  the  investor  as 
a  means  of  securing  his  own  popularity,  or  levying 
blackmail  upon  the  investor  as  a  price  for  not 
sacrificing  him. 

For  predatory  poverty  is  just  as  dangerous  a 
thing  as  predatory  wealth — a  little  better,  perhaps, 
in  that  it  has  the  interest  of  a  larger  section  of  the 


126      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

community  in  view;  a  good  deal  worse,  in  that  its 
acts  are  habitually  blinder  and  the  amount  of  aim- 
less destruction  larger.  Over  and  over  again  it  has 
happened  that  the  politicians,  by  destroying  the 
profits  of  capital  in  obedience  to  a  wave  of  popular 
feeling,  have  interfered  with  the  development  of 
the  whole  community  for  many  years  to  come. 
This  was  the  case  in  the  upper  Mississippi  valley 
at  the  time  of  the  Granger  movement.  Laws  passed 
in  1873  and  1874  hurt  the  railroad  investors  by 
depriving  them  of  their  profits ;  but  they  hurt  the 
shippers  and  the  general  business  interests  of  the 
states  far  more,  by  preventing  for  five  years  that 
investment  of  capital  in  railroads  which  was  needed 
to  furnish  adequate  transportation  for  farm 
products.  This  experience  seems  likely  to  be 
repeated  at  the  present  day,  when  arbitration 
boards  are  constantly  compelling  railroads  to  raise 
their  wages  and  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission is  constantly  refusing  to  allow  them  to  raise 
their  rates.  The  effects  on  transportation  indus- 
tries in  discharge  of  men  and  curtailment  of 
service  are  already  deplorable,  and  seem  likely  to 
grow  worse  in  the  immediate  future.* 

*  The  last  two  sentences  are  left  as  they  were  written  in 
the  spring  of  1914.  Since  that  time  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  has  taken  action  allowing  the  railroads  certain 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE       127 

The  policy  of  turning  the  rascals  out  means  a 
change  of  hands  that  hold  the  reins  of  party 
government.  The  policy  of  punishing  predatory 
wealth  means  a  change  in  the  direction  in  which 
those  hands  drive  us.  Neither  of  these  changes 
goes  far  enough  to  free  us  from  the  political  evils 
under  which  we  suffer.  Neither  of  them  solves  our 
problem  as  a  whole.  They  are  emotional  remedies 
rather  than  practical  ones.  They  serve  to  punish 
an  individual  offender — sometimes  the  right  one, 
sometimes  the  wrong  one;  they  do  not  serve  to 
reform  the  evil  inherent  in  our  political  system. 

There  are,  however,  several  measures  which  have 
been  tried  in  the  past  that  modify  the  system  itself 
in  certain  essential  particulars  and  are  offered  by 
their  advocates  as  practical  remedies  for  the  dis- 
eases of  the  body  politic.  These  measures  may 
be  grouped  under  five  heads:  1.  The  separation 
of  national  from  local  issues.  2.  A  nonpartisan 
civil  service.  3.  The  substitution  of  direct  for 
indirect  methods  of  legislation.  4.  Direct  nomi- 
nation by  the  people.  5.  Assurance  of  direct 
responsibility  to  the  people  by  a  system  which 
allows  the  voters  to  recall  an  official  who  for  any 

needed  increases  of  rates;  and  the  whole  industrial  outlook 
has  been  thereby  improved. 


128      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

reason  ceases  to  carry  out  the  views  of  those  who 
elected  him.  The  first  two  of  these  have  been  fully 
tried;  the  third,  measurably  so.  The  fourth  is 
still  in  the  experimental  stage ;  the  fifth  has  hardly 
passed  beyond  the  status  of  a  project.  I  propose 
to  give  a  brief  analysis  of  each  of  these  remedies, 
to  show  what  it  has  accomplished  or  is  likely  to 
accomplish,  and  what  indirect  evils  and  dangers, 
if  any,  it  brings  in  its  train. 

First  in  order  of  historical  development  is  the 
separation  of  national  from  local  issues.  This  has 
been  so  generally  accepted  as  a  principle  by  think- 
ing men  of  the  present  generation  that  it  is  hard 
for  some  of  us  to  realize  how  recently  it  originated, 
or  how  radical  a  proposition  it  seemed  fifty  years 
ago. 

In  my  own  boyhood  it  was  assumed  that  every 
practical  man  belonged  either  to  one  party  or  to 
the  other,  and  that  under  all  ordinary  circum- 
stances he  voted  the  whole  party  ticket,  national, 
state,  and  local.  In  aggravated  cases  he  might 
"scratch"  an  objectionable  candidate  without 
losing  the  right  to  consider  himself  a  reputable 
member  of  the  party  and  to  ask  such  favors  of 
the  party  manager  as  reputable  members  might 
expect.  But  to  vote  for  the  candidate  of  the  other 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE       129 

party  was  an  extreme  of  independence  which 
relatively  few  ventured  to  practice. 

When  this  feeling  prevailed  it  was  almost 
impossible  to  prevent  party  managers  from  nomi- 
nating bad  men  for  local  offices  at  any  time  when 
national  issues  were  important.  The  more  funda- 
mental the  national  questions  involved,  the  surer 
did  the  political  managers  feel  of  being  able  to  cast 
the  full  party  vote  for  local  candidates,  whether 
good  or  bad.  "Matters  of  national  policy,"  they 
would  say  to  the  voters,  "are  of  so  much  greater 
moment  than  anything  which  a  state  official  can 
accomplish  within  his  own  limited  sphere  of  good 
or  harm  that  you  are  bound  by  the  strongest 
considerations  not  to  weaken  the  party  as  a  whole 
by  the  threat  to  bolt  a  part  of  the  ticket."  The 
Constitution  had  attempted  to  separate  as  far  as 
possible  the  activity  of  the  national  government 
from  that  of  the  separate  states  and  cities.  The 
effect  of  the  party  organization  was  to  bind  them 
together. 

Loudest  in  their  cry  for  the  obligations  of  party 
regularity  were  the  politicians  of  New  York  City. 
But  it  was  in  New  York  City  first  of  all  that  the 
reaction  in  favor  of  independent  voting  on  munici- 
pal issues  developed.  In  the  years  from  1867  to 
1871  the  Tweed  Ring  had  plundered  the  public 


130      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

on  so  gigantic  a  scale  that  all  good  citizens  felt 
compelled  to  unite  to  overthrow  it.  In  spite  of 
this  union  of  good  citizens,  the  Ring  felt  so  secure 
in  its  position  as  a  representative  of  democratic 
regularity  that  it  openly  defied  public  opinion 
inside  its  own  party  as  well  as  outside.  In  1871 
the  issue  between  party  regularity  and  good 
municipal  government  was  clearly  drawn;  and  the 
side  which  stood  for  good  government  won 
decisively.  The  defeat  of  the  Ring  was  followed 
by  the  indictment  and  imprisonment  of  its  leaders. 
It  was  an  object  lesson  of  the  first  importance  in 
the  possibility  and  the  necessity  of  independent 
municipal  voting. 

The  lesson  was  taken  to  heart  in  other  cities 
besides  New  York.  The  election  of  1871  was  the 
beginning  of  a  radical  change  of  sentiment  regard- 
ing the  obligations  of  party  regularity  in  connec- 
tion with  municipal  affairs.  Slowly  but  surely 
people  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  mayor  of 
a  city  was  first  and  above  all  things  else  a  man 
engaged  in  conducting  a  number  of  important 
lines  of  business  for  the  public  benefit;  that  the 
primary  question  was  whether  he  was  likely  to  be 
honest  and  efficient  in  doing  the  business  in  hand; 
and  that  his  attitude  on  the  tariff  or  the  currency, 
however  important  in  determining  whether  you 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE      131 

wished  to  send  him  to  Congress,  had  little  or  no 
importance  in  determining  his  fitness  to  be  mayor. 
Forty  years  ago  these  were  novel  arguments.  The 
man  who  advanced  them  was  considered  an  idealist. 
People  admitted  their  force  as  theories,  but  only 
acted  upon  these  theories  on  rare  occasions,  when 
the  party  leaders  had  been  detected  in  some 
peculiarly  atrocious  attempt  to  sacrifice  the  public 
interest  to  that  of  their  friends  and  associates. 
Today  they  are  accepted  in  most  parts  of  the 
country  as  practical  foundations  of  good  local 
government.  While  it  is  still  true  that  the  voters 
in  a  large  number  of  towns  prefer  to  vote  the 
straight  party  ticket,  local  as  well  as  national,  the 
manager  who  presumes  too  much  on  this  preference 
learns  to  his  cost  how  slight  is  the  hold  of  party 
regularity  in  local  issues.  Many  cities,  by  adopting 
the  commission  form  of  government,  have  tried  to 
make  municipal  politics  permanently  independent 
of  party  organization;  and  the  advantage  of 
accomplishing  this  result  has  been  so  great  as  to 
outweigh  the  serious  disadvantages,  both  in  theory 
and  in  practice,  which  attend  the  operation  of  the 
commission  system. 

This  change  in  sentiment  has  been  rendered 
much  more  effective  by  two  recent  changes  in 
political  practice. 


132      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

The  first  of  these  is  the  separation  of  the  dates 
of  local  and  national  elections.  In  the  old  times 
it  was  customary  in  most  parts  of  the  country  to 
vote  for  national,  state,  and  local  candidates  on  the 
same  day,  if  not  on  the  same  ticket.  This  of  itself 
made  the  sentiment  of  party  regularity  stronger 
than  it  is  at  an  election  where  people  vote  for  local 
officers  only.  The  importance  of  the  national  issue 
made  the  local  issues  look  relatively  unimportant. 
The  politicians  took  full  advantage  of  this;  and 
they  also  developed  complex  systems  of  trading 
votes  in  which  members  of  both  organizations 
worked  hand  in  hand  to  sacrifice  the  independent 
nominees  of  each  party  and  elect  those  who  were 
subservient  to  their  respective  machines.  Separa- 
tion of  the  dates  has  made  it  practicable  to 
separate  the  issues  and  has  limited  the  opportuni- 
ties for  trading  votes.  The  old  argument  about 
regularity  is  far  less  effective  when  local  and 
national  elections  come  on  different  days. 

Another  change  which  is  bound  to  work  in  the 
same  direction  is  the  election  of  United  States 
senators  by  the  people. 

In  the  old  days  it  was  never  possible  to  elect  a 
legislature  on  the  basis  of  state  issues  in  a  year 
when  a  United  States  senator  was  going  to  be 
chosen.  You  might  approve  the  position  of  the 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE       133 

Republican  party  in  your  state  on  canals  or  on 
prohibition,  or  on  economical  management  of  the 
state  treasury,  or  any  one  of  a  dozen  local  issues. 
But  if  you  wanted  to  see  a  Democrat  elected  to  the 
United  States  senate  you  had  to  vote  for  a  Demo- 
cratic candidate  for  the  state  legislature,  even  if 
he  was  bibulous,  extravagant,  unprogressive,  and 
averse  to  building  the  canals  you  wanted.  His 
chief  business,  after  all,  was  to  elect  a  United 
States  senator.  A  legislature  has  to  elect  a  senator 
twice  in  six  years.  In  those  states,  therefore,  which 
elected  their  legislatures  for  two  years  at  a  time, 
two  out  of  every  three  legislatures  were  chosen  on 
national  issues  and  only  one  of  the  three  on  local 
ones.  This  gave  the  leaders  in  party  politics  a 
stronger  hold  over  nominations  and  elections  to 
the  state  legislature  than  they  would  otherwise 
have  possessed,  and  had  an  effect  on  the  conduct 
of  state  politics  and  state  business  far  more  serious 
than  has  generally  been  recognized.  Prior  to  the 
last  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  complete 
separation  of  state  and  national  issues  in  politics 
was  impossible.  Today  it  rests  with  the  voters 
themselves  whether  they  will  make  it  possible  or 
not. 

It  may  be  said  of  the  separation  of  local  and 
national  politics  that  it  is  unqualifiedly  good  in 


134      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

principle.  It,  however,  stops  far  short  of  being 
a  complete  solution  of  our  problem;  because  the 
prizes  of  either  national  or  local  politics,  taken 
separately,  are  sufficiently  large  to  furnish  remu- 
neration to  those  who  can  control  the  nominating 
machinery  in  either  field.  The  separation  deprives 
the  politicians  of  one  effective  weapon  in  forcing 
machine  candidates  on  an  unwilling  electorate. 
But  they  have  other  equally  effective  ones  left  at 
their  command. 

The  second  means  of  preventing  the  perversion 
of  party  government  has  been  the  series  of  meas- 
ures known  as  civil  service  reform,  imposing 
certain  rudimentary  tests  of  fitness  upon  candi- 
dates for  office  and  preventing  the  removal  of 
officeholders  for  political  reasons. 

When  Marcy  and  Jackson  advanced  the  theory 
that  federal  offices  ought  to  be  given  as  a  reward 
for  political  activity,  they  had  no  idea  of  the 
damage  that  they  were  doing.  The  force  of 
federal  officeholders  in  1830  was  small  in  number; 
the  problems  with  which  they  had  to  deal  were 
simpler  than  is  the  case  today.  There  was  some 
plausibility  in  the  arguments  used  by  Jackson 
and  his  followers  as  to  the  danger  of  allowing 
these  officeholders  to  form  an  official  class  of 
permanent  appointees,  removed  from  the  mutations 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE      135 

of  politics.  But  the  practical  working  of  the  spoils 
system  was  far  worse  than  any  one  could  have 
anticipated.  If  people  received  and  held  offices 
as  a  reward  for  political  activity,  it  meant  that 
they  were  encouraged  to  serve  their  party  at  the 
expense  of  the  government.  This  not  only  led  to 
the  appointment  of  men  to  positions  for  which  they 
had  no  special  training  or  fitness — an  increasing 
evil  as  the  service  became  more  complex — but  it 
encouraged  many  of  them  to  neglect  their  duties 
and  to  connive  at  the  plunder  of  the  public 
treasury  by  men  who  were  influential  in  the  party. 
The  $75,000,000  of  revenue  frauds  discovered  in 
the  second  administration  of  President  Grant  were 
but  the  logical  consequence  of  the  Jacksonian 
principle  that  the  spoils  belong  to  the  victor. 

Organized  agitation  for  reform  of  the  federal 
civil  service  began  in  1867.  This  movement  was 
at  first  made  the  object  of  ridicule.  But  it 
gathered  strength  when  people  saw  what  glaring 
frauds  were  being  perpetrated  under  the  old 
system.  The  danger  of  regarding  appointment  to 
office  as  a  matter  of  party  favor  was  strikingly 
brought  home  to  the  people  in  1881,  when  Guiteau 
assassinated  President  Garfield  as  a  matter  of 
private  revenge  for  his  failure  to  get  the  position 
he  wanted.  Even  then  it  is  doubtful  whether  the 


136      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

Republican  politicians  who  were  in  control  of 
Congress  would  have  allowed  any  serious  change 
in  a  system  which  contributed  to  their  power  and 
to  their  friends'  profit,  except  for  the  strong 
indications  that  the  Democrats  were  going  to  be 
successful  in  the  presidential  election  of  1884. 
Fearing  that  they  would  lose  control  of  the  federal 
offices  in  any  event,  the  Republicans  in  1883  made 
a  virtue  of  necessity  and  passed  a  bill  establishing 
a  classified  civil  service  with  preliminary  exami- 
nations and  permanence  of  tenure.  At  first  only 
fourteen  thousand  offices  were  included  in  this 
classified  service;  but  successive  presidents  have 
made  use  of  the  authority  given  them  'to  extend 
the  scope  of  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1883,  so 
that  about  three  fifths  of  the  four  hundred  thou- 
sand federal  employees  are  now  subject  to  its 
provisions.  In  local  administration  the  reform 
has  not  made  corresponding  progress;  but  a  few 
states  and  a  considerable  number  of  municipalities 
are  now  following  the  example  of  the  federal 
government. 

Civil  service  reform,  like  independent  municipal 
voting,  is  thoroughly  good  as  far  as  it  goes.  Its 
direct  effect  in  promoting  good  government  is, 
however,  limited.  It  applies  almost  entirely  to  the 
lower  ranks  of  the  service.  It  does  not  apply  to 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE      137 

the  positions  that  give  a  man  power  to  dominate 
the  policy  of  the  country.  The  really  important 
federal  offices  are  included  for  the  most  part  in 
the  forty  per  cent  of  unclassified  places,  not  in  the 
sixty  per  cent  of  classified  ones.  Those  who  have 
observed  the  working  of  the  system  most  carefully 
believe  that  the  chief  good  that  we  have  accom- 
plished is  an  indirect  one.  We  have  broken  down 
the  theory  that  offices  are  to  be  regarded  as  spoils. 
The  people  who  continue  to  view  public  office  in 
that  light  no  longer  venture  to  avow  their  heresies 
openly. 

The  two  measures  thus  far  described  restrict  the 
power  of  the  politicians  by  limiting  the  patronage 
at  their  disposal.  The  three  others  go  more  to  the 
heart  of  the  matter,  and  strive  directly  to  curb 
the  power  of  party  organizations  in  the  making  of 
laws,  the  nomination  of  candidates,  or  the  action 
of  officials  after  they  have  been  nominated  and 
elected. 

The  first  of  these  means  is  the  system  of  direct 
legislation  by  the  people;  either  through  the 
medium  of  state  constitutions  or  by  the  agency 
of  the  referendum  and  the  initiative. 

The  popular  distrust  of  legislation  by  representa- 
tive assembly  dates  from  about  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  Down  to  that  time  it  had  been 


138      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

supposed  that  this  was  the  natural  method,  and 
in  fact  the  only  good  method,  for  making  laws  in 
a  large  commonwealth.  In  a  small  city  all  the 
citizens  can  attend  an  assembly  or  town  meeting, 
can  hear  measures  discussed,  and  can  vote  upon 
them  after  full  deliberation.  The  vote  will  repre- 
sent more  or  less  adequately  the  public  opinion  of 
the  community.  But  in  a  large  city  this  is 
difficult;  and  in  a  state  or  nation  it  is  obviously 
impossible.  The  system  of  representative  govern- 
ment was  devised  to  meet  this  difficulty.  It  allows 
people  in  each  district  to  select  the  man  whom 
they  regard  as  best  fitted  to  act  as  their  proxy. 
These  representatives  can  meet  with  one  another, 
to  discuss  the  proposed  measures  of  common  con- 
cern and  decide  what  is  best  for  the  community; 
and  their  votes,  taken  after  such  discussion,  ought 
to  represent  the  general  sense  of  the  state  or  nation 
in  the  same  way  that  the  vote  of  the  town  meeting 
represents  the  general  sense  of  the  borough  or 
village.  Such  was  the  theory  of  representative 
government  as  it  was  held  with  little  question  until 
about  1850. 

Such  also  had  been  the  practical  working  of  the 
system  in  England  in  the  days  when  Parliament 
was  establishing  its  supremacy.  Down  to  the 
seventeenth  century  the  English  Parliament  was 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE       139 

essentially  a  place  where  representatives  of  dif- 
ferent districts  and  different  interests  met  in  order 
to  shape  their  opinion  intelligently  on  the  affairs 
of  the  kingdom.  It  created  a  national  public 
opinion  in  the  same  way  that  a  town  meeting 
creates  a  local  public  opinion.  There  was  no  other 
adequate  agency  for  this  purpose.  There  were  few 
newspapers.  There  was  little  opportunity  for 
public  information  of  any  kind  regarding  the 
conduct  of  national  and  international  affairs.  Had 
it  not  been  for  the  necessity  of  calling  Parliaments 
in  order  to  levy  taxes,  the  king  might  have  taken 
advantage  of  this  public  ignorance  to  undermine 
the  liberties  of  different  parts  of  the  kingdom 
separately.  The  country  gentlemen  who  went  to 
Parliament  found  out  what  was  going  on.  They 
deliberated  with  representatives  from  other  parts 
of  the  kingdom  and  made  plans  for  common  action. 
When  they  went  home  they  told  the  people  who 
had  sent  them  what  new  measures  were  being 
proposed  or  enforced  and  what  they  ought  to  think 
about  them. 

The  system  of  public  law  which  was  framed  by 
the  English  Parliaments  was  an  expression  of  the 
public  opinion  thus  formed,  and  derived  its  essen- 
tial force  from  the  fact  that  the  sentiment  of  the 
nation  was  behind  it,  rather  than  from  the  fact 


140      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

that  it  had  been  discussed  by  two  houses,  one  of 
which  was  a  representative  body.  But  it  was 
natural  enough  that  people  who  compared  the 
public  law  of  England  with  that  of  France  or 
Austria  and  saw  how  much  better  it  was  should 
overvalue  the  machinery  that  produced  it,  and 
seek  the  cause  of  the  excellence  of  English  law  not 
in  the  intelligence  of  English  public  opinion  but 
in  the  details  of  its  method  of  legislation.  Montes- 
quieu himself  fell  into  precisely  this  error. 

The  men  who  framed  our  state  and  federal 
constitutions  made  the  same  mistake  as  Montes- 
quieu, and  were  much  concerned  to  follow  in  detail 
all  the  forms  of  English  Parliamentary  organiza- 
tion. "We  tried  to  establish  two  legislative  chambers 
in  every  important  political  unit.  It  is  because 
Parliament  had  a  House  of  Lords  as  well  as  a 
House  of  Commons  that  so  many  of  our  munici- 
palities, scattered  all  over  the  nation,  have  a  board 
of  aldermen  as  well  as  a  court  of  common  council. 

But  it  gradually  appeared  that  these  assemblies 
did  not  fulfil  the  function  which  the  theory  of 
representative  government  assigned  them.  They 
were  not  places  where  the  best  men  from  each 
community  went  to  make  up  their  minds  about 
public  questions.  The  representatives  were  sent 
with  more  or  less  specific  instructions.  They  were 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE       141 

chosen  for  the  purpose  of  putting  into  effect  cer- 
tain ideas  and  principles  already  expressed  in  the 
party  platform.  The  telegraph  and  the  printing 
press  have  deprived  parliaments  and  congresses  of 
their  function  as  agencies  for  the  making  of  public 
opinion.  It  was  almost  always  formed  before  they 
assembled. 

But  while  the  deliberative  power  of  such  assem- 
blies has  been  diminished,  their  law-making  power 
has  very  greatly  increased.  The  authority  of 
Parliament  in  the  sixteenth  century  was  preca- 
rious; even  in  the  seventeenth  it  was  by  no  means 
unquestioned.  A  parliamentary  statute  or  ordi- 
nance which  did  not  have  the  will  of  the  people 
behind  it  was  a  plaything  for  the  king  to  toy  with 
as  he  liked.  Today  an  Act  of  Parliament  in  Eng- 
land or  of  Congress  in  America,  even  when 
distasteful  to  the  majority  of  the  people,  is  a 
thing  which  cannot  easily  be  disobeyed  or  ignored. 

This  change  of  conditions,  by  which  parliamen- 
tary assemblies  ceased  to  make  public  opinion  and 
began  to  make  laws  which  were  independent  of 
public  opinion,  has  rendered  modern  representative 
government,  in  its  practical  working,  a  very  dif- 
ferent thing  from  what  the  theorists  have  contem- 
plated. It  has  made  it  worth  while  for  the 
professional  politician  who  is  pursuing  selfish  ends 


142      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

of  his  own  to  see  that  the  men  elected  to  positions 
in  such  a  body  are  those  that  he  can  influence,  and 
that  the  statement  of  principles  which  the  public 
has  exacted  of  them  is  such  as  he  can  approve. 
Both  of  these  opportunities  have  been  given  him 
by  his  control  of  the  nominating  convention.  If 
it  is  completely  under  his  hands  he  can  dictate 
both  the  candidates  and  the  platform.  If  it  is 
partially  under  his  hands  he  can  at  least  prevent 
the  nomination  of  candidates  of  outspoken  inde- 
pendence and  the  adoption  of  platforms  with 
inconveniently  frank  declaration  of  principles.  In 
fact,  it  matters  very  little  what  the  platform  says, 
so  long  as  the  candidate  is  Mr.  Pliable  and  not 
Mr.  Obstinate.  There  are  numerous  precedents  in 
American  politics  for  ignoring  the  pledges  of  party 
platforms.  In  fact,  the  whole  situation  reminds 
one  of  the  experience  of  an  Ohio  politician  who 
tried  to  view  the  scenery  of  the  Alleghany  moun- 
tains from  the  platform  of  a  Pennsylvania  railroad 
train,  instead  of  staying  inside  the  car,  as  the  rules 
required.  When  the  conductor  called  his  attention 
to  the  Company's  rules,  he  asked  sharply  what  a 
platform  was  made  for  if  not  to  stand  on.  The 
conductor  closed  the  discussion  by  saying,  "You 
are  a  practical  politician,  Mr.  Blank.  You  should 
know  that  a  platform  is  not  made  to  stand  on;  a 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE      143 

platform  is  made  to  get  in  on ! "  Of  course  it  may 
happen  that  the  political  leaders,  in  their  anxiety 
to  make  the  candidate  suit  the  organization,  may 
fail  to  suit  the  people  and  therefore  be  defeated 
at  the  polls;  but  inasmuch  as  there  is  usually 
another  party  organization  on  the  opposite  side 
working  for  subservient  candidates  and  machine- 
made  platforms,  this  danger  is  not  always  so  great 
as  it  appears. 

That  part  of  the  work  of  legislative  bodies  which 
first  caused  popular  dissatisfaction  was  their 
liberality — to  use  no  harsher  word — in  granting 
valuable  franchises  to  the  politicians  and  their 
friends  without  adequate  regard  for  the  protection 
of  the  public.  Even  in  the  decades  preceding  the 
Civil  "War  this  practice  aroused  much  adverse 
criticism;  and  in  the  years  immediately  following 
the  war  the  power  was  so  abused  that  constitutional 
provisions  were  adopted  by  many  of  the  states 
which  were  directed  specifically  against  this  evil. 
It  became  customary  to  require  corporations  to  be 
organized  under  general  laws  and  to  restrict  or 
prohibit  the  grant  of  special  charters  and  the 
special  privileges  which  usually  attach  thereto. 

This  was  the  first  step  in  limiting  legislative 
powers.  A  second  followed  almost  immediately 
thereafter.  A  new  form  of  state  constitution 


144      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

became  fashionable,  much  longer  and  more  explicit 
than  the  old,  which  included  a  great  deal  of  matter 
that  was  not  in  a  strict  sense  constitutional  law 
at  all.  A  constitution,  in  the  old  and  accredited 
meaning  of  the  word,  prescribes  the  powers  and 
functions  of  the  different  departments  of  the 
government.  These  new-fashioned  constitutions 
included  a  great  many  general  laws  regarding  the 
conduct  of  corporations  and  individuals.  When- 
ever a  law  of  this  kind  was  incorporated  in  a  state 
constitution  it  had  the  effect  of  limiting  the  power 
of  the  legislature.  If  a  great  body  of  public  and 
private  law  was  thus  made  part  of  the  constitution, 
this  meant  that  the  legislature  had  no  authority 
to  make  any  fundamental  changes  in  the  law 
except  by  the  slow  process  of  constitutional  amend- 
ment, which  required  a  submission  of  the  proposed 
changes  to  a  vote  of  the  people. 

These  long  American  constitutions  were  severely 
criticised  by  European  publicists,  who  said  that 
we  did  not  know  what  the  word  "constitution" 
really  meant.  This  criticism  was  in  some  respects 
wide  of  the  mark.  The  reason  why  our  constitu- 
tions were  made  so  encyclopaedic  was  not  that  the 
people  of  the  United  States  had  wrong  ideas  as  to 
what  should  be  put  in  a  constitution,  but  that  they 
were  unwilling  to  leave  the  legislatures  free  to  vote 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE       145 

on  certain  important  subjects,  and  therefore  incor- 
porated their  views  on  these  subjects  in  the 
constitution  as  the  easiest  way  of  tying  the 
legislature's  hands. 

"Within  recent  years  they  have  found  a  more 
direct  means  of  accomplishing  the  desired  result 
by  the  introduction  of  the  referendum.  Under  this 
system  a  legislature  submits  proposed  changes  in 
law  to  popular  vote  to  determine  whether  they 
shall  become  effective  or  not.  This  mode  of  legis- 
lation originated  in  Switzerland.  After  many 
experiments  in  the  different  cantons  it  was  incor- 
porated into  the  Swiss  federal  constitution  in  1874. 
Two  decades  later  Switzerland  supplemented  the 
referendum  by  the  adoption  of  the  initiative,  or 
right  of  proposal  of  laws  by  popular  petition. 
Some  of  our  states  have  for  many  years  applied 
the  principle  of  the  referendum  in  a  limited  way. 
Certain  classes  of  legislative  acts,  such  as  the 
contraction  of  state  debts,  or  the  selection  of  sites 
for  public  buildings,  have  in  such  states  required 
confirmation  by  popular  vote  before  they  went 
into  effect.  In  1897  Iowa  made  this  requirement 
general  in  regard  to  all  grants  of  franchises  of 
any  kind  whatever.  But  it  was  not  until  1898  that 
the  referendum  was  first  adopted  in  its  complete 
form  by  South  Dakota.  Since  that  time  about 


146      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

one  third  of  the  states  have  introduced  it  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent  into  their  organic  law. 

With  the  adoption  of  the  principle  of  the  refer- 
endum, and  the  initiative  which  is  apt  to  go  with  it, 
the  abandonment  of  the  old  theory  of  representa- 
tive government  is  complete.  The  legislature  is 
now  no  longer  an  agency  for  framing  public 
opinion  and  making  the  laws  which  public  opinion 
demands,  but  a  conference  committee  on  the  affairs 
of  the  state,  one  of  whose  duties  is  to  submit  drafts 
of  proposed  legislation  to  the  people  in  order  to 
see  whether  the  majority  of  voters  likes  them. 
The  power  of  the  leaders  of  nominating  conventions 
to  secure  the  passage  of  such  laws  as  they  wish 
and  the  profits  and  emoluments  incident  thereto 
is  by  this  means  seriously  impaired  if  not  wholly 
destroyed. 

But  there  are  two  other  changes  which  are 
intended  by  their  advocates  to  complete  the  over- 
throw of  old-fashioned  political  machinery  more 
fully  than  can  be  accomplished  by  the  referendum 
or  initiative.  The  first  of  these  is  the  direct 
primary.  Observing  the  evils  which  arise  from 
nominating  conventions,  many  of  our  reformers 
would  give  the  people  the  opportunity  to  nominate 
candidates  themselves.  They  would  do  away  with 
representative  assemblies  for  nomination  as  well 


REACTION  AGAINST  MACHINE      147 

as  representative  assemblies  for  legislation,  and 
would  have  the  name  of  the  party  candidate 
decided  by  a  majority  of  the  popular  vote  within 
the  party. 

The  direct  primary  is  no  new  thing.  It  was 
tentatively  introduced  in  Pennsylvania  about 
1870.  Abandoned  in  the  East  except  by  a  few 
municipalities,  it  was  for  two  decades  occasionally 
tried  in  the  "West  and  frequently  in  the  South. 
But  during  these  early  years  it  was  applied  only 
to  town  or  county  nominations.  The  movement  for 
state-wide  primaries  is  a  much  more  recent  one. 
It  has  gained  rapid  headway  in  the  past  three  or 
four  years.  In  1912  fifteen  states  held  primaries 
to  determine  preferences  for  presidential  candi- 
dates; and  a  considerable  number  of  others  used 
this  agency  to  nominate  candidates  for  governor, 
senator,  or  congressman  at  large. 

Still  more  novel,  and  in  some  respects  more 
radical,  is  the  fifth  and  last  proposal  of  the  advo- 
cates of  direct  popular  government.  They  would 
make  it  possible  for  a  certain  proportion  of  the 
voters  to  petition  for  the  recall  of  an  obnoxious 
or  unpopular  official,  and  compel  the  holding  of 
a  new  election  to  see  whether  he  is  to  be  permitted 
to  serve  out  his  term  of  office.  Many  localities  are 
experimenting  with  the  system  of  the  recall;  but 


148      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

it  is  too  soon  to  say  how  far  those  that  have  tried 
it  are  satisfied  with  it,  or  how  widely  their  example 
is  likely  to  be  followed.  The  plan  is  still  in  the 
experimental  stage. 

Regarding  the  success  of  all  these  more  thorough- 
going plans  for  curbing  the  power  of  professional 
politicians,  we  may  say  what  Ostrogorski,  that 
acute  and  careful  Russian  student  of  American 
politics,  says  concerning  the  direct  primary: 
"Neither  the  sanguine  hopes  of  the  reformers  nor 
the  fears  of  the  bosses  have  been  entirely  justi- 
fied. .  .  .  Frauds  are  not  prevented  by  the  new 
system.  Many  bad  candidates  are  defeated  who 
would  be  nominated  in  convention,  but  the  hap- 
hazard vote  of  the  multitude  rejects  good  men 
against  whom  a  convention  would  not  dare  to  come 
out."  And  after  an  enumeration  of  minor  evils, 
all  the  more  significant  because  of  Ostrogorski 's 
sympathy  with  progressive  views  and  methods,  he 
adds:  "These  unsatisfactory  results  of  the  direct 
primary  cannot  be  considered  as  accidental." 

Why  these  means  have  failed  to  realize  the  hopes 
of  their  advocates,  and  what  more  fundamental 
reforms  in  practice  and  in  thought  are  necessary 
to  make  government  by  the  people  effective,  are 
questions  which  I  shall  discuss  in  the  concluding 
lecture. 


VI 
THE  SEAT  OF  POWEE  TODAY 

When  party  government  was  at  its  height  the 
leaders  of  the  organization  had  a  decisive  influence 
on  the  nomination  of  candidates  and  the  passage 
of  laws.  Public  opinion  counted  for  comparatively 
little,  except  as  an  indirect  deterrent  of  mistakes 
that  might  lose  elections.  The  measures  which  I 
have  described  in  the  last  lecture — the  initiative, 
the  referendum,  the  direct  primary — were  efforts 
to  make  organization  count  for  less  and  public 
opinion  for  more.  Why  have  they  disappointed 
the  hopes  of  their  advocates  ? 

Chiefly  because  it  is  impossible,  except  in  grave 
emergencies,  to  make  unorganized  public  opinion 
effective  in  practical  politics.  If,  as  Mr.  Root  well 
says  in  his  book  on  The  Citizen's  Part  in  Govern- 
ment, all  the  voters  went  to  the  polls  without 
previous  discussion  and  cast  their  several  votes  for 
the  candidates  that  each  man  liked  best,  the  great 
majority  of  votes  would  be  thrown  away.  ' '  Human 
nature  is  such  that  long  before  an  election  could 
be  reached  some  men  who  wished  for  the  offices 


150      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

would  have  taken  steps  to  secure  in  advance  the 
support  of  voters;  some  men  who  had  business  or 
property  interests  which  they  desired  to  have 
protected  or  promoted  through  the  operation  of 
government  would  have  taken  steps  to  secure 
support  for  candidates  in  their  interest;  and  some 
men  who  were  anxious  to  advance  principles  or 
policies  that  they  considered  to  be  for  the  good 
of  the  commonwealth  would  have  taken  steps  to 
secure  support  for  candidates  representing  those 
principles  and  policies.  All  of  these  would  have 
got  their  friends  and  supporters  to  help  them,  and 
in  each  group  a  temporary  organization  would 
have  grown  up  for  effective  work  in  securing 
support.  Under  these  circumstances,  when  .the 
votes  came  to  be  cast,  the  candidates  of  some  of 
these  extempore  organizations  would  inevitably 
have  a  plurality  of  votes,  and  the  great  mass  of 
voters  who  did  not  follow  any  organized  leadership 
would  find  that  their  ballots  were  practically 
thrown  away  by  reason  of  being  scattered  about 
among  a  great  number  of  candidates  instead  of 
being  concentrated  so  as  to  be  effective." 

"We  see  this  fact  elucidated  in  the  workings  of 
the  direct  primary.  Occasionally  it  happens  that 
a  man  is  so  prominent  or  so  conspicuously  well 
fitted  for  the  duties  of  the  office  that  he  can  secure 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  151 

votes  enough  to  nominate  him  by  the  spontaneous 
impulse  of  his  fellow  citizens.  But  such  cases  are 
rare.  A  preliminary  campaign  is  usually  neces- 
sary. The  man  of  ability  who  will  not  take  the 
trouble  to  make  such  a  campaign  gets  fewer  votes 
than  his  less  able  opponent  who  has  the  time  and 
money  to  spend  in  organizing  his  followers  and 
creating  a  public  sentiment  in  his  behalf.  It  has 
become  a  proverb  in  certain  states  that  any  man 
who  wishes  to  be  chosen  for  office  must  incur  the 
trouble  of  making  two  campaigns,  one  for  nomi- 
nation and  the  other  for  election.  Political  chicane 
has  not  been  eliminated.  It  has  simply  been  trans- 
ferred from  the  hands  of  a  party  organization  to 
the  hands  of  individuals  or  groups  of  individuals. 
The  managers  of  the  old  party  machines  tried 
to  find  out  what  their  followers  wanted  by  personal 
conversation  between  man  and  man.  The  ward 
leader  talked  with  the  men  whose  votes  he  con- 
trolled, and  knew  what  they  thought  and  felt. 
The  district  leader  talked  with  the  ward  leaders, 
and  on  the  basis  of  that  conversation  made  up  his 
mind  what  he  wished  to  do.  The  members  of  the 
county  committee  talked  with  the  leaders  in  the 
several  districts  and  obtained  full  knowledge  of 
the  demands  of  party  men  in  different  sections. 
The  successful  politician  was  the  man  who  under- 


152      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

stood  the  art  of  mixing  with  men,  of  getting  at 
what  they  wanted  and  coming  to  an  understanding 
with  them  as  to  the  degree  in  which  their  several 
wants  could  be  gratified.  It  was  thus  that  the 
sentiment  was  organized  which  could  carry  con- 
ventions and  determine  nominations.  It  was  on 
these  means,  supplemented  by  the  influence  of 
great  orators  and  debaters  who  argued  in  defense 
of  the  plans  thus  framed,  that  the  older  politicians 
relied  for  securing  acceptance  of  their  projects. 

The  modern  politician  must  go  to  work  in  a 
different  way.  He  must  appeal  to  a  wider  public 
sentiment — a  sentiment  which  has  been  created, 
not  by  a  vast  number  of  separate  conversations  but 
by  the  influence  of  a  few  newspapers  and  maga- 
zines upon  their  readers.  It  is  through  the  press — 
daily,  weekly,  or  monthly — that  the  American 
people  forms  its  opinion  as  to  men  and  measures. 
The  success  or  failure  of  a  candidate  in  securing 
the  nomination  depends  largely  upon  the  support 
which  he  receives  from  this  quarter.  The  man  who 
accomplishes  most  in  modern  politics  is  he  who 
recognizes  this  fact  most  fully.  It  is  not  by  the 
personal  influence  which  was  characteristic  of  the 
old  party  system  that  nominations  are  now  secured 
and  the  way  made  clear  for  the  passage  of  laws. 
It  is  by  the  influence  of  the  printed  page,  which 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  153 

enables  the  man  who  controls  it  to  determine 
thousands  of  votes  for  good  or  for  evil. 

In  1824  we  overthrew  the  legislative  caucus  as 
a  dominant  power  in  politics,  and  left  the  field 
open  for  the  party  machine.  Today  we  are  over- 
throwing the  party  machine  and  are  leaving  the 
field  open  to  the  press.  In  neither  case  have  we 
provided  for  the  expression  of  a  spontaneous  or 
unorganized  public  opinion.  We  have  simply  sub- 
stituted one  method  of  organization  for  another. 
Under  the  old  system  the  goodness  or  badness  of 
a  party  machine  determined  whether  Congress 
would  make  good  laws  or  the  administration  good 
appointments.  Under  the  new  system  the  good- 
ness or  badness  of  newspapers  is  likely  to  determine 
whether  the  initiative  and  the  referendum  will  be 
used  to  promote  intelligent  legislation;  whether 
the  direct  primary  will  give  us  good  candidates  or 
bad  candidates;  whether  we  shall  be  able  to  sur- 
mount the  perils  with  which  the  experiment  of  the 
recall  is  attended. 

Among  the  many  changed  conditions  of  Ameri- 
can politics,  the  growth  of  an  independent  press  is 
perhaps  the  most  important.  Prior  to  1850  it  was 
regarded  as  almost  indispensable  for  a  newspaper 
to  belong  to  a  party.  Before  the  nominating 
convention  met  the  different  sections  of  the  party 


154      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

would  have  different  newspapers  supporting  their 
own  particular  candidates  or  measures.  After  the 
nominating  convention  was  over  the  newspapers 
were  expected  to  fall  into  line  just  as  the  different 
sections  of  the  party  fell  into  line ;  and  they  quite 
generally  did  so.  The  papers  that  were  really 
independent  were  few  in  number,  and  might  be 
divided  into  two  classes:  the  very  good  and  the 
very  bad.  Journals  of  each  of  these  classes  found 
their  advice  neglected  by  astute  politicians;  the 
very  good,  because  their  readers  were  supposed 
to  be  cranks,  and  too  frequently  gave  ground  for 
that  supposition;  the  very  bad,  because  they  were 
known  to  be  for  sale  to  the  highest  bidder,  so  that 
their  support  carried  no  weight. 

The  growth  of  the  free  soil  party  in  the  North 
and  the  consequent  agitation  in  favor  of  secession 
in  the  South  gave  the-  press  a  somewhat  greater 
importance  and  influence  in  party  councils.  The 
slavery  question  was  one  which  could  not  be  dealt 
with  by  the  old  political  methods  of  discussion  and 
compromise.  A  kind  of  popular  feeling  was  grow- 
ing up  in  both  North  and  South  which  the  politi- 
cians who  framed  the  compromises  of  1848  were 
powerless  to  control.  Under  such  circumstances 
journals  like  the  Springfield  Republican,  the  New 
York  Tribune,  and  the  St.  Paul  Pioneer  Press  in 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  155 

the  North,  or  like  the  Charleston  Mercury  and — to 
take  an  instance  of  a  different  kind — De  Bow's 
Review  in  the  South,  were  making  the  opinion 
which  the  politicians  had  to  be  content  to  follow. 
The  press  in  1860  was  thus  a  far  more  potent  factor 
in  politics  than  it  had  been  ten  years  earlier.  But 
it  was  not  as  yet  a  dominant  factor.  People  still 
liked  better  to  listen  to  debates  than  to  read 
editorials;  they  still  preferred  to  form  their 
opinion  from  the  spoken  word  rather  than  from 
the  printed  page.  Nor  were  the  newspapers  and 
reviews  in  any  true  sense  independent  of  party. 
They  did  more  to  make  the  party  than  they  did 
before,  but  when  it  was  made  they  stood  closely 
by  it  as  an  organization.  For  the  sake  of  mould- 
ing the  opinions  of  their  fellow  Republicans  or 
Democrats  on  some  points,  they  were  content  to 
forego  the  privilege  of  expressing  their  own 
personal  views  upon  others. 

The  real  power  of  the  press  in  politics — the 
power  possessed  by  a  paper  that  tells  people  the 
things  they  want  to  know,  in  the  face  of  the 
hostility  of  one  party  machine  and  the  indiffer- 
ence of  another — was  accidentally  discovered  by 
the  New  York  Times  in  the  summer  of  1871. 
Tweed  was  at  that  time  in  complete  control  of  the 
city  government.  The  efforts  of  political  rivals 


156      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

to  shake  his  dominance,  within  his  own  party  or 
outside  of  it,  had  proved  futile.  The  attempts  to 
overthrow  him  by  conventional  methods  were 
abortive.  The  Democratic  machine  throughout  the 
state  was  his  to  direct.  Even  the  Republican 
leaders  were  unwilling  to  engage  in  active  oppo- 
sition to  a  system  of  plunder  which,  though 
organized  on  a  larger  scale  than  their  own,  was 
yet  a  natural  development  of  political  methods 
with  which  they  were  familiar  and  by  which  many 
of  them  profited. 

"While  matters  were  in  this  shape,  a  bookkeeper 
in  one  of  the  departments  of  the  city  government 
had  gradually  collected  evidence  that  the  public 
was  being  robbed  on  a  large  scale.  He  offered  this 
evidence  to  one  New  York  paper  after  another. 
Incredible  as  it  may  now  seem,  one  paper  after 
another  refused  it.  The  newspapers  of  that  day 
were  afraid  to  publish  facts  which  the  party 
machine  preferred  to  keep  quiet.  Finally  the  New 
York  Times  undertook  the  campaign  of  publicity. 
I  am  told  that  it  did  so  with  much  reluctance  and 
grave  apprehension  of  the  possible  consequences 
to  itself.  But  the  Times  was  not  being  very 
actively  supported  or  highly  valued  by  the  Repub- 
lican machine  at  the  time;  and  it  decided  to  take 
the  chance  that  the  people  might  be  interested  to 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY     157 

read  the  detailed  evidence  as  to  the  way  in  which 
millions  of  dollars  were  being  extracted  from  their 
pockets  every  month. 

The  result  astounded  the  proprietors  of  the 
Times  as  much  as  it  did  anybody  else.  Men  who 
had  listened  apathetically  when  orators  like 
Beecher  or  Evarts  described  the  way  in  which  the 
city  was  being  plundered  seized  eagerly  upon  the 
facts  when  they  were  put  before  them  in  cold  type. 
The  printed  page  had  come  into  its  own  heritage. 
It  could  do  things  which  the  spoken  word  could 
not  do.  People  called  for  copies  of  the  Times 
faster  than  the  press  could  furnish  them.  These 
were  days  when  the  sale  of  other  papers  on  trains 
and  on  the  streets  had  practically  ceased,  because 
people  wanted  the  Times  and  nothing  else.  I  can 
myself  remember  the  distressed  lament  of  some 
of  the  Republican  leaders  that  people  would  insist 
on  getting  the  Times,  whose  party  regularity  was 
not  above  suspicion,  merely  because  it  gave  them 
the  information  they  desired,  when  they  could 
have  got  the  same  information  reprinted  in  other 
papers  one  day  later  without  sacrifice  of  their 
party  consciences.  But  it  was  in  vain  that  they 
protested.  The  Staats-Zeitung  joined  with  the 
Times  by  publishing  the  facts  in  the  German 
tongue.  Thomas  Nast  in  Harper's  Weekly  drove 


158      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

the  lesson  home  by  his  inimitable  cartoons.  In  two 
short  months  public  opinion,  formed  under  the 
influence  of  these  three  newspapers,  became  over- 
whelming in  its  force.  The  Cooper  Union  meeting 
of  April  6th,  before  the  newspaper  disclosures,  had 
accomplished  nothing.  The  Cooper  Union  meeting 
of  September  4th,  after  the  newspaper  disclosures, 
was  a  political  upheaval.  The  indictment  of 
corrupt  officials  followed  in  October,  a  crushing 
defeat  for  Tammany  as  an  organization  in  the 
elections  of  November;  and  before  the  close  of  the 
calendar  year  the  power  of  Tweed  was  at  an  end. 

The  experience  of  the  New  York  Times  in  1871 
taught  at  least  two  distinct  lessons :  first,  that  facts 
presented  by  a  newspaper  were  more  effective  than 
the  same  facts  presented  by  orators  of  eminence; 
second,  that  if  a  newspaper  had  such  facts  in  its 
possession  it  could  commercially  afford  to  print 
them  even  if  the  party  leaders  did  not  wish  them 
printed.  But  the  press  of  the  country  was  rather 
slow  to  learn  these  lessons.  A  few  newspapers  in 
our  larger  cities  assumed  an  attitude  of  political 
independence  in  municipal  affairs.  A  somewhat 
larger  number  adopted  the  policy  of  giving  an 
unvarnished  tale  of  facts  in  their  news  columns 
as  distinct  from  their  editorial  pages.  It  was  not 
until  about  ten  years  later  that  Joseph  Pulitzer, 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  159 

familiarized  the  public  with  the  theory  that  a 
newspaper's  first  duty  was  to  give  its  readers 
information.  It  was  Pulitzer's  principle  to  decide 
whether  a  thing  should  be  published  and  in  what 
shape  a  thing  should  be  published,  solely  on  the 
basis  of  its  value  as  news;  with  relatively  little 
reference  to  political  or  moral  considerations, 
except  so  far  as  these  considerations  might  affect 
the  readability  of  the  article  and  the  consequent 
sale  of  the  paper. 

Of  the  good  and  the  evil  that  was  brought  into 
journalism  by  this  new  method,  as  introduced  by 
Pulitzer  and  carried  out  still  further  by  some  of 
his  followers,  I  shall  not  undertake  to  speak  in 
detail.  We  are  concerned  only  with  its  great  and 
almost  revolutionary  consequences  upon  the  rela- 
tion between  newspapers  and  parties.  No  longer 
could  the  party  leader  hope  that  a  view  of  the 
facts  which  was  accepted  as  profitable  by  him  and 
his  associates  in  a  convention  would  be  presented 
to  the  public  by  a  devoted  band  of  newspaper 
followers  and  received  as  gospel  truth  by  nine 
tenths  of  the  men  who  read  those  newspapers. 
The  statement  had  to  be  what  the  newspaper  men 
themselves  regarded  as  profitable  for  them  to 
publish.  The  power  of  moulding  public  opinion 
had  passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  party  leader 


160      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

and  into  those  of  the  editor.  And  as  if  the  poli- 
tician's troubles  with  the  daily  press  were  not 
enough,  weekly  and  monthly  papers  rose  in  great 
numbers  which  undertook  with  more  or  less  success 
to  tell  the  people  the  facts  which  the  editors 
thought  that  they  wanted;  publications  which  did 
for  the  members  of  the  rural  community  what  the 
daily  papers  did  for  the  people  of  our  larger  cities 
in  giving  them  data,  sometimes  right  and  some- 
times wrong,  for  judging  public  questions  inde- 
pendently of  party  utterances. 

Is  this  change  in  the  method  of  organizing 
public  opinion  a  good  one  or  a  bad  one  ?  The  old- 
fashioned  man  of  affairs,  whether  in  politics  or 
out  of  it,  is  inclined  to  think  it  almost  wholly  bad. 
The  editor  of  the  new  school  and  the  reader  who 
takes  his  opinion  from  the  editor  are  apt  to  think 
it  wholly  good.  The  truth,  as  usual,  lies  between 
the  two  extremes.  It  is  a  change  which  is  pre- 
dominantly for  the  better,  but  one  which  has 
possibilities  of  evil  as  well  as  of  good.  And 
according  as  the  press  uses  its  new  power  for  evil 
or  for  good  will  the  results  of  the  referendum  and 
the  direct  primary,  and  other  similar  agencies  of 
modern  democracy,  be  also  evil  or  good. 

The  organization  of  public  opinion  by  the  news- 
papers instead  of  by  the  party  managers  has 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  161 

certain  distinct  and  obvious  advantages.  In  the 
first  place,  it  involves  a  more  direct  appeal  to 
reason.  A  newspaper  owes  its  power  to  the  fact 
that  its  readers  think  as  its  editor  wishes  them  to 
think.  Their  opinion  may  be  right  or  wrong.  The 
evidence  presented  to  them  may  be  complete  or 
incomplete.  But  the  opinion  is  in  any  case  a  real 
opinion,  based  on  an  examination  of  important 
statements. 

In  the  next  place,  this  opinion  is  formed  in  the 
open  instead  of  being  shaped  by  secret  conferences, 
as  was  so  often  the  case  under  old-fashioned  party 
leadership.  The  newspaper  makes  its  appeal  in 
broad  daylight.  If  the  appeal  is  an  unfair  one, 
those  who  are  arguing  on  the  other  side  have  at 
least  a  chance  to  see  what  is  being  said  and  done 
by  their  opponents  and  to  try  to  prove  that  it  is 
unfair.  Government  by  newspapers  is  government 
by  discussion.  It  is  perhaps  the  only  form  of 
government  by  discussion  which  is  practicable  in 
a  large  community. 

In  the  third  place,  the  appeal  which  the  news- 
paper makes  to  its  readers  almost  necessarily  takes 
the  form  of  an  appeal  to  their  judgment  rather 
than  to  their  selfishness.  A  party  manager  work- 
ing under  the  old  system  is  constantly  occupied  in 
pointing  out  to  his  followers  how  their  personal 


162      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

interests  would  be  advanced  by  some  measure  or 
some  candidate.  A  newspaper  or  magazine  that 
should  adopt  this  policy  would  soon  find  its 
influence  confined  within  a  limited  circle.  The 
general  public  would  suspect,  and  rightly  suspect, 
that  a  measure  which  one  group  of  voters  was 
urged  to  support  on  purely  selfish  grounds  would 
be  of  doubtful  benefit  to  the  community  as  a  whole. 
A  journalist  may  himself  often  be  led  to  support 
certain  measures  or  certain  candidates  for  reasons 
of  self-interest.  But  his  appeal  to  his  readers  for 
support  must  be  placed  on  broader  grounds  than 
this  in  order  to  be  effective. 

Such  are  the  patent  and  obvious  advantages  of 
having  the  organization  of  popular  opinion  left  in 
the  hands  of  the  public  press.  They  are  so  funda- 
mental in  character  that  we  are  sometimes  tempted 
to  overlook  the  disadvantages  and  dangers  with 
which  this  process  is  attended.  The  very  fact  that 
makes  the  appeal  of  the  press  an  almost  ideal  agency 
in  democratic  government  when  rightly  used,  corre- 
spondingly increases  the  perils  when  it  is  used 
wrongly.  The  power  of  an  editor  is  a  power  to 
influence  public  thinking.  If  he  confines  himself 
to  legitimate  methods  of  influence  he  realizes 
Bagehot's  ideal  of  government  by  discussion.  If 
he  uses  it  wrongly  and  leads  his  readers  to  act  on 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  163 

imperfect  information,  lie  not  only  turns  the 
action  of  the  government  into  wrong  channels,  but 
he  effects  the  more  permanent  and  disastrous  harm 
of  poisoning  public  opinion  at  its  source. 

I  do  not  mean  that  this  last  in  its  extreme  form 
is  a  very  common  thing.  While  unscrupulous  men 
occasionally  acquire  power  as  journalists,  they  are 
no  more  numerous  in  that  profession  than  in  any 
other.  But  there  is  a  good  deal  of  danger  of 
unintentional  poisoning  of  public  opinion;  danger 
that  the  journalist,  in  his  honest  desire  to  promote 
a  particular  measure,  will  encourage  the  public  in 
habits  and  methods  of  thought  which  are  antago- 
nistic to  the  success  of  democratic  government. 

The  first  and  most  frequent  source  of  harm  is 
that  while  he  is  pretending  to  appeal  to  the 
judgment  of  his  readers  he  really  appeals  to  their 
emotion. 

A  man  who  desires  to  make  his  newspaper 
popular  is  under  a  constant  temptation  to  pander 
to  the  prejudices  of  his  public.  Without  actually 
making  grave  misstatements,  he  can  print  the  facts 
which  they  like  in  large  type  and  suppress  or 
relegate  to  obscure  columns  the  facts  which  they 
do  not  like.  Under  these  circumstances  their 
judgment  is  distorted  and  their  preconceived 
impressions  confirmed,  until  they  become  incapable 


164      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

of  weighing  the  real  evidence  on  which  their 
political  action  ought  to  be  based.  If  another 
paper  tries  to  furnish  them  the  true  facts,  they 
disbelieve  it.  They  are  accessible  only  to  the  kind 
of  evidence  that  their  own  particular  journal 
prefers  to  furnish. 

The  editor,  under  such  circumstances,  often 
makes  the  excuse  that  he  gave  his  readers  what 
they  wanted.  Even  if  he  were  an  ordinary  private 
citizen,  this  excuse  would  hardly  pass  current. 
The  man  who  puts  aniline  dyes  into  children's 
candy  is  not  excused  by  the  fact  that  the  children 
like  to  have  their  candy  bright  colored.  And  the 
newspaper  man  is  not  an  ordinary  private  citizen. 
He  is  by  the  course  of  recent  events  put  into  a 
place  of  public  responsibility.  He  has  it  in  his 
power  more  than  any  other  man  to  see  that  the 
country  is  governed  well  or  ill.  If  he  enables  his 
readers  to  base  their  votes  on  organized  informa- 
tion he  does  service.  If  he  leads  them  to  base  those 
votes  on  organized  emotion  he  does  irreparable 
wrong. 

I  do  not  know  whether  it  was  President  Lowell 
or  some  one  else  who  coined  the  phrase  "organized 
emotion."  Whoever  may  have  been  the  inventor, 
it  is  an  accurate  description  of  something  which 
gravely  threatens  the  stability  of  American  govern- 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  165 

ment.  Every  student  of  history  knows  what 
fearful  mistakes  democracies  have  made  under  the 
influence  of  emotion  evoked  by  popular  orators; 
how  thousands  of  men,  listening  to  an  appeal  to 
prejudice  veiled  in  the  form  of  exposition  of  fact, 
have  taken  leave  of  their  judgment  and  brought 
their  commonwealths  to  the  brink  of  ruin  or  even 
beyond  it.  Our  own  people  have  not  been  wholly 
exempt  from  this  danger.  "The  curse  of  the 
country,"  said  Daniel  Webster  in  a  moment  of 
bitterness,  "has  been  its  orators."  This  dangerous 
gift  of  the  orator,  of  making  emotion  take  the  place 
of  information,  is  one  to  which  the  newspaper 
has  today  fallen  heir. 

The  danger  which  will  result  to  the  common- 
wealth if  our  political  action  is  based  on  organized 
emotion  rather  than  organized  information  is 
peculiarly  great  in  connection  with  the  direct 
primary. 

Under  the  old-fashioned  system  of  nomination 
by  party  conventions,  two  questions  were  always 
asked  concerning  a  candidate :  first,  did  the  party 
want  him?  and  second,  could  he  be  elected?  It 
was  not  enough  for  the  leaders  to  know  whether 
the  candidate  was  popular  with  the  majority  of 
their  followers.  It  was  an  equally  important 
question — in  fact,  in  a  great  many  instances  a  much 


166      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

more  important  question — whether  he  could  attract 
a  sufficient  number  of  votes  from  the  opposite 
party,  or  hold  a  sufficient  number  of  doubtful  votes 
within  his  own  party,  to  make  his  election  reason- 
ably certain.  The  managers  wanted  to  get  the 
strongest  candidate  they  could;  and  the  strongest 
candidate  was  not  always  the  man  for  whom  his 
party  associates  were  most  enthusiastic.  He  was 
commonly  a  man  of  more  moderate  views  than 
they.  Take  a  salient  instance,  which  has  now 
become  historical.  In  the  presidential  campaign 
of  1860,  if  the  Republican  convention  had  consulted 
the  wishes  of  the  majority  of  voters  within  the 
party  it  would  have  nominated  Seward.  He  had 
taken  strong  ground  against  slavery;  and  northern 
Republicans  who  were  excited  by  the  heat  of  our 
slavery  contest  saw  in  him  their  natural  champion. 
But  sagacious  men  knew  that  Seward  could  not 
be  elected,  and  convinced  the  convention  of  the 
soundness  of  that  view.  It  nominated  Lincoln — a 
man  who  spoke  less  of  abstract  principles  than 
Seward  and  more  of  constitutional  law ;  less  of  the 
abolition  of  slavery — however  much  he  may  have 
had  this  at  heart — and  more  of  the  preservation 
of  the  Union.  The  nomination  of  Lincoln  was  a 
distinct  disappointment  to  extremists  throughout 
the  North;  but  it  appealed  to  moderate  men  in 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  167 

states  adjoining  the  Potomac  and  the  Ohio,  whose 
votes  were  necessary  and  sufficient  to  elect  him. 

This  instance  is  a  typical  one.  The  convention 
system  has  been  distinctly  favorable  to  the  nomi- 
nation of  businesslike  candidates  for  the  principal 
offices — of  candidates  who  were  unsatisfactory  to 
some  of  the  extreme  elements  in  their  own  party 
and  satisfactory  to  the  moderate  men  in  the 
opposite  party.  It  has  tended  to  give  us  men  who 
appealed  to  the  country  instead  of  appealing  to  a 
group.  With  the  substitution  of  the  direct  primary 
we  are  bound  to  lose  something  of  this  advantage. 
We  are  almost  certain  to  see  a  larger  number  of 
candidates  who  represent  extreme  views  on  either 
side.  To  prevent  this  danger  from  becoming  fatal 
the  press  of  the  country  will  have  to  recognize  the 
responsibility  that  is  placed  in  its  hands  by  the 
new  conditions,  and  strive  to  moderate  rather  than 
to  accelerate  the  tides  of  unreasoning  emotion. 

Closely  akin  to  the  appeal  to  prejudice  is  the 
appeal  to  impatience;  and  there  is  great  danger 
that  the  modern  editor  will  be  tempted  to  make 
use  of  this  appeal  to  the  detriment  of  good 
government. 

The  work  of  governing  a  commonwealth — 
nation,  state,  or  city — is  a  complicated  and  difficult 
piece  of  business.  It  never  goes  wholly  right.  The 


168      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

statesman  must  sacrifice  some  things  which  he 
regards  as  highly  desirable  in  order  to  secure  other 
things  which  he  deems  fundamentally  essential. 
He  alone  knows  how  necessary  the  sacrifice  is  and 
how  much  he  himself  regrets  it.  The  man  who 
looks  on  from  outside  thinks  that  the  statesman  is 
doing  it  lightly.  Such  a  man  sees  the  loss  to  the 
shipper  from  allowing  an  increased  railroad  rate. 
He  does  not  see  that  he  must  let  the  railroad  charge 
that  rate  in  order  to  secure  the  necessary  develop- 
ment of  the  transportation  system  of  the  commu- 
nity. He  sees  the  loss  from  having  American 
vessels  pay  tolls  in  the  Panama  Canal.  He  does 
not  see  the  gain  in  foreign  relations  due  to  the 
adoption  of  an  honorable  policy.  A  journalist  is 
tempted  to  make  himself  popular  by  voicing  the 
complaints  of  his  readers.  By  advocating  a  short- 
sighted policy  which  works  for  today  only,  he  can 
make  a  profit  for  himself;  and  few  of  those  who 
buy  his  paper  foresee  the  loss  that  comes  to  the 
country  if  his  advice  is  followed,  or  put  the  blame 
on  his  shoulders  after  it  has  come. 

This  sort  of  captious  criticism  is  one  of  the 
incidental  evils  which  has  attended  government 
by  discussion  in  all  ages  and  in  every  state. 
"Armies,"  says  Macaulay,  "have  won  victories 
under  bad  generals,  but  no  army  ever  won  a 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  169 

victory  under  a  debating  society."  Once  let  the 
officials  of  a  democracy  be  placed  at  the  mercy  of 
a  purely  critical  press,  and  the  efficiency  of 
American  democracy — not  to  say  American  democ- 
racy itself — is  at  an  end.  It  is  this  that  makes 
the  proposed  institution  of  the  recall  so  perilous. 
The  recall  is  based  on  the  theory  that  people  should 
be  encouraged  to  judge  of  a  man's  work  when  it 
is  half  done.  On  terms  like  these  efficient  and  far- 
sighted  administration  is  impossible.  The  recall 
may  seem  to  be  justified  in  a  few  cases  where  an 
official  has  palpably  betrayed  his  trust  without 
quite  rendering  himself  liable  to  impeachment; 
but  for  one  case  of  that  kind  where  it  does  good, 
there  are  likely  to  be  a  dozen  cases  where  it  will 
prevent  an  official  from  assuming  the  sacrifices 
and  incurring  the  odium  which  any  farsighted 
plan  of  government  is  apt  to  involve  before  its 
results  are  understood. 

Most  of  the  public  discussion  of  the  recall  has 
centered  about  the  recall  of  judges.  "We  are  told 
that  the  judicial  office  is  something  apart  by  itself, 
and  that  there  are  special  dangers  which  make  the 
recall  inapplicable  in  this  particular  instance.  I 
believe  that  this  distinction  between  the  recall  of 
judges  and  the  recall  of  other  officials  is  an  essen- 
tially false  one;  that  every  official  should  be 


170      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

allowed  to  serve  out  his  term,  except  in  case  of 
misconduct  or  incapacity;  and  that  the  nation 
which  claims  the  right  to  change  its  mind  as  to 
the  fitness  of  an  official  during  the  middle  of  his 
term  is  proving  its  incapacity  for  democratic 
government.  It  is  either  unwilling  to  take  the 
proper  care  in  the  selection  of  officials  or  unable 
to  have  patience  until  the  allotted  work  is  done 
before  passing  judgment  on  its  merits. 

A  third  danger  to  which  the  press  is  subject  is 
the  assumption  of  omniscience.  In  this  respect, 
as  in  the  other  two  that  I  have  just  named,  the 
newspaper  or  magazine  is  simply  falling  in  with 
the  prepossessions  of  its  readers.  We  all  rather 
like  to  feel  that  we  know  everything  that  is  worth 
knowing.  The  present  tendencies  in  our  education, 
which  lead  us  to  scatter  our  study  over  a  large 
range  of  subjects,  tend  to  strengthen  this  feeling. 
Small  wonder,  then,  that  the  newspaper,  bringing 
a  vast  range  of  information  within  reach  of  the 
people,  should  claim  to  inform  them  on  many 
details  of  business  and  politics,  of  science  and  art, 
which  must  necessarily  be  left  to  the  judgment  of 
the  expert  if  they  are  to  be  effectually  dealt  with 
in  practice.  The  editor  is  constantly  tempted  to 
natter  his  readers  into  believing  that  they  know 
everything  about  government  which  is  worth  know- 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  171 

ing,  and  that  anybody  who  claims  to  know  more 
than  the  general  public  is  either  an  aristocrat  or 
an  impostor. 

There  is  a  theory  that  if  you  only  find  out  what 
the  people  want  you  will  know  what  the  govern- 
ment ought  to  do.  Like  most  political  aphorisms, 
this  is  a  mixture  of  truth  and  falsehood,  of  prac- 
ticaf  good  sense  and  unpractical  idealism.  If  we 
mean  by  this  statement  that  the  ideals  of  the  people 
and  the  policy  of  the  government  must  be  in 
harmony,  and  that  one  cannot  be  a  great  deal 
better  or  a  great  deal  worse  than  the  other  without 
strain  and  damage  and  threat  of  revolution,  it  is 
right.  But  if  we  interpret  it  to  mean  that  the 
people  as  a  whole  are  competent  to  decide  how  the 
business  of  government  should  be  managed  in  each 
particular  instance,  it  is  wrong.  This  distinction 
is  as  old  as  Aristotle's  Politics  itself.  Aristotle 
showed  how  the  state  which  deserves  the  title  of 
"republic"  is  one  where  the  laws  conform  to  the 
general  wishes  of  the  people,  but  where  at  the  same 
time  people  are  content  to  elect,  for  the  actual 
conduct  of  a  nation's  affairs,  men  better  trained 
than  themselves  in  the  details  of  public  business. 

Among  the  qualities  needed  to  make  a  democracy 
successful  I  should  agree  with  Aristotle  in  laying 
great  emphasis  upon  the  readiness  to  value  experts 


172      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

as  they  deserve  to  be  valued.  The  larger  and  more 
complex  the  affairs  of  the  state,  the  less  is  it  pos- 
sible for  each  member  of  the  people  to  inform 
himself  on  all  the  details  of  public  business.  In  a 
small  country  town  each  intelligent  citizen  is 
competent  to  fill  almost  any  office  at  short  notice. 
In  a  city  it  requires  training  to  be  a  successful  head 
of  one  of  the  departments.  In  a  nation  the  need  of 
specialization  for  the  proper  command  of  the  army 
and  navy  and  for  the  proper  administration  of 
justice  is  even  more  conspicuously  necessary. 
Amid  the  keen  competition  that  now  exists  between 
different  peoples,  the  permanent  influence  of  the 
United  States  depends  on  having  its  public  service 
carried  on  with  a  high  degree  of  technical  efficiency. 
The  more  complex  our  development  is,  the  more 
urgent  is  the  need  of  self-restraint  and  modesty 
in  our  public  opinion;  such  self-restraint  and 
modesty  as  will  lead  us  to  be  content  with  judging 
the  expert  by  the  results  which  he  achieves  instead 
of  trying  to  prescribe  the  methods  that  he  shall 
follow. 

If  'we  really  value  experts  properly  we  must 
show  our  faith  by  our  works  and  be  prepared  to 
pay  them  more  in  the  future  than  we  have  been 
willing  to  pay  them  in  the  past.  The  parsimony 
of  the  American  people  in  this  respect  has  become 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  173 

a  byword.  The  salaries  of  our  officers  in  the  army 
and  the  navy  are  notoriously  low  as  compared  with 
what  men  of  equal  ability  could  obtain  in  private 
business.  We  refuse  to  give  our  judges  more  than 
a  fraction  of  the  income  which  they  could  obtain 
by  the  practice  of  their  profession.  We  take  the 
ground  that  the  honor  of  serving  the  country  is  so 
great  that  a  man  should  be  content  to  do  it  at 
great  pecuniary  sacrifice.  Fortunately  there  are 
many  able  men  among  us  who  are  content  to  accept 
public  service  on  these  niggardly  terms.  Some 
have  private  fortunes  of  their  own.  Some  are 
willing  to  remain  poor  for  the  sake  of  doing  their 
duty  to  an  ungrateful  commonwealth.  But  the 
general  effect  of  our  unwillingness  to  grant  first- 
rate  salaries  to  first-rate  men  is  deplorable.  The 
waste  due  to  inefficient  work  and  unnecessary  red 
tape  is  vastly  in  excess  of  the  economy  realized. 
To  save,  a  few  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  our 
diplomatic  service,  we  lose  millions  in  our  dealings 
with  other  states.  We  are  undertaking  to  hold  our 
place  among  the  nations  of  the  world  in  a  competi- 
tion which  grows  every  year  more  keen.  But  the 
United  States  is  the  one  country  which  begrudges 
the  money  necessary  and  the  expert  ability  neces- 
sary to  give  its  citizens  a  high-grade  public  service 
at  home  and  abroad. 


174      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

Besides  placing  the  proper  value  upon  the  ser- 
vices of  officials,  we  must  also  be  prepared  to  give 
them  a  proper  degree  of  independence.  "We  must 
not  keep  nagging  at  them. 

In  a  well-managed  private  business  the  man  at 
the  head  keeps  careful  control  of  the  general  policy 
and  takes  great  pains  to  select  good  men  to  attend 
to  the  several  parts.  But  he  does  not  spend  his 
time  interfering  with  their  management  of  details. 
If  he  did,  it  would  interfere  both  with  his  efficiency 
in  his  work  and  with  their  efficiency  in  theirs. 
What  is  true  of  the  individual  head  of  a  private 
business  is  even  more  true  of  the  directors  of  a 
well-managed  corporation.  They  determine  the 
policy,  and  choose  the  men  to  carry  it  out.  In 
order  to  have  time  and  strength  to  do  these  things 
wisely,  they  leave  the  details  of  engineering  and 
of  accounting  to  the  officials  whom  they  have 
selected  for  the  purpose. 

The  position  of  a  voter  in  a  democracy  is  essen- 
tially that  of  a  director  rather  than  that  of  an 
official.  It  is  his  function  to  place  the  right  men 
at  the  head  of  certain  departments  of  the  govern- 
ment and  prescribe  the  ends  which  they  should 
try  to  attain.  The  means  by  which  they  are  to 
reach  these  ends  should  generally  be  left  to  the 
judgment  of  the  officials  themselves.  But  this 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  175 

principle,  which  is  understood  in  every  well- 
conducted  private  business,  is  not  understood  in 
public  business.  We  lay  more  stress  on  the  need 
of  watching  our  officers  than  we  should,  and  less 
stress  on  the  need  of  choosing  them  carefully  and 
leaving  them  to  themselves.  Instead  of  rejoicing 
when  we  can  put  a  department  of  the  government 
in  the  hands  of  a  man  who  knows  more  than  we 
do  about  the  methods  of  conducting  it,  we  are 
jealous  of  superior  knowledge  and  watch  its 
manifestations  with  suspicion. 

There  are  certain  points  on  which  it  is  possible 
for  the  citizens  of  the  community  as  a  body  to 
form  an  intelligent  public  opinion.  There  are  cer- 
tain other  points  on  which  opinion  is  valueless 
without  technical  training  behind  it ;  and  the  deci- 
sion of  these  points  must  be  left  to  the  different 
groups  of  men  who  have  the  expert  knowledge 
which  is  necessary.  The  whole  town  can  decide 
where  a  bridge  ought  to  be  built  and  how  much 
should  be  spent  in  building  it.  It  requires  knowl- 
edge of  mathematics  to  know  how  to  design  the 
bridge,  and  knowledge  of  physics  and  chemistry 
to  know  what  sort  of  materials  to  use  in  its  con- 
struction. The  whole  community  can  know  whether 
it  wants  to  have  railroads  owned  by  the  govern- 
ment or  by  private  corporations.  It  requires 


176      UNDERCURRENTS  IN  POLITICS 

knowledge  of  engineering  to  know  how  to  locate 
such  railroads  properly,  and  knowledge  of  political 
economy  to  know  what  system  of  rates  can  be 
adopted.  Any  attempt  to  settle  scientific  matters 
by  public  opinion  means  rotten  bridges  and  bank- 
rupt railroads. 

The  American  people  has  made  some  progress 
toward  learning  this  lesson.  We  no  longer  entrust 
politicians  with  the  command  of  armies,  as  was  so 
frequently  done  in  Athens  or  Rome.  A  proposal 
to  take  the  conduct  of  the  army  in  the  field  out 
of  the  hands  of  army  officers  and  put  it  into  the 
hands  of  members  of  Congress,  which  was  seriously 
urged  in  1848,  would  seem  quite  laughable  today. 
But  we  need  to  carry  the  lesson  further  in  the 
next  century  than  we  have  in  the  last.  We  are 
in  more  immediate  competition  with  Europe  now 
than  we  were  fifty  years  ago.  To  keep  our  place 
in  this  competitive  struggle,  we  must  prove  that 
a  democracy  can  manage  business  as  well  as  a 
monarchy;  that  it  can  show  the  same  care  in  the 
selection  of  officials  and  the  same  self-restraint  in 
judging  of  their  work  before  it  is  done.  The  people 
as  a  whole  must  assume  the  double  duty  of  voting 
intelligently  on  matters  which  public  opinion  can 
decide  and  leaving  to  the  specialist  matters  which 
can  only  be  decided  by  the  specialist;  of  holding 


SEAT  OF  POWER  TODAY  177 

the  expert  responsible  for  results  and  promoting 
the  man  who  has  done  business  well  rather 
than  the  one  who  flatters  the  people  that  he  is 
going  to  do  business  in  a  way  they  will  like  and 
understand.  Thus,  and  thus  only,  can  we  com- 
bine two  things  which  are  equally  essential  to 
American  democracy  if  it  is  to  hold  its  place  among 
the  nations:  popular  sovereignty  and  efficient 
government. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Acts  of  Parliament,  141; 
contrasted  with  Acts  of 
Congress,  42 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  71 

Anti-Trust  Act  of  1890,  74, 
75,  87-89 

Arbitration  Acts,  78,  87 

Aristocracy,  in  American 
colonies,  3-11,  36;  perma- 
nence of,  in  South,  56,  57 

Aristotle,  on  democracy,  90, 
91,  97,  98;  ideal  of  repub- 
lic, 171 

Ashley,  W.  J.,  35 

Bagehot,  Walter,  162 
Banking  laws,  50,  51 
Bentham,  Jeremy,  43,  44 
Brokerage    in    politics,    100, 

101,  121 

Bryce,  James,  23 
Burr,  Aaron,  13,  110,  111 

Capital,    legal    position    of, 

27,  29;  scarcity  of,  49-51 
Caucus  system,  108,  109 
Charleston  Mercury,  155 
Charters,    as    contracts,    55; 

abuses      connected      with 

grant,  143 

Checks  and  balances,  98 
Chevalier,  Michel,  21 
Church    and    state    in    New 

England,  4,  5 


Civil  service,  federal,  116, 
117;  present  condition  of, 
91-93;  reform  of,  127, 
134-137 

Civil  War,  industrial  effects 
of,  56-59,  64,  65,  118-120 

Class  consciousness,  79 

Classified  civil  service,  137 

Clay,  Henry,  112 

Colonial  charters  and  state 
constitutions,  10,  11 

Colonies,  aristocracy  in,  3-11 

Commerce  and  Labor,  De- 
partment of,  86 

Company  stores,  29 

Competition  in  England  and 
in  the  United  States,  59- 
63 

Congress  and  nominating 
power,  108,  109 

Congressional  caucus,  108, 
109 

Constitution,  Federal,  and 
democracy,  11,  12;  condi- 
tions affecting  adoption 
of,  37-42;  permanence  of, 
102-104 

Constitutional  Convention  of 
1787,  38-40 

Constitutions  in  Western 
states,  143-145 

Contract,  obligation  of,  39, 
40 


182 


INDEX 


Convention,   nomination    by, 

109-111,     142,     143,     165- 

168 
Corporations,  growth  of,  51- 

53;  legal  position  of,  53- 

56 
Cost  of  living,  increase  of, 

81-83 
Courts,  authority  of,  42-47 

Dartmouth  College  case,  53- 

55 

De  Bow's  Review,  155 
Declaration     of     Independ- 
ence,   indirect    effects    of, 
15,  16 
Democracy       in       America, 

actual  beginnings  of,  20 
Democratic    party,    24,    27, 
108;   relation  to  Sherman 
Act,    88;    to   silver   inter- 
ests, 121 

Department  of  Labor,  77 
Direct  primary,  146-151 
Due  process  of  law,  40 

Educational  tendencies,   170 
Election   of   president,    105- 

107 
Employers '     liability,      28 ; 

federal  Act,  86 
England,     labor    legislation 
in,  28;  limits  to  competi- 
tion in,  59-63 
Equality,  sentiment  of,  16 
Experts,      position      of,      in 
America,  171-174 


Extra-constitutional  powers, 
104 

Factory  Acts,  28,  77 

Farrand,  Max,  14,  23,  41 

Federal  Constitution,  condi- 
tions affecting  adoption 
of,  37-42;  permanence  of, 
102-104 

Federal  offices  as  rewards 
of  party  service,  116,  117 

Federalist  party,  12,  108 

Feudal  and  industrial  ten- 
ures, 33-36 

Fink,  Albert,  71 

Ford,  H.  J.,  110 

Fourteenth  Amendment,  53- 
56 

Franchises,  grant  of,  118, 
143 

Freehold  ownership,  48 

Freehold  suffrage,  3 

George,  Henry,  79,  80 
Government,     functions     of, 

62,  63,  68 
Granger     movement,     65-70, 

124-126 

Hamilton,      Alexander,      13, 

49;  land  policy  of,  17-20 
Harper's  Weekly,  157 
Hildreth  on  colonial  history, 

8,  9 

Hobbes,  Thomas,  43,  44 
Hours    of   labor,    regulation 
of,  28,  86 


INDEX 


183 


Immigrants,  opportunities 
for,  48,  49;  change  in 
character  of,  77,  78 

Impatience,  newspaper  ap- 
peal to,  167 

Incorporation  Acts  of  colo- 
nies, 51 

Industrial  Workers  of  the 
World,  79 

Interlocking  directorates,  83, 
84 

Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, 89,  126 

Interstate  commerce  law,  71, 
72;  supplemented  by  ad- 
ditional Acts,  86 

Iowa,  referendum  in,  145 

Jackson,  Andrew,  20,  21, 
115,  116,  134,  135;  atti- 
tude toward  corporations, 
52,  53 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  12-14,  19 

Joint  stock  companies,  51- 
53 

Judges,  recall  of,  169 

Judson,  F.  N.,  88 

Knights  of  Labor,  78 

Labor,  Department  of,  77 

Lamar,  L.  Q.  C.,  107 

Land  laws,  16-20 

Legislation  by  representa- 
tive assembly,  137-144 

Limited  liability  in  the 
United  States,  51,  52 


Lincoln,    Abraham,    nomina- 
tion of,  166,  167 
Louisiana  purchase,  19 
Lowell,     A.     L.,     164;     on 
party  government,   99-101 

Macaulay,  T.  B.,  168 

McMaster,  J.  B.,  23 

Marshall,  John,  47 

Massachusetts,  early  social 
system,  4-6;  labor  legis- 
lation, 28 ;  corporation 
laws,  52;  railroad  regula- 
tion, 71,  72 

Middle  colonies,  social  sys- 
tem of,  7 

Military  tenures,  34-36 

Mississippi  valley,  develop- 
ment of,  19,  65-69 

Money  power,  jealousy  of, 
81,  83-85 

Monopoly,  59,  60;  legal  posi- 
tion of,  70;  extension  of, 
72-75 

Montesquieu,  98,  140 

Myers,  Gustavus,  110 

National    spirit,    beginnings 

of,  15 
New    England,    early   social 

system  of,  4-6 
New  York,  land  holding  in, 

7;  state  politics  in,  115 
New     York     Staats-Zeitung, 

157 

New  York  Times,  155-158 
New  York  Tribune,  154 


184 


INDEX 


Newspapers,     influence     on 

politics,  152-159 
Nomination,  by  conventions, 

165-168;      of      president, 

105,  106,  108-110 
Nullification,  45,  46 

Organized  emotion,  164 
Ostrogorski,  M.  L.,  23,  148 

Paper  money,  effects  of,  57, 

58 
Parliament,  authority  of,  42, 

43 ;  early  history  of,  138- 

140 
Party,    perversion    of,    99; 

two  meanings  of,  99-102 
Party  regularity,  128-131 
Passive  resistance,  45-46 
Patroon  system,  7 
Pennsylvania,    state   politics 

in,  115 

Plantation  system,   8 
Politicians,          professional, 

112-114,  122-124 
Popular  election  of  senators, 

132-134 

Predatory   wealth,    124-126 
Preemption  Acts,  18 
Presidential     election,     105- 

107 

Prices,  rise  of,  81-83 
Primary,  direct,  146-151 
Professional  politicians,  151- 

153 

Progress  and  Poverty,  79,  80 
Progressive  taxation,  28,  29 


Property  owner,  legal  posi- 
tion of,  27,  29,  32-42 

Property  qualifications  of 
office  holders,  11 

Protection,  58,  59 

Public  land,  16-20 

Public  opinion,  agencies  for 
forming,  141 ;  unorgan- 
ized, 149;  sphere  of,  175 

Public  utilities,  72-74 

Publicity  of  railroad  ac- 
counts, 71 

Pulitzer,  Joseph,  158-160 

Eailroad  regulation,  30,  65- 
72;  in  England,  60 

Railroads,  present  economic 
condition  of,  89 

Recall,  147,  148;  theory  of, 
169 

Referendum,  145,  146 

Regularity,    party,    128-131 

Representative  government, 
theory  of,  106-108,  137- 
139 

Republican  form  of  govern- 
ment, interpretation  of, 
12 

Republican  party,  attitude 
on  tariff,  120,  121;  on 
civil  service  reform,  135, 
136 

Restraint  of  trade,  74 

Roman  parallels  to  New 
England  history,  5,  6 

Root,  Elihu,  149,  150;  on 
party  government,  99-101 


INDEX 


185 


Saint  Paul  Pioneer  Press, 
154 

Salaries  of  American  offi- 
cials, 173 

Senators,  popular  election 
of,  132-134 

Separation  of  national  and 
local  issues,  127,  128,  132- 
134 

Seward,  W.  H.,  166 

Sherman  Act,  74,  75,  87-89 

Silver  coinage,  58,  121 

Slavery,  political  effect  of, 
8,  24;  extension  of,  26; 
influence  on  political 
methods,  154,  155 

Social  contract,  43,  44 

Socialistic  movements  in 
America,  30,  31,  76-79 

South  Carolina,  property 
qualifications  in,  11 

South  Dakota,  referendum 
in,  145 

Southern  colonies,  social  sys- 
tem of,  7-10 

Sovereignty,  doctrine  of,  43- 
46 

Spoils  system,  134,  135 

Springfield   Republican,   154 

State  constitutions,  and  colo- 
nial charters,  10,  11; 
modern  form  of,  143-145 

State  socialism,  recent  move- 
ments toward,  76-79 

Subsidies,  53,  65,  66,  118 


Suffrage,  colonial  restric- 
tions on,  3 ;  universal,  21 

Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  46,  47 

Switzerland,  referendum  in, 
145 

Tammany  Hall,  13,  110-114, 

158 
Tariff  legislation,  115,  118- 

121 
Taxation,     progressive,     28, 

29 
Tocqueville,    Alexis    de,    21- 

23 
Tweed  King,  129,  130,  155- 

158 

Unconstitutionality,  42-47 
Unearned   increment,   80 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  111-113 
Virginia,    colonial    organiza- 
tion in,  8-10 

Wages      in      England     and 

America,  61,  62 
War  of  1812,  effects  of,  16 
Webster,  Daniel,  54,  165 
West,  settlement  of,  16-20; 

social  system  of,  25,  26; 

financial     legislation      in, 

50 

Weyl,  W.  E.,  33 
Whig  party,  24,  27 
Wortman,  Teunis,  111 


Date  Due 


JAN  2  6  1965 


Library  Bureau  Cat.  No.   1137 


A     001  012  811     4 


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